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ABSTRACT
This paper examines Cold War influences on early post-World War II 
presidential elections, Barry M. Goldwater's rise to Republican presidential 
nominee, and the contribution of foreign policy issues to the Arizonan's defeat 
in the 1964 presidential election. World War II and the Cold War increased the 
importance of foreign policy considerations in presidential elections, and from 
1948 through 1964, every major party nominee advocated the militant 
containment of communism. Goldwater was an ardent Cold Warrior, who had 
developed staunch convictions on domestic and foreign matters. As a senator, 
his unwavering conservatism cast him as a "maverick" among other 
Republicans; however, in 1964 the GOP right wing dominated state and local 
party machinery and the increasingly popular Arizonan captured the 
presidential nomination. The margin of Goldwater's overwhelming election 
defeat was due largely to the public's perception of him as an impulsive radical 
who would senselessly risk nuclear confrontation in the Cold War. This grossly 
unfavorable perception was propagated by the senator's numerous Republican 
and Democratic critics, although Goldwater, himself, bore significant 
responsibility for the image.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. iü
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... v
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2 THE COLD WAR CONTEXT...................................................... 7
CHAPTER 3 FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS . . 28
CHAPTER 4 THE RISE OF A M AVERICK...................................................... 56
CHAPTER 5 BAPTISM BY FIRE.......................................................................  86
CHAPTER 6 BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE......................................................  116
EPILOGUE .....................................................................................................  157
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................  164
IV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This paper could not have been completed without the participation and 
support of others. I want to express my appreciation to Ms. Evelyn Cooper and 
her staff for assisting me with the Goldwater Collection at the Arizona 
Historical Foundation. Professors Eugene Moehring, Thomas Wright and Robert 
Bigler, all provided insightful critiques of my thesis. Special thanks go to 
Professor W illard Rollings who provided much needed counsel and 
encouragement. My mentor. Professor Andy Fry, has devoted invaluable 
amounts of time and energy to my studies for which I w ill never be able to 
adequately repay. Finally, I would like to thank my family and cadre of friends, 
especially my best friend Renee, for patiently listening to me ramble for years 
about Senator Barry Goldwater and my love of American history.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s the United States was approaching its zenith as the 
dominant world power. The nation's post-World War II economic boom 
provided Americans with unparalleled prosperity and enabled its government 
to operate a global military defense network. The economy of Western Europe 
had recovered rapidly from its wartime destruction with substantial U.S. aid, 
and the region's governing democratic principles had remained generally intact. 
Correspondingly, America's new rival power, the communist governed Soviet 
Union, lagged behind the West's sweeping economic modernization. By 1963 
Russia had achieved remarkable military advancements, including a rapidly 
expanding atomic arsenal, but Moscow suffered from a major defeat in the 
"Cold War" against the West when it was forced to withdraw nuclear missiles 
from the Caribbean island of Cuba. Despite occasions of detente, such as the 
limited nuclear test ban accord, the two superpowers engaged in inflammatory 
geopolitics and an ominous weapons race.
Momentous world events, such as the Soviet Union's domination over 
Eastern Europe (1944-48), the rise of China's communist government (1949),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2communist North Korea's invasion of South Korea (1950), Moscow's forceful 
suppression of Eastern European revolutionaries (1956), the Soviet Union's 
Sputnik satellite launch (1957), and Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union 
(1961), caused the leaders of United States and Western Europe to fear the 
encroachment of communism. Consequently, perfervid anti-communist 
philosophy and policy came to govern American society and led to a "Red 
Scare" in the 1940s and 1950s. And, despite the passing of McCarthyism and 
even the death of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in 1957, a generally bipartisan, 
militant anti-communist foreign policy continued to dominate Washington.
Influential leaders in the United States equated Joseph Stalin's postwar 
totalitarianism with the evils of Adolph Hitler's imperialism and consequently, 
there was minimal domestic opposition to emerging foreign policies designed 
to "contain" the spread of international communism. Containment policy was 
manifested in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine pledge that "It must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures."’ The United States 
assured Western Europe's security with the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while other non-communist 
nations such as Greece, Turkey, Israel, South Korea and Vietnam benefitted 
from foreign aid programs and regional collective security agreements.
’John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Securitv Policv (New York, 1982), 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3America's preoccupation with fighting the spread of communism 
significantly influenced domestic politics. Only once did a well known 
presidential candidate, Henry Wallace, openly advocate cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, and he failed to win a single electoral vote in the 1948 election. 
Other presidential candidates, including Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, all 
subscribed to historical lessons derived from the 1930s including the 
importance of military preparedness and the avoidance of diplomatic 
appeasement. Most leaders, from what historian Thomas G. Paterson has called 
the "cold war generation," believed that the massive troop demobilization, 
weapons disarmament, and political isolationism of the industrialized nations 
after World War I directly encouraged German and Japanese aggression. 
Further, Nazi belligerence in the thirties exposed the pitfalls of "soft" 
diplomacy: that "aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and 
unchallenged, ultimately leads to war."^
After 1948 every major party U.S. presidential nominee systematically 
sought to emphasize his Cold War credentials and promised to execute a 
"more effective" anti-communist foreign policy. For eight years in the 1950s, 
Americans intrusted their foreign relations to a career military officer. General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower. The extremely close presidential election of 1960, 
between Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy, demonstrated the "ingrained
^Thomas G. Paterson, "Bearing the Burden: A Critical Look At JFK's Foreign Policy," The Virginia 
Quarterlv Review. 54 (Spring 1978): 199.
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4nature" of Cold War history as the candidates shared similar views on foreign 
affairs with both calling for "victory" over international communism/ But just 
four years later, the Democratic Party's overwhelming presidential triumph gave 
the appearance of national consensus on domestic and international platforms 
of a single candidate. Although the incumbent President, Lyndon Johnson, was 
likely to defeat any opponent in 1964, his landslide margin of victory, which 
resulted largely from his posturing on defense and foreign policy, was neither 
predictable nor inevitable. Still distraught by the November 1963 Kennedy 
assassination, the American people were unlikely to condone the election of a 
third different president w ithin a mere twelve month period. However, the 
1964 campaign possessed the potential for a meaningful debate of issues and 
ideology that had been noticeably absent in the Kennedy-Nixon contest. At the 
core of the candidates' differences were widely varying interpretations over the 
role of the federal government. Their positions on civil rights, fiscal policy, and 
federal spending programs, all posed legitimate differences from which voters 
could choose. The Republican challenger, Barry Goldwater, promised "A 
Choice Not An Echo." Ironically however, it was the candidates' perceived 
differences in foreign affairs - - an area in which the two candidates probably 
shared the most basic if unspoken commonality - - that ended up being one of 
the most decisive campaign issues.
Lyndon Johnson's crushing victory resulted from the public's negative
^Paterson, "Bearing the Burden," 199.
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5perception of his opponent: an alleged reactionary, who opposed popular 
federal spending programs; a reputed racist, who opposed civil rights; and an 
ostensible foreign policy militant, who advocated nuclear wars. Goldwater, 
himself, bore significant responsibility for this irreparable image. His adherence 
to and outspoken support of conservative political ideology, his fervent anti­
communism, his advocacy of limited wars and nuclear testing, and his 
impetuous and sometimes careless speaking manner, all contributed to this 
unfavorable portrait. But both the Democratic Party and Goldwater's 
Republican critics vehemently promoted this negative characterization by 
capitalizing on his verbal blunders and distorting and exaggerating his positions 
on numerous domestic and international issues.
O f the many factors that contributed to the "Goldwater image," the 
lingering impression of a foreign policy extremist proved the most damaging to 
his campaign. The country's escalating commitment to Southeast Asia, capped 
by Johnson's August 1964 retaliatory bombing of North Vietnam, served to 
heighten the importance of foreign affairs leadership during the election. 
Goldwater's bellicose Cold War rhetoric amplified voter apprehension 
regarding U.S. involvement in either limited or unrestricted warfare. Although 
continuing involvement in Southeast Asia allowed Goldwater to criticize 
Kennedy-Johnson policies, the Vietnam issue also enabled Johnson and others 
to perpetuate the expanding representation of Goldwater as a presidential 
candidate who would risk nuclear war to halt the spread of communism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6Analysis of 1964 presidential campaign could easily be reduced to a study 
of contrasts. Nowhere were the stark contrasts of the 1964 campaign more 
evident than in the comparison of the nominees themselves. Barry Goldwater 
was a popular conservative idealist with relatively limited political expertise, 
whereas Lyndon Johnson was a pragmatic and masterful career politician. In 
retrospect, it is clear that the Arizonan wanted to debate ideological principles 
and the Texan wanted to become president. Significant leads in early public 
opinion polls and general Democratic Party unity enabled Johnson to 
concentrate on presidential duties early in the year and run a low key 
incumbent campaign. His challenger, who planned an exhaustive assault style 
strategy, quickly found himself on the defensive in the Republican primaries, 
fending off attacks from GOP moderates and liberals. The serious wounds 
suffered by Goldwater during the first half of the year were never allowed to 
heal. The Democrats capitalized on the Republicans' bruising treatment of their 
own nominee and embarked upon a relentless attack on Goldwater. Unlike the 
presidential election of 1952, the last time the GOP faced an incumbent 
Democratic Party, Goldwater was never able to mount a decisive offensive 
against Lyndon Johnson. This paper seeks to review how the Cold War 
influenced early post-World War II presidential elections, Barry Goldwater's 
rise to Republican presidential nominee, and the contribution of foreign policy 
issues to the Arizonan's landslide defeat in the 1964 presidential election.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE COLD WAR CONTEXT, 1945-1963
By the early 1960s the United States's tenure as a world power 
approached what historian Thomas J. McCormick characterized as "Hegemony 
at High Tide."'* With more than one million service personnel stationed 
abroad, the United States operated a vast network of military installations from 
Manila to Berlin. Although concerns had been raised over the margin of 
America's nuclear missile superiority, the country's military capabilities still 
greatly exceeded all other nations including the Soviet Union. Equally 
impressive was America's unparalleled economic growth. In the two decades 
that followed World War II, economic production exceeded the nation's 
aggregate output during its first 170 years of existence. From 1945 to 1963 
annual domestic gross national product nearly tripled from $211.9 to $590.5 
billion and the number of employed workers increased by 20 million. During 
this era of unprecedented military and economic power, the objective of U.S. 
foreign policy was to maintain America's prosperity and contain the influence 
of the Soviet Union.
'’Thomas j. McCormick, America's Half-Centurv: United States Foreign Policv In The Cold War 
(Baltimore, 1989), 125.
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8Remarkably, In 1946 America produced 50 percent of the world's goods 
and services, possessed a nuclear monopoly, and maintained a 100,000-plane 
air force and a 70,000-ship navy. But the instability of the postwar world 
joined by fears of another Great Depression pressured the U.S. government to 
construct a new international system that encompassed vibrant and stable 
markets. American efforts to remake the world based upon liberal national 
principles of multilateral trade and democracy resulting in a de facto war 
against international communism, a war that permeated the fabric of American 
society.
The "Cold War" originated from the many complex events of World War 
II, which had, according to historian Thomas G. Paterson, "unhinged the world 
of stable politics, inherited wisdom traditions, institutions, alliances, loyalties, 
commerce, and classes."^ America's prewar inclination toward political 
isolationism had diminished significantly after japan's successful attack upon 
Pearl Harbor and with the maturation of the nuclear, air and communication 
ages. With its industrial and agricultural capacity unscathed, the United States 
emerged as the world's only economic and military superpower, as the once 
powerful nations of Europe and Asia had fallen victim to the ravages of war. 
Although the Soviet Union survived the ordeal with a relatively powerful 
conventional army, even its power allowed only for regional hegemony.
^Thomas G. Paterson, On Everv Front: The Making And Unmaking Of The Cold War (New York, 
1992), 15.
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9thereby leaving the U.S. the predominant architect of the postwar world.
America's future prosperity and security required the cooperation of other 
industrialized nations, and given its historic economic, cultural, and political 
ties to its major wartime allies, Europe's postwar recovery became a priority 
objective for policymakers. The combination of widespread human suffering 
and massive commercial and residential property damage in Europe resulted in 
political turmoil and spawned socialist and communist movements, particularly 
in France, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands. By war's end, the 
Russian Army had already occupied the entire eastern half of the continent and 
Americans feared further western encroachment in addition to the possibility of 
indigenous communist victories.
After the war, an uneven and increasingly hostile bipolar world had 
begun to replace the prewar multipolar configuration of the 1930s. The United 
States and the Soviet Union, Paterson observed, "became ensnared in the 
instability of the new international system and increasingly clashed...[as] they 
built competing spheres of influence." Threatened by America's economic and 
military power and suspicious of a U.S. dominated Europe, Russia quickly 
severed its wartime alliances and began to independently enhance it own 
national security, including increased military and political control over Eastern 
European nations. American leaders concluded that Russia had "gone 
imperialistic." Their exaggerated anti-Russian rhetoric that stressed the dangers 
of "creeping communism" and gave rise to an anti-communist atmosphere
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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engulfed America for decades. President Harry S. Truman distinguished 
differences between "open" and "exclusive" spheres of influence and justified 
increased U.S. militancy: "Though the United States wants no territory or profit 
or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases 
necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace."® 
Soviet leaders had reached similar imperialistic conclusions about American 
postwar militancy and expansion into Western Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East.
Truman's immediate postwar foreign aid programs dovetailed with the 
evolution of America's formal anti-communist foreign policy. In February 1946, 
U.S. Foreign Service officer, George F. Kennan sent Washington an 8,000 word 
cable from Moscow, interpreting Russia's postwar anti-Western behavior. He 
wrote "we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that 
with [the] US there can be no permanent modus vivendi."'' Kennan's "long 
telegram," noted historian john Lewis Gaddis, possessed "ideas of such force 
and persuasion" as to inspire an immediate change in American foreign 
policy.® The resulting policy of "patience and firmness" evolved into a policy 
of "containment," which sought to prevent any Soviet influence in the
®Paterson, On Everv Front. 43, 56, 58, 79.
^Thomas G. Paterson, j. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth j. Hagan, American Foreign Policv: A 
Historv / since 1900 (Lexington. Massachusetts, 1983), 444.
®john Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Securitv Policv (New York, 1982), 19.
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reshaping of the postwar world. George Kennan's July 1947 Foreign Affairs 
article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," outlined containment as a defense 
strategy designed to "confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at 
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a 
peaceful and stable world."® Containing the Soviet Union became "the central 
preoccupation of postwar national security policy."’®
America's preoccupation with the communist threat resulted in activist 
policies reliant upon a conventional and nuclear arms build-up and massive 
economic and military foreign aid programs. From 1945 to 1947 the United 
States provided $9 billion in foreign aid utilizing various indirect conduits such 
as the Export-!mport Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United 
Nations. Much of this aid went to less-developed countries. World War II had 
accelerated nationalist movements in Asia, Africa and the Middle East which 
resulted in political instability. As the old European empires began to 
disintegrate in places like Indonesia and Vietnam, the United States attempted 
to keep the emerging governments w ithin the West's realm of influence. 
America's foreign aid policy toward two eastern Mediterranean nations created 
lasting and influential precedents.
Bankrupt by five years of war. Great Britain announced its inability to 
maintain support of the pro-Western governments of Greece and Turkey.
®Paterson, On Everv Front. 72.
'°Gaddis, Strategies Of Containment, viii.
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Greece had become embroiled in a fierce struggle against communist 
insurgents, and Turkey, which possessed a key geographic position between 
Russia and the Mediterranean, appeared in comparable jeopardy. Secretary of 
State Dean G. Acheson predicted that the "loss" of Turkey and Greece to 
communism would open the door for Soviet influence on three continents. In 
March 1947 President Truman appealed to the U.S. Congress to "support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressures."”  Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan 
summarized the Truman-Acheson thesis: "the fall of Greece, followed by the 
fall of Turkey, would establish a chain reaction around the world which could 
very easily leave us isolated in a Communist-dominated e a r t h . T h e  
Congress concurred and approved a $400 million aid package for the two 
countries. The Truman Doctrine, described as "the commanding guide to 
American foreign policy in the Cold War," had been officially established.”  
Later the same year, the Truman administration received bipartisan 
support for the European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, 
which provided the nations of Europe more than $13 billion in aid from 1948 
through 1951. U.S. leaders hoped that the West's economic recovery and 
ensuing prosperity would ultimately prompt Eastern European nations to reject
’ ’David McCullough, Truman. (New York, 1992), 548.
’^Robert A. Divine, Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacv in Recent American Historv (New York, 
1979), 13.
’^Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policv. 449.
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communism. However, the Marshall Plan, like many other postwar American 
foreign policy initiatives, heightened the Soviet Union's security anxieties and 
resulted in a hardening "iron curtain."
American efforts to consolidate the Western controlled zones of Germany 
and to eventually reunify the war torn country "starkly exposed the great 
postwar schism" that had developed between the two major powers.”  In june
1948 the Soviets erected a blockade around West Berlin in its own attempt to 
integrate the Western-controlled portions of the city with communist dominated 
East Germany. President Truman intimated that he would risk nuclear war over 
the Berlin crisis, but during the following year, as the West airlifted food and 
supplies into the city, direct military confrontation was averted. With no 
alternatives short of war, the Soviets ended the blockade in May 1949.
The Berlin crisis reenforced fears of communist aggression, and in july
1949 the U.S. Senate overwhelming ratified the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), a comprehensive security pact with Canada and nine 
European nations designed to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. 
Retired General Dwight D. Eisenhower was recalled to active duty to become 
the first Supreme NATO Commander. This military companion to the Marshall 
Plan further raised tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Moscow eventually countered NATO with a military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, 
comprised of Eastern European nations. The militancy of America's anti-
uPaterson, One Everv Front. 84.
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communist foreign policy became institutionalized in 1950 with Truman's 
acceptance of NSC-68. The National Security Council document concluded that 
the Soviet Union was bent on world domination and that the spread of 
communist influence must be checked by "a much-expanded American defense 
establishment."”
Already dismayed by the explosion of Russia's first nuclear bomb in 1949, 
America had to cope the same year with the military victory of Mao Tse-tung 
and the Chinese Communist Party over the Nationalist government. The United 
States had sent $3 billion to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists during the 
bloody civil war in an attempt to keep China, with its vast resources and 
potential markets, w ithin the American sphere of influence. Applying a zero- 
sum game mentality to the Cold War, many Americans equated Truman's 
"loss" of China as a monumental victory for Moscow. America's prevailing 
belief in monolithic communism prevented any formal relationship between 
the United States and communist China, and Washington withheld diplomatic 
recognition and blocked its entrance into the United Nations.
United States Asian policy enjoyed better success in the industrial and 
political reconstruction of japan, which had remained firm ly under American 
control since the end of the war. Under the direction of General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Truman administration sought to "rebuild japan as an anti-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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communist bulwark in Asia."”  The small countries of Southeast Asia with 
their plentiful resources and strategic locales were deemed vital to Japan's 
sustained recovery, and, therefore, were incorporated w ithin the security 
interest of the United States. After the communist Chinese victory, U.S. leaders 
vigilantly fended off any further communist encroachments into the region. In 
1950 the Truman administration formally recognized France's puppet 
government in Vietnam, which received substantial U.S. military aid to help 
defeat a communist led insurrection.
In June 1950 communist soldiers from North Korea invaded South Korea. 
Recounting the failure of the West's appeasement policy at the 1938 Munich 
conference and the successes of postwar confrontations in Greece, Turkey and 
Berlin, Truman ordered American combat troops to Korea to challenge the 
aggressors: "This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now 
there won't be any next step."”  An overwhelmed South Korea had suffered 
heavy casualties and was in danger of losing the war until General MacArthur 
commanded a daring amphibious landing on Inchon which began to reverse 
North Korean gains.
With this new-found momentum Truman abandoned the policy of 
containment and attempted to "roll-back" communism. MacArthur proceeded 
to push the enemy northward to the North Korean and Chinese border.
'®lbid., 92.
” Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policv. 473.
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Threatened by the rapid advancement of U.S. and U.N. forces, communist 
China launched a massive ground assault against the multinational troops in 
North Korea. MacArthur, who was later relieved of command by Truman for 
insubordination and for wanting to expand the war to China, was forced to 
retreat to back into South Korea. As the conflict bogged down the American 
people became increasingly disenchanted with the land war in Asia. By war's 
end, the original policy objective of containment had been achieved in Korea, 
but the intrusion of communist Chinese forces had obliterated the new strategy 
of roll-back. More importantly. North Korean aggression validated many 
conclusions reached in the U.S. defense document NSC-68 regarding 
communist aggression and helped to rally domestic support for its call for 
increased militarization. From 1950 to 1953 annual U.S. defense expenditures 
increased from $13.1 billion to $50.4 billion.
Truman's unpopular firing of MacArthur, the Korean War stalemate, the 
"loss" of China, and the end of America's nuclear monopoly, all contributed to 
a second "Red Scare" in the United States that weakened the Democratic 
Party's dominant position in American politics. Conservative Republicans, 
including Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, capitalized upon the 
circumstances. They attacked the Truman administration for being "soft" on 
communism and engaged in red-baiting and witch-hunts searching for 
communist subversives. McCarthy's outlandish charges of an organized 
communist infiltration of the U.S. government gained widespread acceptance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Still, the domestic hysteria had bipartisan roots. The House Un-American 
Activities Committee had contributed to the pandemonium, and Truman 
himself helped to institutionalize the fear by implementing a Loyalty Program 
in 1947, whereby federal job applicants and employees were investigated for 
links to communism. Even after McCarthy's censure by the Senate in 1954 and 
his death in 1957, the nation's fear of communism continued and its 
commitment to win the Cold War remained resolute.
Against the backdrop of events in China, Korea and the McCarthy 
rampage. Republican presidential nominee General Dwight D. Eisenhower was 
elected in 1952. Despite periodic superpower overtures for peaceful 
coexistence during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration, intense 
Cold War battles continued. Notwithstanding strident campaign rhetoric to the 
contrary, the new President accepted the basic tenets of Truman's containment 
policy. Eisenhower also feared "creeping communism," but with a penchant for 
a balanced budget he applied a "New Look" approach that favored foreign aid, 
covert operations and atomic diplomacy over the more costly reliance upon 
large ground forces, conventional weapons and limited wars like Korea.’®
On several occasions Eisenhower applied brinkmanship, a strategy 
whereby the threat of nuclear retaliation was employed to achieve policy 
objectives. Ike benefitted from a significant degree of bipartisan support
'®Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. 127.
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regarding foreign affairs, and in 1955, Congress authorized the Formosa 
Resolution, which allowed the President to use all necessary force in defense of 
the Nationalist Chinese island refuge, Formosa. In two separate instances 
Eisenhower threatened communist China over Formosa and the two small 
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Historians have debated the practicality 
of Eisenhower's dangerous policy, but the President successfully avoided any 
protracted military engagements involving large numbers of U.S. troops.
Faced with a rapidly changing Third World, Eisenhower approved a range 
of covert operations and foreign aid programs to counter instability attributed to 
leftist insurrectionists. The Central Intelligence Agency participated in the 
overthrow of several foreign governments, including those in Iran and 
Guatemala, and planned the ouster of Fidel Castro in Cuba. To augment the 
NATO alliance. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arranged a series a 
regional defense accords with anti-communist nations in Asia and the Middle 
East. In Southeast Asia Eisenhower increased already substantial military and 
economic aid to French forces in Vietnam. After Vietnam's communist led 
victory over France in 1954, the President designated U.S. obligations under 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the rationale for supporting South 
Vietnam against communism. In defense of his Vietnam policy Eisenhower 
subscribed to the domino theory, a familiar hypothesis whereby the loss of one 
government to communism would lead to the successive fall of neighboring 
governments. This grossly flawed supposition was also applied to the unrelated
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and independent activity of nationalist groups in the Middle East.
In defiance of the United States and other western nations, Egypt, lead by 
Gamal Abdel Nassar, seized the Suez Canal in July 1956 to help pay for 
construction of the Aswan Dam. The United States had recently withdrawn its 
offer to help build the dam when Egypt formally recognized communist China 
and negotiated an arms purchase with communist Czechoslovakia. W ithout 
informing the U.S., the trio of Great Britain, France, and Israel coordinated a 
counterattack on Egypt in late October. Eisenhower was furious with the action 
of the allies and feared Soviet intervention. The President soberly concluded 
that if the Soviets attacked British or French forces "we would be in war" and 
that "we may have to hit them with everything in the bucket."’® Eisenhower 
moved quickly to defuse the situation and ultimately arranged a peaceful 
settlement through the United Nations. Egypt's Aswan Dam was later 
constructed with the support of the Soviet Union.
Not only did the Suez crisis bring the world to the brink of nuclear war, 
but it also overshadowed the Soviet Union's concurrent violent repression of 
democratic movements in Eastern Europe. According to Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, it was "nothing less than tragic that at this very time, when we 
are on the point of winning an immense and long-hoped-for victory over Soviet 
colonialism in Eastern Europe, Western colonialism in Egypt was the center of
19,Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York, 1990), 431.
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the world's attention. It was maddening..."^® In the midst of these foreign 
crises, Eisenhower was overwhelmingly elected to a second term as president.
The last years of the Eisenhower administration contained events of both 
hope and despair in the Cold War. The successful launch of the Soviet space 
satellite Sputnik in 1957 generated fears that the communists had eclipsed U.S. 
military technology and were capable of hurling intercontinental nuclear 
missiles towards the North American continent. Eisenhower's repeated 
assurances that the United States still possessed vastly superior technology and 
military capabilities were not entirely persuasive. The administration's political 
opponents, not privy to convincing secret intelligence data, made 
unsubstantiated charges of "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps." America's 
exaggerated reaction to the "Sputnik Challenge" resulted in the increased 
militarization of the Cold War.^’
For Eisenhower, a more bona fide crisis arose in 1958, again in the 
Middle East. The administration had recently received congressional authority 
via the Eisenhower Doctrine to resist communist influence in the region. Barely 
two years after the Suez affair, the Iraqi government fell to a group of pro- 
Nassar military officers and U.S. officials feared neighboring Lebanon would 
follow. W hile the President never officially invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
he hurriedly deployed thousands of troops to Lebanon to prevent a pro-Nassar
^°lbid., 428.
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coup. The action demonstrated Eisenhower's willingness to risk American 
troops in a proxy battle against alleged Soviet influence. Equally important, 
Eisenhower's policy toward Lebanon, like Guatemala, Iran and Vietnam 
previously, demonstrated America's inability to distinguish nationalism from 
Soviet-directed communist subversion.
Despite the continued militarization of the Cold War, Soviet Premier 
Nikita S. Khrushchev undertook a goodwill tour of America in the autumn of 
1959. He downplayed political differences between the superpowers and 
stated, "We w ill not bury you, nor w ill you bury us."^^ Plans were arranged 
for a formal peace summit in Paris for the following year and Eisenhower 
hoped to end his presidency in an aura of cooperation. The May 1960 
downing of an American high altitude spy plane over the Soviet Union 
doomed all thoughts of a successful conference with the Soviets. Eisenhower 
eventually assumed public responsibility for the military blunder but refused to 
offer an apology. The Soviets in turn denounced the United States and aborted 
the summit meeting. The Cold War raged on.
Eisenhower's management of Cold War policy had been generally 
compatible with that of the Truman administration. U.S. policymakers, 
frequently aided by bipartisan congressional support, were still unable or 
unwilling to distinguish between nationalism, neutralism and communism, and 
there were no differing assessments of U.S. security interests. Although
Paterson, et al., American Foreign Policy. 498.
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Eisenhower held defense expenditures below Korean War levels, he helped 
expand the arms race to include space and missile technology. And while 
Eisenhower's successor pledged to be "more effective" and "more active" in the 
battle against international communism, the new administration's basic policies 
were firm ly rooted in the Cold War legacies of Truman and Eisenhower." An 
ardent anti-communist. President John F. Kennedy believed that the Cold War 
was best "waged against communism abroad, not argued at hom e.""
Kennedy's first major foreign policy challenge came in April 1961 with a 
CIA sponsored invasion of Cuba that had been organized by the Eisenhower 
administration. A staunch anti-communist, Kennedy supported the overthrow of 
Castro. Since he had chastised Eisenhower during the campaign for allowing 
the establishment of a communist satellite just off the Florida coast, the young 
President felt even more compelled to follow through w ith the invasion.
Despite months of planning, Castro's heavily armed m ilitia easily routed the 
amphibious assault. Unlike Eisenhower's previous successes in Iran and 
Guatemala, the Cuban expedition failed miserably. Kennedy, who had denied 
CIA requests for U.S. air cover, blamed the disaster on "faulty intelligence and 
sloppy execution."" The Bay of Pigs fiasco did not weaken Kennedy's resolve
"Thom as G. Paterson, "Bearing The Burden: A Critical Look A t JFK's Foreign Policy," The 
V irginia Quarterly Review 54 (Spring 1978): 200.
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to oust Castro or w in the Cold War, rather, according to historian Robert A. 
Divine, the lesson learned from Cuba was that "harder work, greater sacrifice, 
and even more reliance on military force were needed to win."^®
Kennedy replaced Ike's New Look approach to containment with 
"Flexible Response," which in theory allowed the U.S. to respond more 
effectively to a wider variety of communist threats. The administration 
embarked on a broader military build-up to win the Cold War with new 
initiatives such as, paramilitary training, the Peace Corps, and the Alliance For 
Progress. From 1960 to 1963 Kennedy augmented military spending, including 
both conventional and nuclear weapons, from $45.9 to $53.2 billion, and with 
an expanded draft he greatly increased the number of people in military 
service. In response to Khrushchev's January 1960 pledge to support "wars of 
national liberation," Kennedy took personal interest in developing 
counterinsurgency forces needed to repel communist guerrillas.^’' The 
increasing political instability in Third World provided Kennedy the opportunity 
to apply these new paramilitary techniques against communist insurgents.
Kennedy's aggressive policy toward South Vietnam demonstrated the 
continuity of American postwar foreign policy and the new administration's 
intense desire to achieve a Cold War victory. Truman and Eisenhower had 
supported massive military aid to France and its South Vietnamese successor
"D iv in e , Since 1945. 113. 
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government, but both had resisted temptations to involve large numbers of 
American troops. JFK, who as a young senator had criticized Truman for losing 
China to communism, tripled military aid to Vietnam and increased U.S. troop 
presence from 3,205 in 1961 to 16,700 in 1963. Despite these efforts, 
conditions in South Vietnam deteriorated and during Kennedy's three years in 
office more than 600 American soldiers were killed.
America's confrontations with communism under Kennedy's tutelage were 
not limited to proxy wars in the less-developed world. Russian demands for the 
removal of allied troops from West Berlin had sparked several international 
crises since World War II and Khrushchev, wanting to test the new American 
president, repeated the summons to Kennedy. The young President held "cold 
and firm" and refused to negotiate Berlin's future; this led Khrushchev to order 
the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961." Kennedy accepted the 
permanent division of the city leading historian Stephen Ambrose to conclude, 
"The great powers had decided that Berlin, and beyond it Germany, were not 
worth a nuclear exchange...nothing vital had been sacrificed."" Three weeks 
later in response to Kennedy's continued military build-up, the Soviets ended a 
joint three year moratorium on nuclear testing and began a series of tests that 
culminated in the largest atomic explosion in history.
More aggressive maneuvering the following year that brought the two
"Stephen E. Ambrose. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 (Baltimore. 1971), 
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powers to the edge of war. The dangerous brinkmanship of the Eisenhower 
years paled in comparison to that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In mid- 
October an American U-2 spy plane photographed the construction of Soviet 
ground missile sites in Cuba. Twenty-two nuclear warheads had already been 
delivered. In a nationally televised address on October 22, Kennedy announced 
a U.S. military blockade of the small island. The President asserted that a 
missile launch from Cuba would be interpreted as "an attack by the Soviet 
Union on the United States, requiring full retaliatory response upon the Soviet 
U n ion ."" Within two days the Air Force had 550 aircraft, some carrying 
atomic weaponry, in constant flight. Tensions peaked on October 27, when the 
Soviets shot down a U-2 plane flying over Cuba. Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara later observed that one bomb "directed at Miami or New York or 
even Washington might have killed a million or 2 million people."®’ A 
peaceful solution ensued when Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles in 
return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. But a subsequent demand, the 
removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey, arrived from Moscow shortly thereafter. 
Kennedy publicly pledged not to invade Cuba and privately agreed to remove 
the Turkey missiles. Kennedy biographer James N. Giglio characterized the 
Cuban missile crisis as JFK's most significant Cold War victory.®®
®°James N. G iglio, The Presidency o f lohn F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 240. 
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After the Soviets withdrew their missiles from Cuba, relations between the 
Cold War antagonists showed signs of improvement as both agreed to a 
Washington-Moscow "hot-line," a ban against atomic weapons in space, a 65 
million bushel wheat sale to Russia, and a limited nuclear test treaty that 
banned nuclear testing under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space. 
However, the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis and the subsequent aura 
of detente did not completely thaw Cold War tensions. Soviet hardliners 
escalated their weapons build-up to overcome their nuclear inferiority. In 
Washington, the Cuban crisis had served to validate an already "arrogant belief 
in the efficacy of American answers to world problems through the exercise of 
United States power."®®
By 1963 the United States operated 275 military bases in 31 countries. 
The number of military and other government personnel totalled more than 
1.25 million. In a three year period the number of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) had increased by more than 600 percent from 61 to 424, the 
defense budget had grown by more than $7.0 billion; and the government had 
implemented a $207 million civilian nuclear fallout shelter-program. According 
to historian Walter LeFeber, "confidence in U.S. power and in a glamorous, 
active presidency had never been higher. That confidence resembled a star that 
beamed brightest just as it began to burn out."®" President Kennedy's
®®Paterson et al., American Foreign Policy. 546. 
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assassination in November 1963 temporarily caused the nation to look inward, 
but the brewing Cold War, with crises in Southeast Asia and Latin America, 
and persistent tensions with the Soviet Union and communist China, would 
return foreign policy issues to the forefront of national attention during the 
presidential election campaigns of 1964.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
FOREIGN POLICY AND U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, 1948-1960
America's Cold War against international communism often influenced 
the country's national elections. W hile the exact importance of foreign policy 
to American voters has been difficult to gauge, the nation's postwar acceptance 
of internationalism caused foreign affairs to become a "major factor" in U.S. 
presidential elections. In his two volume work spanning elections from 1940 to 
1960, Robert A. Divine demonstrated that events of the Cold War "insured the 
continued prominence of international considerations in American presidential 
politics."®®
By 1947 many Americans had begun to question President Harry S. 
Truman's ability to govern the nation into the next decade. Some prominent 
Democrats, who doubted his electability in the next presidential race, 
attempted to draft "the glamorous general," Dwight D. Eisenhower, as their 
nominee. Determined to be elected president in his own right, Truman fought
®®Robert A. D ivine, Foreign Policv And U.S. Presidential Elections. 1952-1960 (New York, 1974),
v iii.
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off bitter attacks from both liberal and conservative Democrats. According to 
biographer David McCullough "not even Herbert Hoover in his darkest days, 
had been treated with such open contempt by his own party."®® Ultra-liberal 
Henry Wallace, who was eventually nominated for president by the Progressive 
Citizens of America party, became a vocal critic of the administration's foreign 
policy. Wallace and the Progressives called for direct negotiations with the 
Soviet Union to end the Cold War. Southern Democrats attacked from the 
right. The conservative "dixiecrats" endorsed Truman's containment strategy but 
detested his burgeoning pro-civil rights policy. After losing a floor fight over the 
party's pro-civil rights platform at the Democratic national convention, the 
conservatives defected and formed the pro-segregationist States' Rights Party led 
by Strom Thurmond. Despite the party's fragmentation, Truman's control over 
the Democratic machinery and Eisenhower's refusal to join the fray, enabled 
the Missourian to win the presidential nomination on the first ballot.
Given the rancorous Democratic infighting, the Republicans were 
confident of winning the White House after a sixteen-year absence. At the GOP 
convention there was "never anything but victory in the air." The delegates 
renominated the popular New York governor, Thomas Dewey, who had lost to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944 by approximately 3.5 m illion votes, FDR's 
narrowest margin of victory. A self-assured Dewey told his delegates, "Our task 
is to fill our victory with such meaning that mankind everywhere, yearning for
®®David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992), 633.
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freedom, w ill take heart and move forward..."®® Operating more like an 
incumbent than a challenger, Dewey ran a controlled campaign that promoted 
national unity. He refused to debate specific issues, and guided by Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg and Republican strategist John Foster Dulles, Dewey 
generally avoided any critical commentary on international affairs.
The Russian blockade of Berlin in June 1948 and the allies massive airlift 
of food and supplies dominated news reports during the election. The 
increasingly successful airlift proved to be "one of the most brilliant American 
achievements of the postwar era" and worked to Truman's advantage.®® 
Although Truman feared that "we are very close to war," advisor Clark Clifford 
reminded the President that "In times of crisis the American citizen tends to 
back up his President." Dewey, in fact, was a Cold Warrior who supported a 
powerful military, aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the Berlin 
Airlift. According to Robert Divine, the challenger "hewed closely to the 
bipartisan foreign policy line" and "refused to attack the Democrats on 
Berlin."®®
At Clifford's advice, Truman "moved to the left" on domestic issues and 
continued his "get tough policy with the Kremlin.""® Supported by cheers of
®®McCullough, Truman. 629, 642. 
®®lbid., 631.
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"Give'em hell, Harry," Truman crisscrossed the nation by rail. His stump 
speeches emphasized domestic issues whereby he condemned the "Republican 
'do-nothing' 80th Congress" and appealed to the Democratic Party's stalwart 
supporters: labor, farmers, intellectuals, city bosses, southerners, and the 
working poor. Truman preferred to bypass his opponent and level attacks on 
the conservative wing of the Republican Party, whom the President claimed 
would "dismantle the progress made by the New Deal and in foreign affairs, 
retreat back into isolationism, which would be disastrous for the country and 
the world." "Some things are worth fighting for" he exclaimed, "We must fight 
isolationists and reactionaries, the profiteers and the privileged class...""’
Truman's strident anti-communist policy appealed to the large block of 
European ethnic voters, which led his biographer David McCullough to 
conclude that "for no other reason than his stand on foreign policy, Truman 
had an excellent chance of winning their support." At the risk of alienating oil 
rich Arab nations, Truman salvaged the volatile Jewish vote by extending de 
facto recognition to the new Israeli nation in May 1947. As the dark horse in 
the campaign, Truman was forced to differentiate himself from Dewey, and he 
chose to balance his Cold War rhetoric with that of a peace candidate. He 
warned voters to "'Keep your bullets bright and you powder dry'...we w ill get 
peace in this world." With tensions running high over the Berlin crisis, Truman 
privately confided "It's all so futile. Dewey, Wallace, the cockeyed southerners
41 McCullough, Truman. 661, 677.
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and if I w in ...!'!! probably have a Russian war on my hands.""®
Probable war against the Soviet Union had promoted Henry Wallace to 
run against the incumbent. He had defined the Truman Doctrine as "a curious 
mixture of power politics and international carpetbagging.""® The entrance of 
the Progressives into the campaign temporarily elevated foreign policy to the 
forefront of public view. Wallace blamed the U.S. for the Cold War, 
denounced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, demanded the recall of 
American troops stationed abroad, and advocated the destruction of America's 
nuclear arsenal. He believed that direct negotiation with the Soviets was the 
only viable way to end the Cold War. Interest in the Wallace candidacy began 
to wane during the year as the ongoing Berlin crisis seemed to validate 
mainstream charges of communist led aggression. Furthermore, Wallace failed 
to fully repudiate support from the Communist Party and his Progressive "peace 
party" was increasingly portrayed by opponents as a tool of Moscow.
Truman's opponent on the right, Thomas Dewey sought to exploit the 
issue of communists in the U.S. government. In mid-summer 1948, witnesses 
before the House Un-American Activities Committee testified that there were 
numerous spies in the Truman administration and accused a former State 
Department official, Alger Hiss, of participating in a subversive communist 
network. The news electrified Washington. To make matters worse for the
170.
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Democrats, Hiss had been an active supporter of Roosevelt's New Deal and 
Truman's Fair Deal programs. Dewey recommended that voters "elect an 
administration that simply w on't appoint them (communists) in the first place." 
Throughout the campaign, the Republican claimed that "Communists and 
fellow travelers [have] risen to positions of trust in our govern ment... [and yet] 
the head of our own government called the exposure of Communists in our 
government 'a red herring.'" Truman responded by branding Dewey's charges a 
"smoke screen" designed to hide the inadequacies of the Republican Party. The 
President boasted further that his Loyalty Program had "proven the loyalty of 
99.7% of all federal workers" and that "It was not Republican talk that checked 
the Communist tide, but programs like the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall 
Plan."""
Truman and some of his campaign advisors believed that they needed "a 
bold move" to demonstrate the President's sincere desire for world peace. In 
what became known as the Vinson mission. Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson was 
asked to go to Moscow to hold a private consultation w ith Joseph Stalin over 
the Berlin crisis. Vinson had no diplomatic experience and when Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall heard of the plan he killed it immediately. After the 
press reported news of the aborted mission, Truman was accused of the 
cardinal Cold War sin, appeasement. Dewey, ever confident of victory, told 
reporters that the current mismanagement of the government would soon be
"McCullough, Truman. 674, 679.
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rectified "If Harry Truman would just keep his hands off things for another few 
weeks! Particularly, if he w ill keep his hands off foreign policy, about which he 
knows considerably less than nothing." By the end of the campaign, a 
desperate Truman leveled a rare and vicious blow at the Republican; he 
proclaimed, "a vote for Dewey was a vote for fascism.""®
Dewy's low-key strategy designed to avoid mistakes appeared to be 
effective as most political analysts predicted a GOP victory. The Republican 
nominee demonstrated his confidence late in the campaign by embarking upon 
a week long vacation. By contrast, Truman refused to concede defeat and 
continued his exhaustive touring. The incumbent's hard work and balanced 
strategy of remaining firm against communism and appealing to the New Deal 
coalition succeeded brilliantly. In a dramatic upset victory, Truman defeated 
the Dewy by more than two million votes. The President collected 330 
electoral votes compared to only 189 for Dewey. The Strom Thurmond and the 
"dixiecrats" managed to collect 38 electoral votes from four southern states 
while Wallace and the Progressives failed to capture even one state.
There can be no doubt that Truman's relentless campaigning on New 
Deal domestic issues was the most important factor to voters in 1948, but 
David McCullough added that "The precarious state of the world also appeared 
to have benefitted the Truman campaign, and particularly as it became clear 
that the Berlin A irlift was a resounding success." In retrospect, most political
"®lbid., 685, 687, 700.
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analysts have agreed with Clark Clifford's assessment that, "Dewey's whole 
campaign was a mistake...They were greedy and dumb, and anxious to get 
back to power.""® The arrogant GOP had attempted to utilize the postwar 
bipartisan foreign policy to their advantage and consequently neglected 
"promising" and "ripe" issues of the continued suppression of Eastern Europe, 
the "loss" of China, and Truman's new Palestine policy. Republicans never 
again campaigned on a completely bipartisan foreign policy, and the stunned 
GOP had to wait another four years to correct their mistakes."®
By the summer of 1952, President Truman's public approval rating had 
declined to an abysmal 26 percent. Weighed down by McCarthyism, the 
Korean War stalemate, and charges of corruption in government, the President 
chose not to seek reelection and instead contemplated a suitable successor. 
Many Democratic leaders were disappointed to learn that the Republicans had 
successfully induced the ever popular Dwight Eisenhower to run for their 
party's presidential nomination. The GOP's powerful eastern liberal wing 
backed the Eisenhower candidacy which came to symbolize "collective security 
and a European-first orientation.""®
Only "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, seriously challenged 
Ike for the nomination. While generally conservative on domestic matters.
"®lbid., 713, 717.
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Eisenhower differed greatly from Taft on foreign affairs. Ike, a full fledged 
internationalist, eagerly supported the Truman Doctrine and personally oversaw 
in the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Taft, on the 
other hand, was a vocal critic of economic multilateralism and was less w illing 
to extend American commitments abroad. At best the senator was a begrudging 
Cold Warrior who was w illing to condone the Marshall Plan and aid to 
Greece, but not the long term deployment of U.S. troops under NATO. When 
the two wings of the Republican Party squared off at the Chicago National 
Convention, polling data indicated that only the widely popular general would 
be able to defeat the leading Democratic nominees. By the end of the GOP 
convention, most Republican delegates had reached the same conclusion and 
nominated Eisenhower for the presidency.
The selection of Eisenhower's opponent proved more complicated. 
Ultimately the Democrats compromised on Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson. 
As a former Assistant Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 
the Roosevelt administration, the eloquent governor could legitimately 
campaign as both a New Dealer and an expert in foreign affairs. Many party 
leaders and intellectuals supported the "scholarly and reflective" Stevenson 
despite the glaring weakness that he was generally unknown to the national 
electorate."®
Forced to respond to repeated Republican attacks on Truman's Asian
49 Ibid., IV:3236.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
policy, Stevenson argued that the United States could not have "saved" China 
from communism in 1949 without starting World War III. Furthermore, he 
stressed that bombing China during the Korean War would have caused the 
same result. Stevenson reminded the GOP that there had been bipartisan 
support to demilitarize Korea after World War II, and that there had also been 
bipartisan support for Truman's original decision to deploy U.S. combat troops 
to repel the North Korean invasion. Had the President not acted swiftly, he 
said, communism "could have picked away at the free world and engulfed 
more millions, piece by piece...[until] we would have had to fight." Stevenson 
also emphasized that the West could also have "lost" Japan and East Asia.®®
In addition to overcoming his anonymity, Stevenson attempted to 
distinguish himself from the discredited Truman administration, a daunting task. 
As a firm anti-communist, the governor blamed the Cold War on Soviet 
aggression and lauded Truman's activist foreign policy. His speeches often 
echoed Truman's 1948 campaign, as he favored a powerful military "not with a 
view toward war but with a view toward preventing war and negotiating the 
conditions of peace." Stevenson also cautioned Americans that "victory was not 
always possible"; since the nation's resources were finite, its goals had to be 
realistic.®’
Also reminiscent of Truman four years earlier, the Democratic nominee
®°lbid., 3254. 
®'lbid., 3253.
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linked Eisenhower's candidacy to "reckless" right wing Republicans, who had 
simultaneously called for the bombing of China and for the removal of U.S. 
troops from Europe. He attacked the general's vague call for the "liberation" of 
Eastern Europe. Such a policy, he assured voters, would lead to war with the 
Soviet Union. The governor also criticized Ike's proposal to reduce defense 
spending by relying more heavily upon a nuclear deterrent and the Air Force. 
Stevenson argued that a "high budget, high taxes, inflation, even deaths in 
Korea, were the price America must pay to maintain freedom.
Stevenson struggled to reassemble the vital coalition of New Deal voters, 
and mid-way through the contest he asked Truman to jo in the campaign. An 
enthusiastic Truman went on the attack. Utilizing the same strategy he 
employed against Dewey, the President portrayed General Eisenhower as a 
captive of the party's conservative wing and warned voters to "beware of the 
isolationists: they would cut foreign aid, slash the defense budget, and embark 
upon a reckless policy of 'liberation.'" He accused the Republicans of running 
a campaign of "fear and deception" and told voters they could choose between 
"stopping Communism and retreating before the red menace or plunging the 
world into atomic warfare."®®
Unlike his predecessor in the 1948 election, Eisenhower planned a 
vigorous and aggressive national campaign. First he moved to solidify
®®lbid., 3254.
®®lbid., 3251, 3257.
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Republican support for the ticket, which meant a rapprochement with Taft 
conservatives. By September, Senator Taft had stated publicly that he agreed 
with Ike "100 per cent" on domestic issues and "to a large extent" on foreign 
affairs. The Democrats created a minor stir for the ticket by chastising 
Eisenhower for "surrendering" to the right wing, but most voters appeared 
unconcerned with the nominee's positioning. A more serious controversy arose 
in October when news broke that Eisenhower had deleted from a prepared 
speech a "strong rebuke" of GOP Senator Joseph McCarthy and "staunch 
defense" of Truman's Secretary of State George Marshall, whom the Wisconsin 
senator had called a "traitor."®" The political mistake seemed to substantiate 
the Democrats' association of Ike with the right wing. An embarrassed 
Eisenhower deeply regretted the blunder and in later speeches lauded Marshall 
as a great patriot.
General Eisenhower campaigned against "creeping socialism" at home 
and Truman's "inept waging of the Cold War abroad."®® He referred to 
Washington as a place of "waste and extravagance and inefficiency; of 
incompetence...; of corruption...; of bungling in our affairs at home; of 
fumbling in the life and death matter of war and peace."®® Eisenhower 
promised a strong military with "great retaliatory power" and a "drastic
®"lbid., 3242, 3245.
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reduction" in the federal budget that would stimulate economic growth.®® He 
also called for a new foreign policy of "liberation" intended to support the 
suppressed peoples of Eastern Europe announcing "we w ill abandon the policy 
of mere containment and actively develop hope" and "never desist in our aid 
to those shackled" by communism.®®
As the campaign progressed, foreign affairs and particularly the Korean 
War became the election's most important issue. In a simplistic but persuasive 
statement, GOP stalwart Thomas Dewey proclaimed that "Stalin is most afraid 
of Eisenhower, certainly not Stevenson." Public discontent with the Korean War 
escalated as troop casualties mounted and the stalemate continued. In January 
only 25 percent of voters considered Korea the most important problem facing 
the nation, but by late October the number increased to 52 percent.
Eisenhower had started the campaign backing Truman's Korean War policy, 
however, he later accused the President of "squandering American prestige and 
power."®® The closest Eisenhower came to offering a solution to the Korean 
stalemate came one month before the election when he pledged to build up 
South Korean defenses and announced "If there must be a war there, let it be 
Asians against Asians..."®® Stevenson contended that this "proposal of a quick
®®lbid., 3240.
®®Divine, Since 1945. 44, 51.
®®Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. IV:3249. 
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and easy way out of Korea..is false." Two weeks later, Ike delivered what 
turned out to be the fatal blow while campaigning in Michigan; he told voters 
that if peace requires "a personal trip to Korea...I shall go to Korea."®’ It was 
futile for Stevenson to counter with any comparable pledge. Historian Robert 
Divine concluded that "The promise to go to Korea, coming from the man 
identified in the public mind with the victory in World War II, clinched the 
election."®®
Eisenhower received more votes than any previous presidential candidate 
in history, 33.9 million, and he won victories in 39 of 48 states. Unlike the 
1948 election when domestic issues dominated the campaign, the single most 
decisive issue in 1952 proved to be the Korean War. Pollster Louis Harris 
concluded that the war issue "was easily the Achilles heel of the Democratic 
campaign."®® The effects of war abroad would significantly influence voters 
again in the presidential election of 1956.
Key Republicans had begun to pressure President Eisenhower to run for a 
second term immediately after his recovery from a massive heart attack in 
January 1956. With no viable successor in place and with his physician's 
approval, Eisenhower announced his intention to seek reelection. Although he 
planned a limited campaign, Ike told advisors that he still had to "prove to the
®’Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. IV:3249. 
®®Divine, Since 1945. 52.
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American people I am a rather healthy individual."®'’ The President's approval 
rating was a stellar 71 percent in Spring of 1956 and with a vibrant domestic 
economy and the world at peace, the Democrats' chances of unseating 
Eisenhower appeared bleak.
Democratic hopes were buoyed in June when the sixty-five-year-old 
President was hospitalized with ileitis, raising serious questions over his 
physical ability to lead the nation for another four years. Adlai Stevenson 
reemerged as the Democratic presidential nominee after a "hectic struggle" 
against Estes Kefauver, Averell Harriman and Lyndon Johnson. Once again 
Stevenson attempted to reconstruct the New Deal coalition of voters that had 
proved successful for Truman in 1948. He transversed the country and 
campaigned with "great conviction." In attempts to capitalize on the "health 
issue" Stevenson frequently described Ike as "a part-time leader."®® Given Ike's 
bipartisan successes with Congress on matters of defense and foreign affairs, 
political advisors urged the Democratic nominee to subordinate foreign policy 
to domestic policy during the campaign. In the summer of 1956 during the 
beginning of the Suez crisis. Democratic Senate Majority Leader Lyndon 
Johnson reconfirmed bipartisan support for the President by telling newsmen, 
"Politics stop at the water's edge when the security of our country is at
®'’Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York, 1990), 420. 
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stake."®® The Democratic nominee reluctantly agreed but still managed to 
raise two defense issues in a rare early speech devoted to foreign affairs. 
Stevenson called for an end to the draft and implementation of an all voluntary 
professional military. But his main goal was a pledge to stop all nuclear testing. 
A negotiated test ban accord with the Soviets, he claimed, would eradicate 
dangerous radiation fallout and curtail the arms race. He denounced 
Eisenhower's foreign affairs management as "guile in international dealings," 
and argued that Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, not the President's diplomacy, 
had led to the end of the Korean War.®^
The Republicans seized the opportunity to make foreign policy a central 
campaign issue. Most Americans disagreed with Stevenson's assertion and 
credited Eisenhower with negotiating the truce in Korea, which proved a 
"powerful arrow in the Republican campaign quiver right down to election 
day."®® The country's general economic prosperity negated the importance of 
Stevenson's stance on domestic issues, and the Commander In Chief convinced 
voters that the former governor's positions on defense policy were "unsound 
and dangerous."®® Eisenhower even referred to the nuclear test ban idea as "a
®®Divine, U.S. Presidential Elections. 1952-1960. 120. 
®^Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. 3351.
®®lbid., 3350.
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theatrical gesture."^® Campaigning on his record of peace and prosperity, 
Eisenhower proclaimed "everything's booming but the guns."^’ The 
President's gradual recovery from his bout with ileitis and the rise of an 
international crisis quickly eliminated any chances of a Democratic victory.
Eisenhower's management of the October-November 1956 Suez crisis was 
regarded by biographer Stephen Ambrose as one of his "greatest moments as 
President." The President feared Russian intervention on Egypt's behalf and told 
cabinet members, "if those fellows start something, we may have to hit'em" 
and "we would be justified in taking military action even if Congress were not 
in session." On November 5, the day before the presidential election, "all hell 
broke loose" as British and French forces landed in Egypt. To the surprise of 
most nations the United States condemned the aggression of its allies, backed 
the sovereignty of Egypt and utilized the United Nations to arrange a peaceful 
settlement. Fortunately for Eisenhower, the Suez crisis overshadowed the 
United State's unwillingness to aid the simultaneous outbreaks of nationalism 
in Poland and Hungary, which would have fu lly exposed the hollowness of the 
administration's long stated "liberation" policy.''^
Stevenson's decision not to attack Ike on his Middle East and Eastern 
European policies was reminiscent of Dewy's handling of the Berlin crisis in
“^Ambrose, Eisenhower. 419.
^'W illiam  E. Leuchtenburg, A  Troubled Feast: American Societv Since 1945 (Boston. 1973), 86. 
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1948. Not wanting to jeopardize Eisenhower's efforts to peacefully resolve a 
perilous situation, Stevenson was unable to capitalize on world events. Had the 
Democratic nominee developed themes concerning the dangers of 
brinkmanship and massive retaliation during the campaign, he would have 
been able to utilize the international crises to his advantage. Instead, as many 
as three million voters switched from Stevenson to Eisenhower during the last 
two weeks of the contest. Historian Robert A. Divine described election day as 
the "tensest moment in the Cold War since the Berlin blockade in 1948," and 
the country rallied behind Eisenhower just as it had with Truman in 1948.^® 
Eisenhower's crisis management combined with the nation's underlying 
economic prosperity to earn the GOP its first successful presidential reelection 
since Ulysses S. Grant. The outcome of the 1956 election was viewed as "the 
most spectacular presidential victory" in twenty y ea rs .Th e  strong economy 
prevented Stevenson from consolidating enough voter support behind his 
domestic agenda, and his ideas to change the defense policies of the nation's 
most popular living general proved pointless. A Stevenson biographer 
concluded, that it was "impossible to defeat a president whose aces in the hole 
were peace, prosperity - and war."^®
World events during Eisenhower's second term raised Cold War tensions
^®Divine, Since 1945. 81.
‘^‘Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. IV:3353. 
^®Divine, Since 1945. 82.
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to new levels. The 1957 Sputnik launch created a "crisis of confidence" in the 
United States that impacted both domestic and foreign policy far into the 
1960s.^® Capitalizing on the public's fear of Soviet technological advances, 
the Democrats attacked Eisenhower for allowing a "missile gap, space gap, 
limited-war gap."^^ Using high altitude spy planes, the administration knew 
there were no such gaps but could not refute the charges publicly without 
jeopardizing national security. The Sputnik launch, increasing Soviet influence 
in Cuba, and Khrushchev's militant rhetoric combined to elevate the 
importance of foreign affairs in the 1960 presidential election.
The May 1960 downing of a U-2 reconnaissance plane inside Soviet 
territory shattered Eisenhower's hopes of ending his presidency during a thaw 
in the Cold War. The President's refusal to offer the Soviet Union an official 
apology led Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev to denounce the United States 
and prematurely disband the Paris summit conference. American-Soviet 
relations also worsened over Cuba. Fidel Castro, who had become increasingly 
hostile towards the United States after the 1959 revolution, began building a 
military and economic alliance with the Soviet Union. In response, Eisenhower 
ordered a 95 percent reduction in Cuban sugar imports in July 1960. Two 
months later Khrushchev embarked upon a "stormy" twenty-five day trip to 
New York to attend the United Nation's General Assembly meeting. In fiery
^®Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993), xv. 
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speeches Khrushchev criticized the United States and the U.N. for policies 
toward Africa and warned that Soviet missiles were being manufactured "like 
sausages."^® Khrushchev's U.N. mission emphasized the growth of the Soviet 
military, economic, and political strength, which presented renewed threats to 
the United States. In 1960 the Republicans had hoped to campaign on 
Eisenhower's eight year record of peace, but these Cold War developments 
vitiated that position and opened the door for Democratic attacks.
In all likelihood Eisenhower could have been reelected to a third term 
had it been allowable. After serving two terms as vice president, Richard M. 
Nixon was virtually assured the Republican nomination. Only the popular and 
wealthy governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, was considered a 
serious competitor. A former assistant to President Eisenhower and the only 
Republican to w in a major election victory in 1956, Rockefeller had become a 
vocal critic of the administration's domestic and foreign policies. When early 
polling data reflected a large Nixon lead, the governor withdrew his candidacy. 
Certain of victory, Nixon moved to solidify the support o f the party's powerful 
eastern liberal wing and arranged for a private meeting with Rockefeller. Nixon 
agreed to strengthen the convention platform's call for increased defense 
spending and to liberalize various domestic planks. The private pact provoked 
outrage among the party's conservative wing, but the Republicans emerged 
from their convention unified.
78 Ibid., 257.
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Nixon's acceptance address reflected the staunch Cold War rhetoric that 
was critical to both candidates throughout the campaign: "We are in a race...for 
the survival in which our lives, our fortunes, our liberties are at stake...It is not 
enough for us to reply that our aim is to contain communism, to defend the 
free world against communism...; the only answer...is a strategy of victory for 
the free world." Nixon also took the opportunity to attack a leading Democratic 
presidential candidate. Senator John F. Kennedy, who had suggested that 
Eisenhower apologize to the Soviet Union for the failed U-2 mission. Nixon 
called the senator's suggestion "rash and impulsive" and defended the flights as 
necessary to "save our country from surprise attack."^®
There was no shortage of candidates for the 1960 Democratic 
nomination. Standard bearer Adlai Stevenson and Senate Majority Leader 
Lyndon Johnson both coveted the nomination but refused to pursue it overtly. 
Missouri Senator Stuart Symington, who campaigned on the single issue of 
increased defense preparedness, appeared to be a potential compromise 
candidate. Only Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Kennedy of 
Massachusetts battled for convention delegates via the party's primary 
elections. Given Kennedy's comparatively weak legislative record and the fact 
that he was Catholic, most party leaders considered him the underdog. But 
Kennedy was popular with voters, and his well financed and organized 
campaign produced important victories in the Wisconsin and West Virginia
79(Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. IV:3553-54, 3556.
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primaries, which ultimately forced Humphrey from the contest. Even the late 
entrance of the powerful Johnson, who had called Kennedy the "boyish 
appeaser of the Soviets," could not derail the Massachusetts team.®® Kennedy 
had effectively cultivated local and state party leaders and systematically 
accumulated enough delegates to win the Democratic nomination on the first 
ballot.
Many political insiders viewed the 1960 presidential election as a "contest 
between two ruthlessly ambitious young men, both smoothly skilled in politics 
and public relations, and both possessing more cool reserve than deep 
emotional convictions." Television had replaced newspapers as the most 
influential medium to voters, and both candidates agreed to a series of 
televised debates. The first debate held in late September constituted a major 
turning point for JFK as his impressive performance on national television 
helped solidify support for his candidacy within the Democratic Party.
Although Nixon reassured voters of his "experience," he was clearly less 
telegenic than his opponent and failed to generate any unexpected enthusiasm. 
During the second debate on October 7, Nixon "drew first blood" and "scored 
heavily" on the issue of defending the small Chinese islands of Quemoy and 
Matsu, which were occupied by Nationalist Chinese forces. Kennedy, who 
thought the islands "indefensible," had criticized Eisenhower for risking war 
with communist China over their protection. Nixon responded by saying "that
80 Ibid., 3460.
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is the same kind of wooly thinking that led to disaster for America in Korea," 
and he pledged not to "yield one inch of 'free soil'" to the communists.®’
Overall the debates were fairly close but probably benefitted Kennedy more 
than Nixon.
Since both men had traveled extensively abroad and preferred discussing 
foreign affairs over domestic policy, defense policy evolved as a central issue in 
the campaign. Each candidate sought to dramatize the importance of foreign 
policy leadership as an decisive issue, even though they both agreed that the 
objective of U.S. foreign policy was outright victory in the Cold War. The 
candidates regularly accused each other of being "impulsive" in their decision 
making and inclined to "shoot from the hip."®^ Nixon, who as a congressman 
in 1948 had gained prominence as an anti-communist zealot by leading the 
crusade against Alger Hiss, resolved in 1960 to defend the Eisenhower record 
and reconstruct his contribution to it. Senator Kennedy was also an established 
Cold Warrior who had condemned Truman in 1948 for the "loss" of China and 
Eisenhower in 1960 for the "loss" of Cuba. Still, when pressed by reporters, 
Kennedy admitted that he basically "endorsed" Truman's and Eisenhower's 
foreign policies. As a result, the foreign affairs debate primarily revolved 
around a partisan critique of eight years of Republican management of the Cold 
War and voter evaluation of the candidates' leadership abilities.
®’ lbid., IV:3450, 3463, 3465.
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Kennedy presented his foreign affairs platform w ithin his broad campaign
theme of "lets get the country moving again." Ultimately he called for
increased military preparedness and proclaimed that he could wage the Cold
War more effectively. Kennedy characterized Republican policies as ones of
"retreat, defeat and weakness" and attacked Eisenhower w ithout naming the
popular president.®® The Democratic nominee said that he "deplored the
greater Russian progress in space, the decline of U.S. prestige abroad, and the
lag in America's appeal to the developing world."®'* Kennedy leveled direct
blows at Nixon and emphasized the Cuba issue: "I wasn't the vice president
who presided over the communization of Cuba," and "I'm not impressed with
those who say they stood up to Khrushchev when Castro has defied them 90
miles away."®® As the campaign progressed, Kennedy espoused such fierce
Cold War rhetoric that historian Thomas Paterson contended "John Foster
Dulles could not have said it better."®® For example he said:
I think there is a danger that history w ill make a judgment that these were the days when the 
tide began to run out for the United States. These were the times when the communist tide 
began to pour in. The enemy is lean and hungry and the United States is the only sentinel at 
the gate. The enemy is the Communist system itself-implacable, unceasing in its drive for 
world domination. For this is not a struggle for the supremacy of arms alone-it is also a 
struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: Freedom under God versus ruthless, 
godless tyranny. [TJhe only thing that w ill deter Mr. Khrushchev from loosing his hounds of
®®lbid., 241.
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hell on us w ill be a strong U.S.. I want to outdo him...outproduce him.®^
Despite the Democratic nominee's rhetoric, Nixon warned that a Kennedy 
presidency would be a throw back to the Truman administration and the Vice 
President proclaimed that the country had "left the policy of retreat behind us 
in 1953." The Republican repeatedly recalled his performance against 
Khrushchev in the famous "kitchen debate" as a proof of his experience and 
ability in foreign affairs. In July 1959, Nixon had embarked upon a good-will 
mission to Russia where he encountered an irritated Khrushchev. At an 
exhibition displaying an American model home, the two men became 
embroiled in a bitter argument. The whole affair had been captured on film 
and the footage displayed Nixon "standing toe to toe with the Soviet leader, his 
finger in the Russian's face, defending American honor and integrity in an 
admirable fashion."®®
Recognizing the closeness of the contest, the Vice President asked for and 
received Eisenhower's direct support. Privately Ike had confided that he would 
do "almost anything to avoid turning my chair and the country over to 
Kennedy," and he campaigned vigorously, though more in support of his own 
record than as a proponent of Nixon. Historian Stephen Ambrose concluded 
that Ike's public comments "never constituted that clear-cut, total endorsement 
Nixon so desperately needed. The total effect was almost devastating." Because
®^bid., 200-01, and Divine, U.S. Presidential Elections. 1952-1960. 242-44. 
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Nixon continued to emphasize his experience in decision making, reporters 
hounded Eisenhower to provide an example of Nixon's input into a major 
policy decision. Ike responded rashly, "If you give me a week I might think of 
one. I don't remember." The Democrats and the press relished the blunder.®®
In a last ditch effort reminiscent of the 1952 Korea pledge, Nixon promised to 
send Eisenhower on a good-will mission to communist bloc nations.
Unlike Eisenhower's Korean pledge, Nixon's offer was made to no avail. 
Kennedy captured one of the narrowest victories in presidential election 
history, defeating Nixon in twenty-three key states, but by a popular margin of 
only 113,000 votes. The results left Eisenhower depressed; he viewed 
Kennedy's victory as a "repudiation" of his eight years in the White House. But 
the President's contributions to the campaign, according to his biographer, had 
been "worse than unhelpful-it actually cost Nixon votes, and probably the 
election."®®
Foreign policy had been central to JFK's theme of "getting the country 
moving again" and to Nixon's theme of "experience," and the militant tone of 
the dual campaigns demonstrated that fervent anti-communism was the only 
viable foreign policy position to take in U.S. presidential politics. But on 
election day that issue was not the most decisive to undecided voters. The 
handling of domestic issues proved more definitive, and here, Kennedy's ability
®®Ambrose, Eisenhower. 522, 524-25. 
®®lbid., 520, 529.
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to minimize his biggest handicap and his decision to balance the ticket with a 
southerner proved brilliant. Kennedy advisor Theodore C. Sorenson concluded 
that "The single factor influencing more swing-voters...was not unemployment 
or foreign policy...but Kennedy's religion."®’ The combination of Catholic 
Democrats and those Protestants w illing  to overlook Kennedy's religion, who 
had voted Republican in 1956, more than offset the number of votes lost on 
that issue in 1960. Furthermore, Kennedy's investment in the Johnson vice 
presidential nomination also paid handsome dividends as the ticket swept the 
Deep South including a reversal of thirty-four crucial electoral votes Eisenhower 
collected in Louisiana and Texas in 1956.
Despite the narrowness of his election victory, Kennedy enjoyed 
widespread popularity throughout all three years of his presidency. In many 
respects this was quite remarkable given ongoing crises at home, in places like 
Oxford, Mississippi, and Birmingham, Alabama, and abroad in Germany, 
Vietnam, and Cuba. In early 1963, Kennedy had begun to look forward to his 
reelection bid the following year, and "within the confines of the White House 
predicted - - and fervently hoped - - that Barry Goldwater would be nominated" 
by the Republicans. Kennedy and Goldwater had become acquainted in the 
Senate in 1952 and they developed a genuine friendship over the years, but the 
two men "stood diametrically opposed [to each other]...on every major issue." 
By autumn 1963, Senator Goldwater, who in only his second term as senator
91 Schlesinger, Presidential Elections. IV;3469.
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had become a leader of his party's conservative wing, also looked forward to a 
high profile ideological contest against Kennedy. The President foresaw one of 
the "most interesting...campaigns...in a long time" and anticipated "a hard, 
close fight" in most states.®^  Kennedy began his campaign planning early and 
eagerly anticipated a revival of the 1960 presidential debates. Even his fateful 
trip to Texas in November 1963 had been a thinly disguised campaign trip.
After Kennedy's untimely death, his successor, Lyndon Johnson carefully 
channelled the nation's grief into support for major federal legislation. The 
Texan's application of presidential power in 1964 was both graceful and 
effective, and consequently ensured his own presidential nomination for the 
Democratic Party. Johnson's ascendance to the presidency appalled GOP front- 
runner Barry Goldwater, who reversed his decision to run for the Republican 
nomination. Preliminary polling data suggested that the fight for the GOP 
nomination would be difficult for all contenders, and that President Johnson 
would likely trounce any Republican candidate. But the ideological challenge 
proved too tantalizing to the independent Goldwater, who in a relatively short 
career in government had established an impressive track record of achieving 
upset political victories. Encouraged by considerable support for his candidacy 
which had been mounting for several years, the Arizonan threw his hat into the 
ring.
®^Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedv (New York, 1965), 753.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RISE OF A MAVERICK:
Barry Morris Goldwater, 1909-1963
The son of an Arizona dry-goods merchant, Barry M. Goldwater was born 
in 1909. As a youth, he went east to attend Staunton M ilitary Academy in 
Lexington, Virginia, where he graduated in the middle of his class. Young 
Goldwater excelled in athletics and earned satisfactory grades. After graduation 
in 1928, he returned to his native state and enrolled at the University of 
Arizona in Tucson. The following year his father, Baron Goldwater, died, and 
shortly thereafter Barry left college to begin a career in the family's department 
store, aptly named Goldwaters. Much to his regret, Goldwater never returned 
to college and later confessed that it was "the biggest mistake of my life."®®
In 1934 he married Margaret "Peggy" Johnson, the daughter of the wealthy Ray 
Prescott Johnson, President of Warner Gear Company. W ithin two years the 
Goldwaters celebrated the birth of their first child, Joanne. Eventually they 
would raise four children, two boys and two girls.
Goldwater, described as a "master merchandiser," applied ingenuity and
®®Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York, 1988), 55.
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natural sales ability to the family business and in 1937 became president of the 
company.®'* He was proud of the firm's relative success during the Depression 
and boasted "we didn't fire anybody....We never sued anyone....We never 
missed a payroll."®® Goldwater was also active outside of the family business; 
he enjoyed outdoor photography, reading, and tinkering with machinery and 
radios. He became an accomplished aviator, and in 1940 he published the first 
of several books on Arizona entitled, lournev Down the River of Canvons. 
During the summer of 1941, Goldwater foresaw direct U.S. intervention in 
World War II and vigorously supported the war mobilization effort as chairman 
of the Military Affairs Committee of the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce. He 
hoped ultimately to fly fighter planes in the Army A ir Corps, but his request 
was denied as the military "took a dim view in those days of 32-year-olds with 
astigmatism."®®
Determined to serve in the Air Corps, Goldwater arranged for a first 
lieutenant's commission and was assigned as an air-to-air gunnery instructor at 
training stations in Phoenix and Yuma, Arizona. After the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Goldwater seized an opportunity to fly non-combat cargo planes 
in the China-Burma-lndia theater with the Air Corps Ferry Command. Despite 
repeated requests for transfer to the Bombing Command, Goldwater never
94 Dean Smith, The Goldwaters O f Arizona (Flagstaff, AZ, 1986), 185.
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engaged in direct combat. By the end of the war, he had been promoted to 
lieutenant colonel and served a brief stint as a pilot instructor in southern 
California before returning to Arizona. At the request of the Arizona governor, 
Goldwater helped organize and command the local A ir National Guard.®'' 
Military service had a pronounced effect on Goldwater. It had exposed 
him to problems outside of Arizona and intensified his interest in world affairs, 
which until then had been largely influenced by voracious reading of materials 
such as F.A. von Hayek's The Road To Serfdom and Carl von Clausewitz's On 
War. Goldwater believed that U.S. isolationism after the first world war had 
contributed to the outbreak of World War II and that future wars could only be 
prevented through a commitment to military superiority. He was also 
developing perspectives on domestic issues. Here the primary influence came 
from his uncle Morris Goldwater, an Arizona pioneer, who served as mayor of 
Prescott for more than thirty years. Morris had also participated in the Arizona 
territorial government and was a founding member of the state's Democratic 
party. Goldwater described his uncle as a Jeffersonian Democrat who 
denounced high taxation and large central government.®®
After the war Goldwater resumed his management duties at the family 
stores, working with his younger brother Robert. But these business 
responsibilities became mundane; and he actively pursued many outside
®^Rob W ood and Dean Smith, Barrv Goldwater (New York, 1961), 73. 
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interests including the U.S. Interior Department's Advisory Commission on 
Indian Affairs, the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission, the Colorado River 
Commission, the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, the YMCA and the Boy 
Scouts of America. In 1949 Goldwater successfully ran for the Phoenix City 
Council on a nonpartisan reform platform. The forty-year-old claimed that his 
election victory had resulted from his "straight talk" and added that "Westerners 
often admire a man more for standing tall than being right."®® In 1950, he 
played a crucial role in the Arizona gubernatorial campaign of Republican 
radio broadcaster J. Howard Pyle. As Pyle's campaign manager, he logged 
more than 20,000 flight miles across the state and earned the respect and 
admiration of Arizona's Republican Party leaders. Goldwater interpreted Pyle's 
narrow upset victory as the first major step toward transforming historically 
Democratic Arizona into a legitimate two party state.’®®
The following year Goldwater won reelection to the Phoenix City Council. 
After having successfully "driven crime underground" and "balanced the city 
budget," he concluded that Arizona's Republicans needed to mount an 
aggressive campaign for the United States Senate against the entrenched 
Democratic incumbent, Ernest W. McFarland.’®’ In 1952 Goldwater
®®lbid., 114-15.
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announced his candidacy and embarked on a "spur-of-the-moment, 
understaffed operation."’®® Concerned about her husband's entrance into 
national politics, Peggy Goldwater cautioned that he was "too direct and 
candid to be successful in politics" and that he would "get hurt and 
disillusioned with the endless promises and compromises needed to 
survive."’®® But Councilman Goldwater was determined to become a U.S. 
senator, and he eagerly began his crusade against the Democratic Party and the 
burgeoning federal government.
On the campaign trail the senatorial candidate declared that he was "fed 
up" with Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, "the ballooning federal government," 
and Harry Truman's "no-win policy in Korea." Goldwater's 1952 campaign 
exhibited the style and many of the issues that would characterize his bid for 
the presidency twelve years later. He called for stronger states' rights, a 
balanced budget, and a "better-directed" military force to oppose international 
communism.’®" He demanded that McFarland "accept his share of the 
responsibility" for the thousands of American troops who had been killed, 
wounded, or captured in Korea.’®®
Late in the campaign while in Prescott, Goldwater was urged by his
' “^Stephen C. Shadegg, W hat Happened to Goldwater? The Inside Storv o f the 1964 Republican 
Campaign. (New York, 1965), 18.
’®®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 121.
' “"ibid., 120, 123.
’°®Richard H. Revere, The Goldwater Caper (New York, 1965), 30.
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manager, Steve C. Shadegg, to read his speech in order to avoid any 
"spontaneous one-liners" that could be negatively portrayed by the media. 
Goldwater said that he used one-liners because they "seemed to get us more 
publicity."’®® Years later this natural tendency would haunt him as a 
presidential candidate, but in 1952 Goldwater's political timing was exquisite 
since his bid for the Senate coincided with the presidential campaign of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. In November, Eisenhower swept into the White House, and in 
a surprise outcome Goldwater became only the second Republican senator 
elected from Arizona since its admission to the Union in 1912. Ike had 
defeated Adlai Stevenson in Arizona by 43,000 votes, while Goldwater, with 
the help of more than fifty-thousand registered Democrats, won by the narrow 
margin of 7,000 votes.’®®
As a forty-four-year-old freshman senator, the Arizonan aspired to a seat on 
either the Interior or the Armed Services Committee, but Senate Republican 
leader Robert A. Taft instead appointed him to the Labor and Public Welfare 
Committee and to the Commerce and Banking Committee. Taft believed that 
Goldwater's business experience would enhance Republican influence in both 
legislative bodies. These appointments allowed the freshman senator input on 
important domestic legislation such as federal aid to education, minimum wage 
rates, and public welfare expenditures. As a member of the Labor Committee,
' “®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 122-23.
’®®Bell, Mr. Conservative. 61. Goldwater's defeat of McFarland led to election of Texas Senator 
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Goldwater became a vocal critic of allegedly corrupt union labor leaders. In 
Arizona, as a tacit supporter of Taft-Hartley, he had helped champion right-to- 
work legislation, and he steadfastly opposed compulsory political contributions 
by union workers. His appointment to the Labor Committee outraged powerful 
labor leaders such as Walter P. Reuther of the United Auto Workers and James 
R. Hoffa of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.’®®
As an adjunct to his seat on Labor, Goldwater was named to the Select 
Committee To Investigate Improper Activities in Labor/Management Relations, 
also known as the McClellan Rackets Committee. The subcommittee's attempts 
to expose union corruption prompted national media attention, including live 
television coverage. Fellow senator John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert, 
acting as the group's chief council, waged a "merciless" fight against 
Hoffa.’®® Meanwhile, Goldwater and other senators directed their efforts at 
Reuther. Their battles made national headlines for a year, and the outspoken 
Arizonan received more than 15,000 letters from rank and file union members 
complaining about corruption. The Senate investigations frequently became 
emotional and occasionally personal. Reuther once told reporters that 
Goldwater was a "political hypocrite and a moral coward."” ® The senator 
responded by challenging the union leader to a televised debate and
’°®lbid., 117-37.
’°®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 128. 
” ®Bell. Mr. Conservative. 120.
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proclaimed that Reuther was "the most dangerous man in the w orld ."” ’
During this period, Goldwater established a genuine friendship w ith the junior 
senator from Massachusetts, a relationship that continued throughout Kennedy's 
final days in the White House.
Goldwater also formed a relationship with fellow Republican committee 
member Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin. As a staunch anti­
communist, the Arizona senator naturally aligned himself with the crusading 
McCarthy. Although Goldwater "often winced at...[McCarthy's] excesses and 
his indiscriminate charges of traitorous behavior," he remained loyal to 
McCarthy to the end, even pleading with him to sign a letter of apology to 
avoid censure in 1954.” ® Goldwater criticized those Republicans who 
advocated censure, which the Arizonan viewed as a triumph for communism.
In 1955, with only two years experience in the Senate, Goldwater's GOP 
peers appointed him chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign 
Committee, since, as he said, "no one wanted the job." His primary 
responsibility was to assist Republican senatorial candidates in their election 
campaigns. Goldwater called it "a grueling, unrewarding, unglamorous job," 
but campaigning for other Republicans across the nation enabled him to 
espouse his conservative ideology.” ® As with his initial disappointment when
’ ’ ’ Ibid., 122.
” ®Smith, The Goldwaters. 205.
11^Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 143-44.
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named to the labor and banking committees, the Senate campaign post 
unexpectedly enhanced Goldwater's political career. For two years he 
crisscrossed the country giving hundreds of speeches on the virtues of 
Republican conservatism covering both domestic and international affairs. The 
Arizonan criticized federal bureaucracy and the expanding national debt and 
denounced massive foreign aid programs, particularly those benefitting nations 
within the Soviet sphere of influence. Goldwater could hardly have planned a 
more advantageous first term in the Senate. As a result of his varied committee 
appointments he participated in the development of important domestic 
legislation and gained national prominence w ithin the Republican Party.” " 
Goldwater's activities on the Senate labor committees appeared aggressive 
and independent, but it was his disagreements with President Eisenhower that 
cast him as a maverick and a renegade. The freshman senator voted against the 
President's nomination of Charles Bohlen as Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
and voted for the Bricker amendment, which was designed to curtail the 
Executive's authority in foreign affairs. His public criticisms of the 
administration were politically risky, as Ike remained extremely popular with 
voters throughout his tenure. One of Goldwater's earliest differences with the 
President involved the appointment of California governor Earl Warren as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. The senator considered Warren too liberal, 
asserting "I can forget the argument that California and Arizona have over
""W ood  and Smith, Barrv Goldwater. 116.
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water. I can forget that Earl Warren hasn't practiced law for twenty-five years. 
But I can't forget that as governor he always recommended programs of the 
welfare state variety."” ® Goldwater's criticism of certain planks in the 1957 
Civil Rights Act and his call for the resignation of presidential advisor Sherman 
Adams also infuriated Eisenhower. But the senator's most notorious 
disagreement with the administration concerned the President's 1957 $71.8 
billion budget proposal, the largest in peacetime history. In April 1957 from the 
Senate floor, the Arizonan proclaimed that the budget "not only shocks me, but 
it weakens my faith in the...administration. What is bad under the leadership of 
one party cannot possibly be good under the leadership of the other."” ® 
Goldwater later characterized Ike's budget proposal as a "Dime store New 
Deal."” ®
Throughout his first term in the Senate the maverick senator had honored 
his campaign pledge to provide "straight talk" for his constituents, and without 
the support of his popular president, Goldwater ran for reelection in 1958. 
Former Senator Ernest W. McFarland, once again provided the opposition. 
McFarland, who had remained a viable political force in Arizona by ousting 
Howard Pyle as governor in 1956, was favored in the polls throughout most of 
the election. Goldwater mounted an aggressive and expensive reelection
” ®Bell. Mr. Conservative. 144, 140.
” ®Congressional Record. April 8, 1957, 85th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5259.
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campaign. Earlier that year, the United Auto Workers union had announced 
that its chief political objective in 1958 was to ensure the defeat of Arizona's 
Republican senator. Goldwater and his campaign manager, Stephen C.
Shadegg, immediately recognized the union's pronouncement as a "political 
situation demanding exploitation."” ® Capitalizing on his image as a foe of 
union corruption, Goldwater successfully linked the Democratic Party and 
Governor McFarland to the allegedly corrupt Walter Reuther and the UAW. 
Biographer Jack Bell claimed that the senator purposely avoided debate on 
specific issues during the campaign and instead chose to "flail the phantom 
figure of Walter Reuther...and to batter 'socialism'."” ® Goldwater reminded 
older constituents of his support for increased social security benefits and the 
general electorate of his successful battles for a balanced budget. He also clung 
to his senatorial record as an opponent of "the Super-State" and extolled his 
independence from "me-too" Republicanism.’®®
Goldwater also utilized foreign affairs in his reelection bid, comparing six 
years of accomplishments under Eisenhower's leadership to the scandals and 
uncertain policies of the Truman administration. He asked his audiences to 
recall that Democratic leadership had led to the communization of Eastern 
Europe and China and to the death of American troops in Korea. In contrast, he
” ®Shadegg. What Happened to Goldwater. 19. 
” ®Bell, Mr. Conservative. 64.
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claimed that the GOP had rebuilt the nation's defense forces with the Strategic 
Air Command's jet bombers and the Navy's new fleet of nuclear submarines.
At the same time, he boasted of his strident opposition to foreign aid for 
communist or neutral governments, and even of his reluctance to aid the 
French in their war against communist insurgents in Southeast Asia unless 
France made "satisfactory assurances" that it would "free" Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia.’ ’^
The well organized and highly publicized Goldwater campaign attracted 
national media attention and substantial contributions from wealthy 
conservatives including Texas oil man H.L. Hunt and Hollywood mogul Cecil 
B. DeMille. As in the 1952 campaign, the Elect Goldwater Committee outspent 
its opposition by nearly two to one and with the assistance of more than 
80,000 Arizona Democrats, Goldwater's margin of victory in 1958 increased 
from 7,000 to 35,000 votes. Stephen Shadegg later characterized the election 
as the major "turning point" in senator's political career.’ ^^  Goldwater's 
increased margin of victory in an overwhelmingly Democratic state had 
demonstrated his personal appeal to voters. His success could no longer be 
dismissed as a product of Eisenhower's coattails.
Upon his triumphant return to Washington, Goldwater enjoyed new 
prominence as the ranking minority member on the labor committees and
’^’ Revere, The Goldwater Caper. 29. 
’^^Shadegg, What Happened to Goldwater. 18.
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moved from sixth to third position on Interior and Insular Affairs. He quickly 
reestablished his maverick credentials in April 1959 by casting the sole 
dissenting vote in the Senate against the Kennedy-Ervin labor reform bill. 
Kennedy promptly remarked that it was "obvious that Senator Goldwater would 
be satisfied with no bill that did not destroy the organized trade union 
movement in the United S ta tes.E isenhow er's  investigation into 
Goldwater's claims that the bill was largely ineffective against union corruption 
and secondary boycotts resulted in a televised presidential speech that 
denounced the measure as inadequate. The Senate later reversed its approval of 
the Kennedy-Ervin bill, and in September 1959 an amended House bill, 
Landrum-Griffen, emerged from conference as law. According to Shadegg, 
"Every knowledgeable politician in America recognized that Barry Goldwater 
was the one man responsible for this legislative turnabout."’ '^*
After considerable prodding by fellow conservatives, Goldwater accepted 
reappointment as chairman of the Senatorial Campaign Committee following a 
two-year layoff. In his absence the Republicans had lost thirteen Senate seats, 
due primarily to the 1958 recession and the party's advocacy of right-to-work 
legislation. Just as Goldwater's intensive campaigning for Howard Pyle in 1952 
had become a self-promoting affair, his relentless efforts as reelection chairman 
had begun to transform him into a popular national figure. His speeches
’ “ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedv (New York, 1965), 54. 
’“ Shadegg, What Happened to Goldwater. 22.
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remained familiar. He denounced large federal government and endorsed a 
powerful military to resist the spread of communism. The senator was 
described as a new party leader who had come "out of the West like a 
refreshing breeze. His language was rough...candor shocking...[and] sincerity 
beyond reproach. He was the Viceroy independent thinker, the Marlboro
man."’ s^
After he delivered a rousing speech at the Western Republican Conference 
in November 1959, the Los Angeles Times requested that the senator 
contribute a tri-weekly newspaper column. Goldwater accepted the offer and 
within two years the column, entitled "How Do You Stand, Sir?," had been 
syndicated to 148 newspapers. Persuaded by fellow Republicans to write a 
book "setting forth in simple terms the basic conservative political philosophy," 
Goldwater published The Conscience Of A Conservative with the assistance of 
Notre Dame law professor Dean Clarence and National Review editor L. Brent 
Bozell in the spring of 1960.’ ®^ Based largely on his campaign stump 
speeches, the 123 page work outlined basic conservative principles and their 
relation to domestic and international affairs. According to Goldwater, this 
"unpretentious book" became a "symbol of a new political consciousness" and 
a "rallying cry of the right against three decades of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
’ “ Ripon Society, From Disaster to D istinction: A Republican Rebirth (New York, 1966), 14. 
' “ Shadegg, What Happened to Goldwater. 32.
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the liberal agenda."'^'' W ith only 10,000 copies published during the first 
printing, no one could have imagined that sales would eventually exceed four 
million.
The book provided a succinct compilation of the senator's political views 
and served as a landmark contribution to the "Goldwater image." The senator 
criticized big government as a threat to the freedom of individual citizens. His 
narrow interpretation of the tenth amendment, "a prohibitory rule of law" that 
recognized the states' jurisdiction in areas not specifically addressed in the 
Constitution, led him to oppose federal spending programs for education, 
public housing, and agriculture subsidies.’^  The tenth amendment reads in 
part; "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor 
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.'"^® Consequently, Goldwater believed that many federal spending 
programs were unconstitutional and that state and local governments working 
with private citizens' groups should assume responsibility for various services.
The last third of the book, under the heading "The Soviet Menace," 
echoed Goldwater's first comprehensive foreign policy address on the Senate 
floor given on March 15, 1960. He proclaimed that the United States was in 
"imminent danger" from communism and called for outright "victory" in the
'^^Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 152.
' “ Barry M. Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative (Sheoherdsville. KY, 1960), 28. 
' “ Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
Cold War. He prescribed military superiority and an aggressive foreign policy 
to prevent the establishment of a "universal Communist Empire." Goldwater 
favored withdrawing diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union and demanded 
a réévaluation of U.S. participation in the United Nations. The senator sharply 
criticized U.S. foreign aid, particularly aid to communist countries like Poland 
and Yugoslavia and to non-aligned countries such as India and Indonesia. He 
believed that the United States had no right or obligation to "promote the 
economic and social welfare of foreign peoples"; however, he advocated 
military and technical aid to "friendly" anti-communist countries such as South 
Vietnam. Goldwater also argued for the resumption of nuclear testing, 
explaining that "tests are needed to develop tactical nuclear weapons for 
possible use in limited wars." In the book's conclusion, Goldwater 
acknowledged that his recommendations were "hard counsel" but that "war 
may be the price of freedom.
The popularity of his book and newspaper column helped to complete the 
transformation of Goldwater's reputation as a maverick senator from a sparsely 
populated state to that of a prominent national leader of the growing 
conservative movement. Arizona's junior senator capitalized on his new 
popularity by using his speaking tours to support the 1960 Republican 
presidential nomination of Richard M. Nixon, whom he deemed more 
conservative than the Vice President's rival. New York governor Nelson A.
130 Ibid., 87, 91, 95, 109, 122-23.
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Rockefeller. In the spring of 1960, Goldwater's rising popularity was manifest 
at the GOP's South Carolina state convention where the Arizonan was the 
keynote speaker. The state's delegates responded so enthusiastically to his 
address that they voted to nominate Goldwater over Nixon for the presidency. 
The senator quickly informed Nixon of the circumstances and assured him that 
he fully backed the Vice President's candidacy.^’
Nixon eventually won the Republican nomination but not before a late 
compromise with Rockefeller on the GOP p l a t f o r m . H e  had agreed to 
emphasize a stronger defense policy and new planks favoring civil rights, 
federal aid to education and opposing right-to-work legislation. Conservatives 
felt betrayed by the platform's new language and Nixon's reversal on the labor 
issue particularly upset Goldwater who wrote in his diary, "The man is a two- 
fisted, four-square liar." The senator characterized Nixon's action as 
"appeasement" of the party's liberal wing and referred to the meeting as "an 
American M u n i c h . T h e  Nixon-Rockefeller pact solidified the right wing at 
the 1960 Republican convention and revitalized support for a Goldwater 
presidential nomination. South Carolina continued to pledge its votes in favor 
of the senator; and Texas threatened to bolt Nixon. In an effort to promote 
party unity, Goldwater asked all delegates to relinquish their support for his
“ 'Shadegg, W hat Happened To Goldwater. 37.
' “ Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon And His America (Boston, 1990), 386-89. 
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candidacy. Nonetheless, the South Carolina delegation voted for Goldwater, 
which gave the senator the opportunity to address the convention. He took the 
stage and officially withdrew his nomination and repeated his call for a unified 
party, but the senator also prodded Republican conservatives to "get to work if 
we want to take this party back-1 think we can."“ " Many observers, 
including Stephen Shadegg, have concluded that the crowd's enthusiastic 
reaction to Goldwater's speech ignited the movement for his presidential 
nomination in 1964. Regardless, Goldwater delivered more than one-hundred 
campaign speeches for the Republican ticket. He frequently relayed strategy 
recommendations to the Nixon campaign staff, often pleading for the candidate 
to take a hawkish stand on foreign policy. On October 27, 1960, the Arizonan 
sent a telegram to the nominee stating, "They want to hear a tough attitude 
toward Russia - - an attitude that might run the risk of war but which would 
guarantee us a fight for our freedom instead of the slow dribbling away such as 
the Democrats have been doing at Versailles, Potsdam, Yalta, Tehran, and 
K o r e a . W h e n  the Republicans narrowly lost to John F. Kennedy in 
November, Goldwater blamed Nixon's reluctance to fu lly involve President 
Eisenhower in the campaign and the Vice President's failure to rally 
conservative voters.
' “ David W . Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 1945 (Lexington. KY, 1983), 155. 
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Shortly after the election, Goldwater's second term as chairman of the 
Senatorial Campaign Committee expired. Despite the fact that all GOP senators 
had successfully run for reelection in 1960, several liberal committee members 
including Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York opposed his reappointment on 
ideological grounds. Goldwater received unexpected support from Senator 
Margaret Chase Smith of Maine. While acknowledging a "substantial 
divergence" in their views. Smith favored his reappointment because he had 
demonstrated "an ability and a determination to do everything he could to get 
every Republican nominee elected regardless of whether he agreed or 
disagreed with the views of the individual candidate."“  ^W ith Smith's 
endorsement, Goldwater undertook his third, two-year term as chairman.
Due largely to his committee assignments, Goldwater's first eight years in 
the Senate had focused primarily on the nation's domestic agenda. A noticeable 
shift towards foreign affairs began a week after the 1960 elections when the 
senator accepted an invitation to deliver a foreign policy speech at the Air War 
College in Montgomery, Alabama. The speech provided the basis for his 
subsequent positions on foreign affairs.” ® Goldwater stated that "where 
conflicts arise, they must always be resolved in favor of achieving the 
indispensable condition for a tolerable world - - the absence of Soviet
' “ Bell. Mr. Conservative. 173.
' “ The speech is reprinted as an appendix to Stephen Shadegg's W hat Happened to Goldwater 
(New York, 1965).
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Communist power."” ® He proclaimed the global pursuit of freedom, justice, 
peace, and prosperity the objects of U.S. foreign policy, but declared them 
secondary to containing the Soviet Union:
Peace is a worthy objective. But if we must choose between peace and keeping the 
Communists out of Berlin, then we must fight. Freedom...is a worthy objective. But if granting 
self-determination to the Algerian rebels entails sweeping that area into the Soviet orbit, then 
Algerian freedom must be postponed. Justice is a worthy objective, but if justice for the Bantus 
entails driving the government of the Union of South Africa away from the West, then the 
Bantus must be prepared to carry their identification cards yet awhile longer. Prosperity is a 
worthy objective, but if providing higher standards of living gets in the way of producing 
sufficient guns to resist communist aggression, then material sacrifices and denials w ill have to 
be made.“ °
Goldwater advocated the anti-communist containment strategy designed 
by Truman and the brinkmanship tactics employed by Eisenhower, and he 
rejected calls for disarmament negotiations as counterproductive to a "peace 
through strength" policy. The senator warned the military officers that, "Free 
institutions and free governments are being challenged by an implacable foe 
dedicated to their destruction. If we renounce in advance the right to resist 
Communist aggression with military strength, we have in effect lost the battle 
and are merely waiting to arrange the terms of surrender."” ' Goldwater 
attacked President-elect Kennedy for substantiating inaccurate charges of a 
decline in U.S. missile superiority and for placing too much importance on 
international perceptions of American prestige. He concluded with a call for 
the removal of the Castro regime and moderate praise for the United Nations,
' “ Shadegg, W hat Happened to Goldwater. 42. 
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but warned that U.S. foreign policy should never be subordinated to the world 
organization.
Goldwater's growing influence in the conservative wing of the GOP was 
obvious in John G. Tower's election to Senate in the spring of 1961. The 
candidate had rejected Nixon's offer to campaign on his behalf in favor of 
Goldwater's direct endorsement. Tower, a young conservative, filled the seat 
vacated by Lyndon Johnson who had become vice president. The first 
Republican senator elected from Texas since Reconstruction, Tower's upset 
victory not only boosted Goldwater's national influence but demonstrated the 
increasing popularity of the conservative movement. Democratic Senator 
W illiam Proxmire of Wisconsin commented that the Arizonan had developed a 
"most surprising personal following in my own state" and that "letters praising 
Goldwater come to me almost as frequently as letters in praise of 
Kennedy."” ^
Goldwater's importance was also evident on April 15, 1961, when 
President Kennedy called him to the White House for counsel on the proposed 
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Goldwater sensed Kennedy's reluctance to order 
U.S. air cover during the operation and was shocked that the President might 
"abandon" the exiled Cubans. He advised the President to "do whatever is 
necessary" to assure a successful invasion. When Goldwater left the White 
House, he was certain that Kennedy would order U.S. forces to assist in the
142 Bell. Mr. Conservative. 198.
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invasion, but the American military did not intervene and the Cuban exiles 
were easily repelled. The Cuban debacle cast a shadow over the new 
administration's ability to conduct foreign affairs.” ® Goldwater and many 
others, including former President Eisenhower, were sure that Kennedy's 
inaction would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness.” " The 
senator later insisted that during this April meeting he, not Kennedy, had 
possessed the "toughness of mind and w ill to lead the country."” ®
Attempting to capitalize on the administration's vulnerability in 
international affairs, Goldwater freely criticized the direction of U.S. foreign 
policy from his new position on the Senate Armed Services Committee. His 
second major book Whv Not Victorv? was devoted exclusively to foreign 
policy and expanded on the ideas presented at the Air War College. Goldwater 
wrote:
I am not calling for return to the naked power of politics of the nineteenth century. I am not 
asking that we declare hot war on Russia or turn a deaf ear to the pleas of help from destitute 
nations. I am w illing to be as modern as anyone as long as modernism does not constitute a 
debasing of our traditional values. But if to be modern I must accede to policies that would 
turn the foreign affairs of the United States over to the United Nations, disarm our great military 
machine, welcome Red China into the Committee of Nations, give away our food and 
technical skills to the so-called neutralist nations, and get nothing in return...if this is what is 
meant, then indeed I am not modern and never want to be.'“
” ®For a thorough analysis of Kennedy's foreign policy, including the Bay o f Pigs invasion, see 
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Conservatives praised the book. The Wall Street journal commented that, 
"Goldwater attacks the heart of various world problems, and most of the time 
his logic is irrefutable."” '' The Saturday Review printed contrasting reviews 
from two political analysts. Raymond Mo ley argued that the senator was an 
"authentic statesman" and that the book contained nothing fanatical; rather "It 
is a reasoned analysis of the failures of foreign policy under the party that he 
opposes." Mo ley's counterpart, Walter Johnson, assailed Goldwater for 
distorting the positions of his opponents and for reveling in the "fundamentalist- 
revivalistic technique of using emotion-laden words." He concluded that 
Goldwater was an "Un-Modern Republican" with "uncomplicated" views on 
foreign policy.” ® The New York Times succinctly concluded that Whv Not 
Victorv contained "the purest of Goldwaterism" that offered "sweet music" to 
Goldwater supporters, although his opponents were likely to "cry horror."” ®
The book's extensive militant language contributed to the senator's emerging 
image as a warmonger. He warned that "Time is running out" in the war 
against communism:
Providence has imposed upon us the task of leading the free world's fight to stay free. We must 
be ready to fight all sorts of wars-brush fires as well as nuclear. We need weapons for both 
limited and the unlimited war. We must-unfortunately-continue to build bigger weapons until 
the Communist menace has subsided. We must go on the offensive....proclaim victory as our 
aim and then press boldly and unremittingly on all fronts. Our job, first and foremost, is to 
persuade the enemy that we would rather follow the world to Kingdom Come than consign it
' “ W all Street journal. April 23, 1962. 
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to Hell under communism.
In the summer of 1961, Senator J. W illiam Fulbright of Arkansas, the 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, began to challenge 
Goldwater's views on foreign affairs in a series of speeches from the Senate 
floor: "voices are saying...that the United States is the strongest country in the 
world, and should not hesitate to commit its strength to the active defense of 
its policies anywhere outside the Communist empire. This is dangerous 
doctrine."” ’ Fulbright supported peaceful co-existence in the Cold War, a 
policy that relied on negotiation and compromise with the Soviets.” ® To the 
Arizonan, peaceful co-existence was the antithesis of conservative foreign 
policy. He described policy under Kennedy and Fulbright as aimless and timid 
and called for new aggressive action to defeat the expanding communist 
menace. World peace, he maintained, was obtainable only through 
demonstrative power. Fulbright chided Goldwater and called upon him to 
explain the meaning of "total victory" in the Cold War and asked how it could 
be achieved "in this age of ideological conflict and nuclear weapons."” ® 
Goldwater defined "victory" in Whv Not Victorv?:
' “ Goldwater, W hv Not Victory?. 43, 122, 143, 157, 159, 161.
'^ 'Congressional Record. June 29, 1961, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p .11702. For a collection 
of early Fulbright speeches see, Karl E. Meyer, ed., Fulbright of Arkansas: The Public Positions of a 
Private Thinker (Washington D.C., 1963).
'®®For a more thorough analysis see J. W illiam  Fulbright's The Arrogance o f Power (New York, 
1966), Eugene Brown's I. W illiam  Fulbright: Advice and Dissent (Iowa City, lA, 1985), and Haynes 
Johnson and Bernard M. Gwertzman's Fulbright: The Dissenter (Garden City, NY, 1968).
' " Congressional Record. July 24, 1961, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 13246.
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If there is doubt as to what victory in the Communist War means, let me say that it means the 
opposite of defeat; it means freedom instead of slavery; it means the right of every man to 
worship God; of nations to determine their own destiny free of force and coercion. Victory in 
the Communist War means the sum total of all the hopes of free men throughout the world. It 
means human dignity, freedom of choice, the right to work. And it means peace with honor for 
men who prize liberty and do not fear death. Those who argue against any use of strength, 
against any military risk, against any unilateral action fail to understand that political victory in 
the Communist War is the only way to avoid a strictly military solution of the East-West 
crisis."""
Goldwater's call for direct resistance to communist expansion was realized 
in October 1962. In a televised address. President Kennedy announced a 
military blockade of Cuba and demanded the immediate removal of Soviet 
nuclear missiles from the island.” ® Nearly two-hundred American ships and 
aircraft, some armed with nuclear weapons, were deployed to the Caribbean. 
The crisis subsided six tense days later when the Soviets agreed to remove the 
missiles and the U.S. promised not to invade Cuba. Despite its favorable 
resolution, the brinkmanship of the Cuban missile crisis frightened many 
Americans, a consequence that did not curtail Goldwater's militant rhetoric. 
Kennedy's leadership during the Cuban crisis galvanized public support for his 
administration and the Bay of Pigs fiasco seemed forgotten. The Democrats 
were rewarded with a four seat gain in the November 1962 mid-term elections 
which forced the Republicans to refocus their attention on regaining the White 
House in 1964.” ®
“ "Goldwater, Whv Not Victorv. 153-54.
” ®For recent scholarship on the Cuban missile crisis see, James A. Nathan, ed.. The Cuban 
Missile Crisis Revisited (New York, 1992).
” ® Harold Faber, ed.. The New York Times Election Handbook 1964 (New York, 1964) 36-39.
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According to a January 1963 Gallup Poll, half of the nation's Republican 
and independent voters favored Nelson Rockefeller as the 1964 GOP 
presidential nominee. Former Vice President Nixon's loss to Pat Brown in the 
1962 California gubernatorial race had severely weakened support for his 
renomination. Rockefeller maneuvered to neutralize opposition to his 
nomination within the party.” ® As the leader of the Republican Party's 
minority conservative wing, Goldwater met with Governor Rockefeller on 
several occasions to discuss "party and policy problems." By the spring of 
1963, Goldwater concluded that the governor "had moved to the right," and to 
the surprise of many, he announced a preference for Rockefeller over two other 
potential nominees, Nixon and political newcomer Governor George Romney 
of Michigan.” ®
Confidence in Rockefeller's leadership declined sharply in May 1963, 
when the governor's recent divorce and subsequent remarriage became public. 
News coverage of the marriage and his new wife's supposed abandonment of 
her children from her previous marriage generated tremendous negative mail. 
Rockefeller's popularity in the presidential polls plummeted, while support for 
Goldwater and Romney soared. A published report detailing a survey of 382 
Republican leaders indicated that "the Goldwater tide is rising high" and that
” ®Mlchael Kramer and Sam Roberts, "I Never Wanted To Be Vice President O f Anything!" An 
Investigative Biograohv of Nelson Rockefeller (New York, 1976), 266-71.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly Goldwater. 176-77.
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he was "far out in front" of all other potential candidates.” ® Rumors 
circulated that Rockefeller blamed Goldwater for the hate mail received from 
right wing conservative groups. Their newfound friendship disintegrated as 
quickly as it had formed. Throughout the summer of 1963, Rockefeller 
condemned right wing extremists for attempting to take over the Republican 
Party and threatened not to support a Goldwater presidential bid if the senator 
were captured by the "radical right."” ®
A "Draft Goldwater Committee" had been in full operation for nearly two 
years. The independent organization led by F. Clifton White, a Republican 
campaign organizer from New York, had worked nationally to recruit 
conservative delegates at all levels of state and local government. On July 4, 
1963, the committee organized a successful political rally of more than 8,000 
supporters at the District of Columbia Stadium without the participation or 
endorsement of its candidate. The Nation described the event as "every 
Goldwater fan's dream of a Republican national convention" complete with 
campaign placards that read "DON'T TARRY - GO BARRY" and "JFK - WE 
WILL BARRY YOU."” ' Senator John Tower and a cast of Hollywood 
celebrities predicted a Goldwater presidential victory before an enthusiastic 
crowd. As a result of his untiring devotion to the GOP, the Arizonan benefitted
'®®U.S. News & W orld  Report. July 15, 1963, 41-43. 
' “ Goldwater and Casserlv Goldwater. 182.
'^ 'Nation. July 27, 1963, 48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
from widespread support among party officials at the county and state levels 
and nationally from fellow senators Norris Cotton of New Hampshire, Carl 
Curtis of Nebraska, Karl Mundt of South Dakota, and congressmen Robert Dole 
of Kansas, Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, and Robert Michel of Illinois. Although, 
Goldwater had distanced himself from the organized effort and delayed public 
announcement of his candidacy, he was outraged at Rockefeller's repeated 
attacks and grew increasingly anxious to win the Republican nomination and to 
challenge his friend and political rival. Jack Kennedy. He believed that 
Kennedy's vacillation in foreign affairs and support for "worn-out domestic 
spending programs" made him vulnerable.'®®
During early October, Kennedy toured several western states and began 
what the press interpreted as a series of pre-election campaign speeches. 
According to the National Review, the public's reaction to Kennedy's speeches 
confirmed the appeal of the "peace" issue and predicted that peace would be 
"the #1 hot item" in his 1964 reelection campaign. The magazine further 
forecast that the any GOP presidential nominee would "have to fight off the 
accusation, 'Warmonger!'"'®® A week later a preliminary presidential election 
poll indicated that Kennedy would command 55 percent of the vote compared 
to 39 percent for Goldwater, with 6 percent undecided. But Goldwater's 
personal popularity was reported at 45 percent and climbing; and a November
'®®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 175. 
'®®National Review. October 22, 1963, 336.
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2, 1963, Associated Press poll of GOP state and county chairmen displayed 
solid support for the senator's nomination. By contrast, Kennedy's national 
approval rating had slipped from 70 percent in 1962 to its all time low of 59 
percent.’®" The President believed that Texas, where his approval rating was 
a dismal 38 percent, was crucial to his reelection in 1964 and the state became 
an important stop on his Western tour.’®® Look magazine projected that 
Goldwater could actually defeat Kennedy.’®® Conservative Republicans 
concluded that even if outright victory were not probable in 1964, the contest 
would at least be close and enable the right wing to capture control of their 
party.
Goldwater had planned to publicly announce his candidacy at the end of 
November, but a sniper's bullet intervened in Dallas on November 22. The 
Kennedy assassination stunned the nation and reversed Goldwater's decision to 
run for president. He told friends that the thought of running against Vice 
President Johnson was "abhorrent." Goldwater believed that there could be no 
battles over issues with Johnson, who was "a dirty fighter" and a "master of 
manipulation." But the groundswell for a Goldwater candidacy that had begun 
at the 1960 GOP convention was overpowering, and under significant pressure
’®" George H. Gallop, The Gallop Poll: Public Opin ion. 1935-1971. vol. 3, 1959-1971 (New 
York, 1972), 1847, 1850.
’®®Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives o f the President. 1963-1969 (New York,
1971), 6.
166 Look. October 8, 1963, 36-37.
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from Senators Cotton, Curtis and other conservatives, Goldwater relented, 
predicting that it would be "an all-out bitter battle."” ®
In just twelve years Barry M. Goldwater had risen from an obscure 
Phoenix city councilman to a legitimate presidential candidate. His immediate 
success had resulted from a blend of candor, enthusiasm, conservative 
ideology, and political good fortune. His exhaustive campaigning against 
twenty years of Democratic leadership in domestic and foreign affairs surprised 
his overconfident opponent in 1952, and the coinciding election of Republican 
Dwight D. Eisenhower ensured Goldwater an upset victory. Once in the Senate 
the Arizonan took advantage of prime committee appointments, and his 
activities earned him a national reputation as a courageous, forthright, and 
independent legislator. His constituents indicated their approval by reelecting 
the maverick in 1958. During his second term, Goldwater emphasized the 
necessity of "victory" in the Cold War and continued his fight against large 
federal government. Gradually the Arizonan had emerged as the leader of the 
Republican Party's conservative wing. By the summer of 1963, Goldwater 
appeared a likely presidential nominee following the political misfortunes of 
the party's two more moderate leaders, Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller.
"'®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 189, 191, 194.
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CHAPTER 5
BAPTISM BY FIRE;
Goldwater And The Drive 
For The 1964 Republican Nomination
Before challenging Lyndon Johnson for the White House, Barry Goldwater 
first had to capture the Republican nomination. During his eleven years in the 
Senate, the Arizonan had established a reputation as the outspoken leader of 
the party's minority conservative wing. He had frequently confronted fellow 
Republicans, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on diverse domestic 
and foreign policy issues. Despite his independence, Goldwater had earned the 
respect and gratitude of many Republicans for his untiring efforts as chair of the 
Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee. Still, senatorial gratitude was not 
equivalent to general support. As he entered the primary campaign, Goldwater 
remained the maverick leader of the GOP's minority faction, and the 
nomination was far from a foregone conclusion.
New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller provided Goldwater's principal 
opposition. The wealthy and powerful governor represented the GOP's 
influential eastern establishment which had supported the Eisenhower 
administration and generally controlled the party's moderate wing. Rockefeller's
86
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presidential ambitions had been well publicized since he mounted a minor 
challenge to Richard Nixon's nomination four years earlier. In 1964 the 
governor campaigned as the party's mainstream candidate who supported a 
strong national defense and moderate federal programs. Since the 1960 GOP 
convention, the conservatives had gradually begun to dominate much of the 
party's local and state machinery, and Goldwater's impressive grassroots 
following forced Rockefeller to attack the senator aggressively, characterizing 
him as a dangerous extremist whose presidency would lead to nuclear war.
Goldwater largely ignored Rockefeller's candidacy and chose to campaign 
against Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. 
Calling for victory in the Cold War, the senator also made foreign affairs a 
primary issue and denounced the defense policies of Democratic presidents 
Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. Rockefeller's negative campaign 
also helped to keep foreign affairs at the forefront of the primaries by seeking 
to capitalize on Goldwater's imprudent, "shoot-from-the-hip" manner. The 
relentless attacks on Goldwater proved so effective that the Democrats quickly 
recognized the Arizonan's vulnerabilities and quietly hoped for a Goldwater 
nomination.
On January 3, 1964, Barry Morris Goldwater, wearing blue jeans and an 
old shirt and leaning on crutches because of recent foot surgery, officially 
announced his candidacy for the GOP presidential nomination from his home 
in Phoenix, Arizona. The outspoken Republican promised to lead the nation in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
a new direction by providing voters "a choice, not an echo."” ® Rather than 
being just another "Me Too" Republican, Goldwater pledged to offer policy 
alternatives distinct from those of rival GOP candidates and the Democratic 
Party. The Arizonan embarked on an intense campaign that would divide the 
Republicans so severely that the party was unable to mount a viable challenge 
for the presidency.
January polling data indicated that popular support for party leadership 
was generally divided among Goldwater, Rockefeller, Nixon and U.S. 
Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and that none of the 
Republicans would run well against Lyndon Johnson in the general election. 
The absence of a predominant leader led to a rancorous fight over the 1964 
GOP presidential nomination and for control of the party. O f the four leading 
Republicans, only Goldwater and Rockefeller formally announced their 
candidacies and actively campaigned for the nomination. Their first battles 
were waged during January and February in New Hampshire.” ®
The New Hampshire primary carried the pledge of fourteen convention 
delegates, but more importantly, the election would afford an early barometer 
of the party's ideological direction and help designate party leadership. Early 
polls comparing the two active candidates indicated an overwhelming 
Goldwater lead; however, his popularity dissipated primarily because of
’ “ Barry M . Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York, 1988), 197. 
'®®Theodore H. W hite, The Making O f The President 1964 (New York, 1965), 98-110.
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campaign controversies regarding his position on social security and foreign 
affairs. In his opening press conference in Concord, Goldwater was asked to 
comment on his position regarding the social security system. He stated that 
the system was financially sound but that it could be improved by making the 
program voluntary. When asked about the Castro regime in Cuba, the senator 
said he would support another exile-led invasion of the island aided by U.S. air 
power. The following day the Concord Dailv Monitor published the headline; 
"GOLDWATER SETS GOALS; END SOCIAL SECURITY, HIT CASTRO."” ®
The headline clearly distorted Goldwater's position, but his proclivity for 
off-the-cuff remarks rather than adhering to formulated policy statements made 
him susceptible to this type of misrepresentation. Furthermore, the senator's 
comments on Cuba only reinforced his image as a warmonger. Earlier, 
Goldwater had asserted that the NATO commander should have authority to 
use tactical nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet attack on Western Europe.” ’ 
Such a policy, although largely unknown, had been implemented by the 
Eisenhower administration and had been continued by Kennedy and Johnson. 
Press representation of his position rankled voters because it suggested that 
Goldwater would arbitrarily transfer control of United States nuclear weapons 
to NATO field commanders. Journalists covering the Goldwater campaign 
pounced on this type of material; and as one Associated Press reporter
’ ®°Robert D. Novak, The Aeonv O f The G.O.P.. 1964 (New York, 1965), 310. 
’ ^’Washington Post. October 25, 1963.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
remarked, "This was great. All we had to do was keep hitting him with 
questions and then wait until he slipped and we had our headlines."” ® 
Goldwater later accepted partial blame for these damaging incidents, 
acknowledging that he should have used "more precise language, qualifying 
what I said"; but he also faulted the press for careless and provocative 
reporting.” ® Aside from the mistakes resulting from the Arizonan's "imprecise 
frankness," his New Hampshire campaign was poorly executed. The "stop-in- 
every-snack-bar" handshaking expeditions overextended the candidate, whose 
proven strength had been making carefully honed speeches to larger 
groups.” " The senator subsequently admitted that the New Hampshire 
primary served as a lesson in "how not to run a campaign."” ®
Comparatively, Rockefeller planned and conducted a more impressive 
campaign, and according to one reporter, the governor "worked harder...and 
had more fun than Goldwater."” ® He traversed the Granite State like a 
quintessential politician. Goldwater biographer Jack Bell described him as a 
"backslapper, an arm-around-the-shoulder and an all-smiles boy," who "tossed
” ®Karl Hess, In A Cause That W ill Triumph: The Goldwater Campaign and the Future of 
Conservatism (New York, 1967), 26.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 204.
” "Hess, In A  Cause That W ill Triumph. 27.
” ®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 202.
” ®Charles M cD ow ell, Jr., Campaign Fever: The National Folk Festival, from New Hampshire to 
November. 1964. (New York, 1965), 30.
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off warmth like a New England stove."” ® Rockefeller successfully 
implemented a strategy designed to capitalize on the mounting "Goldwater 
image" as a reckless radical, who would cancel popular government programs 
and risk nuclear war. According to a campaign journalist, the governor wanted 
to "crystallize it, document it, light it dramatically, and develop it as the villain 
of the piece."” ® But for all of Goldwater's woes. Rockefeller failed to 
improve upon his own popularity with the electorate. Nearly 50 percent of 
New Hampshire's voters remained undecided, and the New York governor was 
dogged by the publicity surrounding his remarriage and the announcement of 
his new wife's pregnancy.” ®
According to a New York Times survey, foreign affairs not Rockefeller's 
personal life, had become the single most important issue to New Hampshire 
voters.’®® Goldwater, who had been promoted to Major General in the Air 
Force Reserve, was most responsible for bringing foreign policy to the forefront, 
and Rockefeller and the press stood poised to seize on any of his unguarded 
statements. The Arizonan proclaimed that the major objective of American 
foreign policy should be "the reduction of communist power."’®’ In addition
’®®Jack Bell, Mr. Conservative: Barrv Goldwater (Garden City, NY, 1962), 300.
’ “ M cDowell, Campaign Fever. 22.
’®®Novak, The Agonv. 322.
’®®New York Times. March 8, 1964.
' “ ’ Goldwater Campaign Speech, San Francisco, California, February 12, 1964, Barrv Goldwater 
Campaign Speeches Volume I. p.7, Barry M. Goldwater Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation,
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to his stand on sharing control of nuclear weapons with NATO, Goldwater 
advocated the reinstitution of the Cuba blockade and the use of force against 
Castro, who had recently cut off the fresh water supply to the Guantanamo 
naval base.’®^ The senator also reaffirmed his willingness to withdraw 
diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, and he recommended that the 
United States leave the United Nations if the People's Republic of China were 
ever admitted. Regarding Vietnam, both candidates criticized the Johnson 
administration and U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for "indecisive" 
and "unclear" policies. The Arizonan claimed current Vietnam policy would 
lead to "disaster" and that the United States could not "ignore hard choices in 
Vietnam....[we must] either w in or withdraw."’®® Goldwater regularly called 
for a return to the foreign policies of Eisenhower and Dulles, who had 
advocated "occasional brinkmanship" and the "proper use of force."’®"
Two days before the primary, the New York Times forecast a close 
election and indicated that rising fears over Goldwater's positions on foreign 
relations had benefitted a surging write-in campaign for New England favorite- 
son. Ambassador Lodge. The Times concluded that the senator's aggressiveness
Tempe, Arizona.
’®^According to historian W alter LeFeber, President Johnson gave a "superb performance" when 
he developed an independent water supply for the installation and then later rejected a Castro offer 
to turn the water back on. See LeFeber, "Latin American Policy," in The lohnson Years, vol. I, ed. 
Robert A. Divine, (Lawrence, KS, 1987), 71.
’®®New York Times. February 21, 1964.
’®"lbid., February 4, 1964.
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on foreign affairs "disturbs voters," and the paper quoted several New 
Hampshire residents describing the senator as "a hot head" and "a nut."’®® 
During the campaign's waning hours. Rockefeller stepped up his assault on 
Goldwater, characterizing his views on foreign affairs as an invitation to "world 
suicide" and the prospect of entrusting the country to him as "appalling."’®® 
Behind the scenes, the governor unsuccessfully urged the leaders of the Lodge 
organization to abandon their efforts.
On March 10, 1964, some 90,000 New Hampshire voters plodded 
through the snow to the voting booths and left political pundits astonished at 
the outcome. Without officially announcing his candidacy or leaving Saigon, 
write-in candidate Lodge with 33,000 votes soundly defeated both Goldwater 
with 20,700 votes and Rockefeller with 19,500 votes. Interpreted as a rejection 
of both Goldwater and Rockefeller, the New Hampshire results left the 
direction of the party uncertain. Most analysts agreed that despite Lodge's upset 
victory, his strong emergence in public opinion polls would prove temporary as 
he lacked a coordinated national campaign and had no significant support 
among state or county level Republican leaders. Observers further concluded 
that the GOP would be forced to seek alternative candidates. Richard Nixon's 
popularity among Republicans had remained fairly stable, and other frequently 
mentioned potential nominees included Michigan governor George Romney
’®®lbid., March 8, 1964. 
' “ Ibid., March 9, 1964.
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and Pennsylvania governor W illiam Scranton. Goldwater's defeat in New 
Hampshire seemed to confirm columnist Joseph Alsop's contention that "No 
serious Republican, even the most Neanderthal type, any longer takes 
Goldwater seriously."’®^ The Goldwater staff regrouped in Washington, 
promoting Cliff White to co-director and enhancing Karl Hess' role as lead 
speech writer and general advisor to the campaign. Reassessing the New 
Hampshire election during a television interview, the Arizonan concluded 
bluntly, "I goofed."’®®
The next major primary elections were in Oregon and California. Unlike 
New Hampshire, the May Oregon ballot included the names of all Republican 
contenders regardless of whether they were announced candidates. The slate 
listed Lodge, Nixon, Goldwater, Rockefeller, Scranton and Senator Margaret 
Chase Smith of Maine. Senator Smith had begun a limited campaign designed 
to demonstrate that it was plausible for a woman to run for the presidency. 
Despite continued popularity in the polls. Lodge denied he was a candidate. 
The Ambassador was soon visited in Vietnam by another undeclared candidate, 
Richard Nixon. The former vice president was reportedly on a world tour as 
legal counsel for the Pepsi-Cola Company; however, he managed to engage the 
press in regular news conferences concerning American politics. Governor 
Scranton publicly remained non-committal. Once again only Goldwater and
’ “ ’'M cD ow ell, Campaign Fever. 30. 
’ ““Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 205.
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Rockefeller overtly solicited convention delegate support.’®®
Ambassador Lodge's New Hampshire victory and surge in opinion polls 
expanded the visibility and importance of U.S. policy in Vietnam. W hile 
campaigning in northern California in March, Goldwater predicted that U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam would constitute a "battalion sized conflict" that 
required a clearly stated purpose.’®® He demanded that Lodge return stateside 
and report to Congress on the deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam. The 
Arizona senator invoked Eisenhower's domino theory, proclaiming that all of 
Southeast Asia would be lost to communism if Vietnam were not adequately 
supported and suggested that direct attacks on North Vietnam "might be 
advisable."’®’ In a televised address Goldwater insisted that U.S. military 
intervention in Southeast Asia had resulted from President Johnson's indecisive 
foreign policy leadership and told voters that "we can and we should end the 
fighting in Viet Nam by taking the strong, affirmative action that would do just 
that."’®® Rockefeller called for Lodge's resignation and for an explanation of 
the failing U.S. policies in Vietnam. He also assailed Goldwater's pledge for 
victory in Vietnam as "irresponsible" and "dangerous."’®® Unbeknownst to
’®®White. M aking O f The President. 111-15. 
’®°New York Times. March 19, 1964. 
’®'ibid., March 14, 1964.
’®®Goldwater National Television Broadcast, May 14,1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign Speeches 
Volume I. p .3, Barry M. Goldwater Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tempe, Arizona.
193 New York Times. April 1, 1964.
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the candidates, President Johnson had already secretly approved Operation 
Plan 34A, which the Pentagon Papers described as "an elaborate program of 
covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam."’®"
Rockefeller stepped-up his attacks after Goldwater received the 
endorsement of California's Republican Assembly for the state's June primary. 
Rockefeller charged that right wing extremists had infiltrated the California 
GOP and that Goldwater remained out of the mainstream of the Republican 
Party. The senator reacted to the accusations with a detailed recounting of his 
Senate voting record, which reflected consistent support for Republican 
initiatives. He dismissed the extremism charge as a "phantom issue."’®®
Concurrently, Oregon polling data indicated that Lodge and Rockefeller 
held large leads over Goldwater, and on the advice of staff, the Arizonan 
curtailed his personal appearances in the Northwest in order to concentrate his 
efforts on delegate rich California. Rockefeller remained in Oregon to campaign 
as the moderate GOP candidate and continued to lash the senator on the issues 
of social security and foreign affairs. The governor contended that he was the 
only candidate who cared enough about Oregon voters to campaign there. 
Goldwater was faring equally badly in national polling contests where he 
trailed both Lodge and Nixon. Still, it was party delegates not the general 
public who nominated presidential candidates, and Goldwater supporters
’ “"Pentagon Papers. (New York, 1972, New York Times-Bantam version), 263. 
’““New York Times. April 1, 1964.
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dominated many precinct, district, county, and state organizations. In an 
Associated Press poll of GOP County Chairman released on April 19, 35.0 
percent expected Nixon to ultimately win the nomination versus the 28.7 
percent who forecast a Goldwater victory; significantly though, 45 percent 
preferred the senator as their nominee compared to just 18 percent for the 
former vice president.’®®
April and May were decisive months for Goldwater across the country. In 
several mid-western primaries he ran virtually uncontested. The formidable 
grass roots organization, "Draft Goldwater," had effectively cultivated a 
majority of party leaders and consequently little campaigning was needed to 
compile impressive delegate counts. For example, in Illinois, his only declared 
opponent was Senator Smith, and while Goldwater's margin of victory was less 
than anticipated, he collected 63 percent of the votes and the commitment of 
most of the state's forty-eight delegates. This phenomenon was repeated 
throughout much of the country. In many states, such as Texas and Nebraska 
that used conventions to select national delegates, Goldwater acquired votes 
faster than all other candidates combined.
The Oregon vote on May 15 threatened to temper these Goldwater 
victories. As the campaign closed, opinion polls reflected Rockefeller gains at 
the expense of Lodge's onetime commanding lead. Oregonians surprised most
'®®John H. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964. (New York, 1968),
65.
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analysts by selecting Rockefeller first with 33 percent of the vote. Closing 
opinion polls had still favored Lodge, who placed second with 27 percent, 
trailed by Goldwater with 18 percent, Nixon with 17 percent. Smith with 3 
percent, and Scranton with 2 percent. More important than the state's eighteen 
delegates, the primary demonstrated Rockefeller's electability and provided his 
campaign with sorely needed momentum and confidence going into the crucial 
California race. Despite Goldwater's lackluster performance in Oregon, 
Newsweek recognized his steady accumulation of delegates elsewhere in the 
country. The magazine suggested that even without a victory in California, the 
Arizona senator might compile enough delegate support to win the GOP 
nomination on the first convention ballot. Given that only 15 percent of 
Republicans nationally supported a Goldwater presidential nomination, 
Newsweek described his delegate count as nothing short of "remarkable."’®® 
Unlike the Oregon primary, the California ballot included only the names 
of announced candidates who had submitted qualifying voter petitions in 
March. Not eligible for the primary. Lodge supporters temporarily backed 
Rockefeller's bid for the Golden State's eighty-six delegates. Early polling data 
indicated a double digit lead for the governor. Nixon and Scranton remained 
neutral, but quietly hoped for a Rockefeller victory and a deadlocked July 
convention. Sensing a possible end to the Goldwater crusade, both undeclared 
candidates discretely courted the Arizonan and his delegates. The senator
’ “^Newsweek. May 18, 1964, 48.
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privately acknowledged that he preferred Scranton to any other potential 
candidate.’®®
Foreign affairs resurfaced as an important campaign issue in California. 
Goldwater claimed that the United States was following "the most disastrous 
foreign policy in its history" and that the administration was sacrificing 
American soldiers in Vietnam because of "old and inadequate equipment."’®® 
The New York Times referred to Goldwater's attacks on Johnson's Vietnam 
policies as his "favorite issue," and the senator reiterated his promise to achieve 
victory in Vietnam with an "aggressive prosecution" of the war.®°° Rockefeller 
restated his charge that Goldwater's views on national defense were impulsive, 
dangerous, and out of the mainstream. He scoffed at the senator's policy 
statements on Vietnam and announced, "I don't believe the answer to our 
foreign policy failures is found in reckless belligerence."®®’ Goldwater 
promptly substantiated Rockefeller's charges with another incident reminiscent 
of New Hampshire.
On May 24, during the ABC news program "Issues and Answers," 
Goldwater was asked about U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Recounting a recent 
meeting held between the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint
' ““Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 213. 
’ ““ Los Angeles Times. May 31, 1964. 
®°°New York Times. May 12, 1964.
®“ ’ lbid.. May 27, 1964.
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Chiefs of Staff, Goldwater stated that the use of low-yield nuclear weapons was 
considered as an option to defoliating the dense jungles that concealed 
Vietnamese supply routes. After the interview, the Associated Press and the 
United Press International reported that Goldwater advocated the use of 
nuclear weapons in Vietnam. The New York Times commented that the more 
Goldwater was criticized for militant foreign policy statements the more he 
made them. The senator attempted to clarify his position, "I would use 
conventional weapons. I would not use atomic weapons when conventional 
weapons w ill do the job."®®® Later the AP issued a correction and the UPl 
retracted the story, but the militant Goldwater image had been reinforced. The 
senator's next setback did not result from a misinterpretation or a 
"Goldwaterism."
On May 25, the New York Herald Tribune published a front page letter 
written by former President Eisenhower describing the ideal Republican 
presidential candidate. The paper ran a parallel article interpreting the letter as 
an attack on the Arizona senator. Eisenhower, pressured by anti-Goldwater 
forces, called for a "responsible, forward looking candidate" who rejected 
simple solutions and "impulsiveness" in foreign affairs.®®® Goldwater 
recognized the article as a timely, disguised assault but countered that he fit 
Ike's description as well as Rockefeller. The senator attempted to minimize the
®°®Los Angeles Times. May 27, 1964. 
®°®New York Times. May 25, 1964.
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untimely damage and in jest sent photographs to Eisenhower and the press of 
himself posing with an arrow under his arm, appearing to have been shot in 
the back.®®"
The Arizonan's recent difficulties were reflected in new polling data. A 
Harris poll reported a 51 to 41 percent advantage for Rockefeller over 
Goldwater in California due largely to foreign policy issues. Although 
Goldwater had begun to attract a majority of previously undecided voters, the 
pollster doubted the senator's ability to win the primary."®®® In a last-ditch 
effort to capitalize on the Goldwater image, the Rockefeller camp mailed more 
than one million pamphlets to Republican households. The headline on the 
mailing read, "Who Do You Want in the Room with the H Bomb?."®®® 
Rockefeller told reporters that Californians had a choice between either 
"constructive, forward looking, responsibility or narrow, doctrinaire, 
extremism."®®® The Goldwater camp launched a massive counterattack 
including a last-minute advertising blitz coordinated with the mass deployment 
of loyal foot soldiers who enthusiastically knocked on voters' doors.
Goldwater's fortunes turned noticeably on May 30 when Mrs. Rockefeller 
gave birth to a baby girl. The ensuing publicity served to rekindle the public's
®®"Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 214. 
®°®Los Angeles Times. May 29, 1964. 
®°®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 216. 
®°®New York Times. June 2, 1964.
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negative attitudes surrounding the couple's recent divorces and remarriage. On 
the next day, just prior to the election, former President Eisenhower told 
reporters that his recent newspaper article had not purposely been anti- 
Goldwater, and any such inferences were "complete misinterpretations."®®®
This last minute flurry of events greatly benefitted Goldwater, and late 
preelection polls indicated that voting would be extremely close. On June 2, 
Californians granted Goldwater a narrow but important 51 to 49 percent 
victory. The election's momentum carried over to additional victories in 
Washington, Colorado, Minnesota, Virginia, Texas and Alabama. This series of 
triumphs seemed to assure the maverick the Republican nomination.
Shortly after his climactic victory in California, Goldwater traveled to 
Washington to cast his vote on the controversial 1964 Civil Rights Act. The 
legislation had been debated in the Senate for several months, but Goldwater 
and other senators considered certain provisions of the law to be 
unconstitutional and recommended further amendment. He stated that the bill 
had been rashly passed because of political pressures and claimed that "if they 
could have locked the doors to the Senate and turned off the lights, you 
wouldn't have gotten 25 votes [in favor of the Act]."®®® Goldwater had been 
a civil rights advocate for nearly twenty years. He had helped desegregate 
Arizona's Air National Guard and Phoenix's lunch counters. He supported the
®®®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 67. 
®®®lbid., 93.
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and had voted for 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. But his criticism of certain components 
of the 1964 legislation allowed opponents to label him a racist and 
segregationist. Political adversaries contended that Goldwater was pandering to 
white Southern voters and to a "backlash" vote in the North, a charge he 
categorically denied. Even New York Times columnist James Reston, hardly a 
Goldwater supporter, characterized the senator's defense of his position as 
"courageous."®’®
Disturbed over Goldwater's posturing on civil rights and by his surprising 
California victory, former President Eisenhower arranged a private meeting with 
Governor Scranton in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to discuss mutual concerns for 
the party's leadership. Scranton left the meeting under the false impression that 
Ike would endorse him as a late challenger to Goldwater. Eisenhower 
subsequently announced that he would not support a stop-Goldwater 
movement. On June 6 at the Annual Conference of Governors in Cleveland, 
Michigan governor Romney gave a rare Sunday press conference and attacked 
Goldwater as an extremist. The senator responded by complaining that his 
opponents seemed "more intent on wrecking the party then on helping to win 
some elections."®”  Six days later, without Eisenhower's public support, 
Scranton announced his belated candidacy for the Republican nomination. The
®'®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 173. 
®”  Novak, The Aeonv. 435.
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Pennsylvania governor wasted no time perpetuating the Goldwater image. 
Scranton proclaimed that he offered the GOP a "real choice" and that he 
rejected the "echo of fear and of reaction - - the echo from the never-never 
land that puts our nation on the road backward to a lesser place in the world 
of free men."®’® Scranton received the support of a somewhat deflated 
Rockefeller organization, and Henry Cabot Lodge resigned his ambassadorship 
to South Vietnam and returned stateside to roundout the GOP's anti-Goldwater 
coalition.
Scranton campaigned vigorously in twelve states during June and soon 
replaced Lodge and Rockefeller atop national opinion polls, but it was too late. 
National delegate support for Goldwater was deep and unwavering. With a 
clear majority of votes intact for a first ballot nomination, Goldwater hoped the 
Republican convention would be a celebration of the conservative wing's 
victory and serve as a launching pad for the party's reclamation of the White 
House. The 1964 convention was anything but a celebration of the 
conservative movement. Instead, the convention, later referred to as a "bloody 
Republican civil war," displayed the dramatic division between the party's 
conservative and liberal factions.®’®
Five days before the opening of the San Francisco convention, Scranton 
was still searching for a divisive incident to derail the Goldwater nomination.
®'®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 70. 
®’®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 220.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
The governor appeared on the NBC morning show "Today" calling the 
Arizonan "impulsive" and he characterized a recent Goldwater interview in Per 
Soieeel as "reckless and dangerous."®’" The June 30 interview with the 
German news magazine became one of several controversies at the Cow 
Palace, and reporter Charles McDowell went so far as to called it "the central 
issue and basic document of the convention."®’® The press repeatedly called 
on Goldwater to defend his comments in the interview. The article covered a 
broad range of subjects but emphasized foreign policy issues such as foreign 
aid, involvement in Vietnam, and relations with Germany. A translation of the 
interview as printed by U.S. News & World Report revealed classic 
Goldwaterisms, many of which are worth recounting to demonstrate his 
ongoing willingness to engage in the type of controversial conversation that 
had plagued his campaign.®’® Responding to a question about his "shoot 
from the hip" style, Goldwater said, "I'll have to admit that I possibly do shoot 
from the hip...I'm not the most intelligent man...and a lot of people think I'm 
quite ignorant...[but] I've experienced more things probably than most men of 
this Congress...and I don't have to stop and think in detail about them." He 
expressed his concern about the Soviet Union's increasing military parity, but 
stated that "the United States is strong enough militarily to do pretty much
®’"New York Times. July 10, 1964. 
®’®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 89.
216 U.S. News & W orld Report. July 20, 1964, 70-72.
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what she wants to do with Russia." The senator acknowledged that he was 
w illing to take the country to the brink of war against communism, given the 
successful precedents of the Straits of Formosa, of Lebanon, of Egypt, of 
Greece, and of Berlin. When questioned about the U.S. commitment to 
Vietnam he responded, "I think President Johnson is tending in that direction - - 
that we aren't going to pull out of Southeast Asia, but that we are going to win, 
in fact. Now the next decision becomes based on military decisions. I don't 
think that's up to a Presidential candidate, or even the President. I would turn 
to my Joints Chiefs of Staff and say: 'Fellows, we made a decision to win; now 
it's your problem'."®’®
The interview also indicated that Goldwater favored strengthening the 
United State's military alliances, and when asked about Germany's 
participation, he said "An alliance with Germany is, I think, imperative....had 
not Germany in both wars been subjected to the supreme command of men-or 
a man in any case - - who d idn't understand war, I think Germany would have 
won both of them." Regarding foreign aid, Goldwater acknowledged the 
benefits of the Marshall Plan - - "there was some wisdom to it" - - but he 
remained opposed to further economic aid, saying "I don't want to give it. 
Period." Instead, Goldwater proposed a multinational fund for extending credit 
to needy nations. He contended that "this business of the United States just 
w illy-nilly giving billions of dollars away and receiving nothing in return - - 1
217 Ibid., 70-72.
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can't buy that. We can't afford it."®’®
The militant nature of Goldwater's responses in the Per Soieeel article 
deepened the schism within the Republican Party. The interview had also 
indicated his doubt that he could win the presidential election. When asked if 
he could beat Johnson, Goldwater said "as of now - - no...l don't think any 
Republican can - - as of now. But I don't think Johnson is better equipped than 
I would be. Nor do I think I am the best man in the Republican party or...in 
the United States. I...decided to give the people...a chance to express 
themselves. Look the idea of becoming a United States Senator scares the hell 
out of me. Becoming President is even more so."®’®
Obviously the probability of Goldwater's presidential nomination also 
frightened his Republican opponents. Upon his arrival at the San Francisco 
convention, former Ambassador Lodge noted that his primary task there was to 
"picture Mr. Goldwater...as an imprudent and trigger happy candidate who 
would rather drop bombs rather than carry out a cautious foreign policy."®®® 
Goldwater was bitter over the continued attacks and did little to calm the 
emotions of adversaries at the convention. On July 12, the last day before the 
convention, the Arizonan received a damning letter from desperate Scranton 
supporters. The letter was a condemnation of the senator, branding him an
®’®lbid.
®’®lbid.
220 New York Times. July 9, 1964.
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"irresponsible radical" and describing his ardent delegate supporters as "little 
more than a flock of chickens whose necks w ill be wrung at will."®®’ The 
letter concluded with a call for an open debate at the convention between the 
two candidates. Charles McDowell described this communication as "perhaps 
the most remarkable episode in the strange, ill-starred odyssey of W illiam W. 
Scranton."®®® For Goldwater the incident ended any possibility of a Scranton 
vice presidential nomination, and he sent copies of the letter to all convention 
delegates and to the press. He attached a copy of an anecdote written by 
Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greely. The passage read:
Dear Sir: I have just read yours of the 19th addressed to myself through the New York Tribune. 
If there be in it any statement or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do 
not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be 
falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an 
impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always 
supposed to be right."^"
McDowell noted the irony that just before Goldwater's nomination, "the 
moderates were practicing extremism and the extremists [were] quoting Lincoln 
on forgiveness and restraint."®®"
With the Scranton letter disarmed, convention activities proceeded with 
routine business. Goldwater supporters ensured that the Republican platform 
met with the senator's approval by rejecting attempts to alter three crucial
®®’ Los Angeles Times, ju ly  13, 1964. 
®®®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 108. 
®®®Los Angeles Times, ju ly  13, 1964. 
®®"McDowell, Campaign Fever. 112.
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sections. First, to alleviate fears that the GOP was being taken over by right 
wing radicals. Rockefeller called for the denunciation of radical groups 
including the John Birch Society and the Klu Klux Klan. The draft platform 
already read "we are against all extreme groups of left and the right who are 
violent."®®® The 1964 Democratic Platform would contain specific 
denunciations, but Goldwater and even Eisenhower were against naming 
specific groups. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania introduced a second 
Scranton-inspired amendment emphasizing Republican support for the Civil 
Rights Act. The Goldwater camp was satisfied with the first draft, which read 
"we pledge full implementation and faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and all other civil rights statutes, to assure equal rights and opportunities 
guaranteed by the Constitution to every citizen." The third major amendment 
called for specific language stating the party's belief that onlv the President had 
control of the country's nuclear arsenal. This amendment was the most 
unacceptable to the conservatives, given Goldwater's position that NATO's 
Supreme Commander should have the authority to repel a Soviet invasion with 
nuclear weapons. Under the heading "NATO: The Great Shield" the platform 
draft read, "Republican leadership w ill move immediately...to explore and 
recommend effective new ways to strengthen alliance participation and 
fulfillment."®®®
®®®Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce johnson. National Partv Platforms. 1840-1968 (Chicago,
1972), 683.
®®®lbid., 683, 688.
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Goldwater kept foreign affairs at the forefront of the convention by giving 
foreign policy addresses at Youth for Goldwater rallies on July 13 and July 14. 
He chose not to mention the Johnson administration specifically but instead 
attacked the "weakness and cowardice" of the "New Frontier." He proclaimed 
that "my opponents w ill call me a warmonger. But I'm the best peacemonger 
among all the candidates. The surest way to disaster is the road we're 
following. The surest way to preserve the peace is through strength - - political, 
moral, economic and military."®®® The senator's speeches did little to 
promote GOP unity.
On the night of July 14, the Republican Party dramatically displayed its 
continuing dissension on national television. The Goldwater staff had arranged 
for the proposed platform amendments to be presented to delegates late at 
night to prevent a large television viewership, and by the time Rockefeller took 
the podium it was almost midnight eastern time. When he called for changes 
to the civil rights portion of the platform, he was booed and jeered by the 
crowd in the gallery. The Goldwaterites had cornered their villain, the eastern 
liberal, the enemy of conservatism, and they attacked him "viciously." Even 
Goldwater was dismayed by the spectacle. Others presenting amendment 
proposals were treated with "grudging tolerance."®®® When the ballots were 
cast for changes to the platform, all amendments were rejected by a large
®®®Los Angeles Times, ju ly  15, 1964. 
®®®McDowell, Campaign Fever. 126-27.
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majority of delegates.
On the following day "in a scene that resembled the lynching of 
liberalism," Barry Morris Goldwater was nominated as the Republican 
presidential candidate on the first ballot.®®® He needed 655 votes and 
received 883. Two days later Goldwater chose New York congressman and 
Republican National Chairman William E. M iller as his vice presidential 
nominee. Miller, a former assistant prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crime 
trials in Germany, was a Catholic from New York, and Goldwater believed that 
the loyal conservative brought geographic and religious diversity to the ticket.
While preparing his nomination acceptance speech, Goldwater was 
informed that President Johnson was leading in early public opinion polls 80 to 
20 percent. He told his staff that "we should be putting together a rejection 
speech and tell them all to go to hell." Recognizing Goldwater's opportunity to 
articulate his positions, the speech writers rejected rapprochement with fellow 
Republicans despite a conciliatory concession address by Governor Scranton. 
According to Goldwater his address signaled "a historic break from the party's 
liberal past."®®® The uncompromising speech accused the Democratic 
leadership of weak and deceitful foreign policies that let "our finest men die on 
battlefields unmarked by purpose, pride, or the prospect of victory."®®’ He
®®®Eric F. Goldman, The Traeedv O f Lvndon lohnson (New York, 1969), 168.
®®°Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 235-36.
®®’Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed.. H istory of American Presidential Elections. 1940-1968 (New 
York, 1971), IV:3667. A complete reprint of the speech is provided.
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proclaimed that the country was at war in Vietnam but that Johnson refused to 
"say whether or not the objective is victory."®®® The leader of conservatism 
asserted that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind 
you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!"®®® A news 
correspondent covering the convention was astonished by the aggressive tone 
of the address and muttered "Oh my God he is going to run [for president] as 
Goldwater."®®"
Political analysts described the GOP convention as disastrous and 
pondered its effect on the future of the party. Interestingly, domestic critics 
agreed with many East European leaders in their assessments. Liberal journalists 
interpreted the Goldwater nomination as a prescription for World War III.
Nikita Khrushchev likened the convention to a "NAZI party rally." And Polish 
Communist Party chief, Wladyslaw Gomulka described Goldwater's 
nomination as "unfavorable to peace" and feared that the senator's foreign 
policies were directed "straight toward a global nuclear catastrophe."®®®
Goldwater's nomination was a remarkable political achievement. At no 
time during the campaign did he ever lead national opinion polls as the party's 
favorite candidate. His limited appeal to the majority of rank and file party
®®®Barry M. Goldwater, W here I Stand (New York, 1964), 12-13. 
®®®Schlesinger, American Presidential Elections. IV:3669. 
®®"McDowell, Campaign Fever. 137.
®®“New York Times, ju ly  22, 1964.
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members was clearly demonstrated In the three most contested primaries. First 
in New Hampshire, he was soundly defeated by an undeclared candidate 
stationed more than 10,000 miles away in Southeast Asia. Two months later he 
suffered a more decisive defeat in Oregon when matched against a full slate of 
GOP leaders. Only in California, when the qualified ballot was limited to just 
two candidates, did Goldwater muster a narrow victory.
How then did the Arizonan manage to w in the nomination? Goldwater 
had acquired a devoted national following of conservative voters during the 
preceding ten years, a result of his non-stop public speaking tours on behalf the 
of Republican Party and due to the popularity of his two books. The 
Conscience O f A Conservative and Whv Not Victorv?. The senator provided 
the GOP right wing with a distinct moral ideology that filled a leadership 
vacuum resulting from the death of Senator Robert A. Taft and the demise of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy. Even the combination of Goldwater's campaign 
blunders, which appeared to substantiate charges of extremism and 
warmongering and the press's periodic misrepresentation of his views could not 
weaken the faith of his conservative supporters. Under the careful orchestration 
of Cliff White and the Draft Goldwater Committee, the conservatives had 
successfully infiltrated and dominated many local and state party organizations, 
thereby warding off the potential for serious challengers in most primary 
elections and state conventions. Furthermore, the divided liberal and moderate 
opposition proved unable to counter this organizational effort.
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After the California primary, with the GOP nomination practically assured, 
Goldwater uncharacteristically failed to prepare a strategy to reconcile the 
splintered party. Any Republican nominee in 1964 was a dark horse candidate 
and consequently needed a cohesive party in order to mount one of the most 
herculean campaign efforts since the GOP battled FDR for the White House. 
The Arizonan mistakenly expected the same magnanimous gestures from his 
opponents that he had displayed at the 1960 convention. The unprecedented 
and relentless assault on Goldwater from fellow Republicans had rendered him 
unable to make the necessary comprises needed to unite the party behind his 
candidacy.
The means by which Barry Goldwater and his minority wing won the 
GOP nomination were impossible to replicate in a two-party national election 
for the presidency. The Republicans, the minority political party, challenged a 
larger, more firm ly united opposition, and Goldwater's small body of fervent 
supporters could not dominate a majority of the national electorate. Before 
Goldwater had begun his quest for the presidency in January 1964, the national 
electorate knew and cared little about the views of Arizona's junior senator.
But once the New Hampshire campaign got underway there were daily news 
reports on Goldwater and the public began to assess his policy positions and 
qualifications to become their president. Over time the regular media coverage 
of Goldwater's off-the-cuff statements and Governor Rockefeller's perpetuation 
of the senator's image as a dangerous extremist began to resonate negatively
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with voters. His image was transformed from that of a maverick senator to an 
extremist presidential candidate. Goldwater's views on domestic issues such as 
social security and civil rights alarmed many liberal and moderate voters, but it 
was the growing perception of him as a radical threatening nuclear war that 
truly frightened the general electorate. As both parties looked ahead to the 
presidential election. Senator Sam Nunn concisely characterized the growing 
national impression of Goldwater's foreign policy views and campaign style as 
"Ready! Fire! Aim!"®®®
®®®Goldwater and Casserly, Goldwater. 238.
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CHAPTER 6
BACK ON THE DEFENSIVE:
Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater 
And The Issue Of War And Peace
Separated in age by one year, Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater were 
both members of the World War II generation. As a young man, Goldwater 
began a business career while Johnson pursued politics after a brief stint as a 
school teacher. Although they developed opposing views on the domestic role 
of government, the two Westerners shared common assumptions about foreign 
relations. Following the war, Johnson and Goldwater supported the militant 
containment policy set forth by the Truman administration. They believed that 
international communism posed a threat to U.S. security interests and that 
heightened peacetime defense appropriations were a necessary deterrent to 
future world wars. During the eight years of the Eisenhower administration. 
Senators Johnson and Goldwater remained loyal Cold Warriors advocating 
massive military budgets and supporting the President's foreign policy. During 
the Kennedy-Johnson administration, Goldwater became a more vocal critic of 
U.S. foreign policy. He attacked Kennedy on many fronts: for grossly
116
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overstating the relative strength of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, for the failed Bay 
of Pigs invasion, and for a general lack of commitment to achieve "total 
victory" over communism.^^^ The senator's disdain for Democratic leadership 
in international affairs carried over to the Johnson presidency and, 
consequently, became a major issue in the 1964 election.
Upon the sudden death of President Kennedy in November 1963, Lyndon 
Johnson's leadership experience proved invaluable to the nation. His modesty 
and call for unity at a time of crisis comforted a shocked and grieving nation. 
Stressing themes of continuity and consensus, the new President focused the 
nation's agenda inward as he championed previously stalled Kennedy 
legislation.^^® After less than twelve months in office, Johnson oversaw the 
approval of an $11.5 billion tax cut complemented by a reduction in the 
federal budget and passage of the Economic Opportunity Act which launched 
the War on Poverty.^”  In July 1964, the President signed into law the 
historic Civil Rights Act which further protected black Americans from 
discrimination in housing, employment, schools, and places of public 
accommodation. Amidst this flurry of legislative activity, Johnson confided 
privately, "We've got to keep this Kennedy aura around us through this [the
^^Congressional Record. July 24, 1961, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 13246.
^^®For a detailed account of LBJ's first year as President see Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedv O f 
Lvndon lohnson (New York. 1969), 1-256.
“ ^Despite vigorous opposition from Republican senator Karl M undt, Johnson also oversaw 
legislation a llow ing the sale of surplus wheat to Russia and other communist countries. See Lyndon 
B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency. 1963-1969 (New York, 1971), 39.
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1964 presidential] e l e c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g  to Johnson aide Eric F. Goldman, 
the Texan had dreamed about living in the White House and "now was the 
chance...to win the presidency.
Lyndon Baines Johnson was born in 1908 in rural central Texas, the son of 
Sam E. Johnson, Jr., a sometime barber, teacher, justice of the peace and 
populist legislator. "Sam Johnson's boy" was bright and energetic. Following 
high school, young Johnson attended South West Texas Teachers College in 
San Marcos, and upon graduation taught public school in rural Texas before 
moving to a Houston high school in 1930. In 1931 he actively campaigned for 
Texas congressman Richard Kleberg, who subsequently hired Johnson as his 
full-time congressional secretary. Johnson immersed himself in the political 
process, emerged as a marginal Washington player and even came to dominate 
Kleberg. In 1935 he left Washington to become the Texas Director of the 
National Youth Administration. Less than two years later, Johnson resigned 
from the NYA to run for Congress. He campaigned as an earnest New Deal 
liberal, won the election and embarked on a brilliant political career.
During his first seven years in Congress, Johnson aligned himself with 
Roosevelt's domestic and international initiatives. His votes for a peacetime 
draft, for pro-British and French amendments to neutrality legislation, and for 
creation of Lend-Lease, all demonstrated his loyalty to the President's foreign
■^’“Eric Foner and John Garraty, ed.. The Reader's Companion to American Historv (Boston, 
1991), 600.
'^’ ’Goldman, Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 171.
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policy agenda. Biographer Robert Dallek noted that the Texan had advocated 
increased defense spending from "the moment he set foot in the House in 
1937."^'*^ Government's heightened spending during the early 1940s enabled 
Johnson to funnel sorely needed capital into the Texas economy, and he took 
an active role in the development of military installations across the state. 
During World War II, Johnson worked for the Navy Department managing war 
materials production in Texas and on the west coast.^ '*®
Sensing the nation's general postwar conservatism, Johnson accentuated 
his states' rights perspective on labor issues, civil rights, and pro-oil industry 
legislation and won reelection to the House in both 1944 and 1946. As the 
Cold War developed, he became increasingly attentive to foreign policy and 
fervently supported the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1948 he ran for the U.S. Senate by extolling 
the virtues of his ten years of public service and by characterizing his opponent 
as a unionist and isolationist. Campaigning against the backdrop of the Berlin 
crisis, Johnson found speeches against communism "an irresistible tactic." His 
Cold War hyperbole energized crowds, as he promoted increased military 
preparedness as a deterrent to communist aggression which, he warned.
Robert Dallek. Lone Star Rising: Lvndon lohnson and His Times. 1908-1960 (New York. 1991),
9.
“^'^Eager to establish any semblance o f a combat record, Johnson managed to arrange two trips 
abroad. A trip  to the Pacific Theater earned him a Silver Star which, according to his biographer 
Dallek, was "the least deserved and most displayed medal" of the war. A second excursion to Europe 
late in the war impressed upon Johnson the region's vu lnerability  to subversive communist 
movements.
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"surges forward in a blood-red tide." W ith both candidates committing voting 
fraud, Johnson won election to the Senate by a mere eighty-seven votes, 
thereby earning the nickname "Landslide Lyndon.
As a freshmen senator, Johnson supported President Truman's Fair Deal 
programs, save civil rights and pro-labor amendments to the Taft-Hartley law. 
His political ambitions led to pragmatic relationships w ith Democratic 
conservatives like Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia and liberals such as 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota. As a member of the Senate Armed 
Services and Foreign Commerce committees, Johnson continued to support 
Truman's Cold War policies including the comprehensive military build-up 
outlined in National Security Council Memorandum No. 68.^ '"®
Senate Democrats suffered key reelection losses in 1950. Arizonan Ernest 
W. McFarland was elevated to Senate Democratic leader and Johnson, 
perceived as a hard working centrist, was made the youngest whip in party 
history. McFarland's subsequent election loss to GOP upstart Barry Goldwater 
in 1952 enabled Johnson to advance to Democratic majority leader. As Senate 
leader he implemented a strategy for the Democrats' return to the majority; it 
emphasized strong party unity and bipartisan foreign policy, which the Texan 
called the "politics of responsibility."^''® In his 1954 reelection bid, "Landslide
“^' ‘'Dallek, Lone Star Rising. 299, 323, 343. 
""®lbid., 396-97.
^"®lbid., 441.
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Lyndon" earned a true landslide victory, winning 71 percent of the vote while 
the Democrats simultaneously regained their majority in the Senate.
Majority Leader Johnson's shrewd management of Senate rules, committee 
appointments, legislative scheduling, and other responsibilities (which 
frequently ignored the tradition of seniority) helped consolidate his power and 
improve his effectiveness as party leader. Johnson oversaw the passage of 
voluminous legislation effecting trade, social security, wages and housing. His 
legislative accomplishments resulted in part from the infamous "Johnson 
treatment," which historian Robert A. Divine defined as a "judicious mixture of 
enticement and fear."^"^ By 1956 Johnson was considered a leading 
presidential candidate, and Joseph P. Kennedy even offered to sponsor a 
Johnson-John F. Kennedy ticket. The Texan declined the offer and refused to 
campaign overtly for the nomination. Although Illinois governor Adlai 
Stevenson eventually won the Democratic nomination, Johnson sensed that the 
White House was within his grasp and began to position himself for a possible 
presidential run in 1960. In Congress he sought to accommodate liberal 
Democrats by slowly reversing his states' rights position on civil rights and 
attempted to appear more independent of President Eisenhower's foreign 
policies. Still an ardent Cold Warrior, much of Johnson's partisan maneuvering 
on foreign affairs, such as rebuking Ike's criticism of Israel during the Suez
■^’^Robert A. D ivine, Since 1945: Politics and D iplomacv in Recent American Historv (New York, 
1979), 142.
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crisis, remained largely symbolic. In the summer of 1960, LBJ supported the 
Republican President during the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet Paris summit. He 
shrewdly manipulated the circumstances to criticize rival presidential aspirant 
John Kennedy, who had blasted Eisenhower for the failed conference.
The Democrats were not lacking presidential candidates in 1960. Johnson 
again decided not to organize an overt campaign, preferring instead to be 
drafted. A draft never materialized. Kennedy's candidacy benefitted from solid 
organization and strong financial backing and he scored primary victories in 
New Hampshire, Wisconsin and West Virginia.^"® Against the advice of 
friends, Johnson embarked on a belated run for the nomination, hoping for a 
deadlocked convention. Instead, the youthful Massachusetts senator won on the 
first ballot. Surprisingly, Kennedy asked Johnson to become the vice 
presidential nominee. LBJ, who had often referred to JFK as a "lightweight," a 
"playboy" or simply as "the boy," accepted the offer believing "power is were 
power goes."^ '*® After serving twenty-three years in Congress, Lyndon Johnson 
left the federal legislature as "the most powerful Majority Leader in Senate 
history."^®®
Johnson hoped to elevate the vice presidency. He quickly solicited
‘^’®Theodore H. W hite, The M aking O f The President 1960 (New York, 1961), 78-114.
^'•^Dallek, Lone Star Rising. 579. Shortly after Johnson accepted the nomination, a shocked fe llow  
senator, Barry Goldwater, wrote to him; it is d ifficu lt "to understand how you are going to try to 
embrace the socialist platform of your party...You were intended for great things, but I don't think 
you are going to achieve them now." See Vantage Point. 102.
^®®Dallek, Lone Star Rising. 590.
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unprecedented responsibility and authority and even suggested that he occupy 
an office adjoining the President's. Kennedy deftly rejected the aggressive 
overtures. Although the President routinely consulted with Johnson on major 
issues, the Vice President was never fully accepted into Kennedy's inner circle 
of advisors. This was apparent by his absence from cabinet meeting discussions 
on important domestic issues such as the 1962 steel crisis and the integration 
of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi. Johnson was also missing 
from key foreign affairs meetings including those surrounding the Bay of Pigs 
invasion and many of the Executive Committee gatherings during the Cuban 
missile crisis.
Johnson became increasingly frustrated by his limited responsibilities and 
bristled at the administrations's inability to pass major legislation. The former 
senate majority leader "retreated into a shell."” ' Nevertheless, Kennedy 
possessed sincere respect and affection for Johnson and sought to involve him 
in "meaningful activity" with appointments as chairman of the administration's 
Space Council and the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. 
Furthermore, the President limited his own travel abroad and dispatched 
Johnson on more than two dozen diplomatic missions, including an important 
August 1961 trip to West Berlin designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment to 
Germany during construction of the Berlin Wall. The Vice President enjoyed 
his international assignments as they made him the center of press attention
251James N. G iglio, The Presidency of lohn F. Kennedv (Lawrence, KS, 1991), 39, 133.
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and provided at least temporary freedom from the Kennedy White House.
Johnson's most publicized mission abroad was to South Vietnam. In late 
April 1961 Kennedy began to receive recommendations to deploy U.S. combat 
troops to South Vietnam from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from an inter­
departmental task force studying Vietnam.”  ^ In May, Kennedy sent the Vice 
President on an extended tour of Southeast Asia which included a lengthy 
layover in Saigon. Johnson publicly lauded President Ngo Dinh Diem and 
upon his return to Washington advised the President not to give up on the 
South Vietnamese leader. He reminded reporters that, "he's the only boy we 
got out there," but privately warned Kennedy that Diem was "beset by many 
problems...[and] is remote from the people."” ® Johnson, like most 
presidential advisors, later rejected all propositions that the United States 
abandon South Vietnam and, instead, he encouraged Kennedy to take stronger 
military action. He counseled that "The battle against Communism must be 
joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success 
there."” '* Despite his travels abroad and domestic appointments, Johnson was 
considered "underemployed" in the vice presidency and his three-year tenure 
was "the lowest point" of his remarkable political career.®®® Still, just prior to
” ®Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedv (New York, 1965), 652.
®®®David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1992), 134. 
” ‘*Giglio. lohn F. Kennedv. 135.
” ®Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. 133.
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Kennedy's assassination, the Texan, who undoubtedly was planning four years 
ahead, had accepted the President's offer to remain on the Democratic ticket 
for the upcoming presidential election.
After Kennedy's death, Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential nomination 
was never in serious jeopardy, although Alabama's Democratic governor 
George C. Wallace entered several primary elections. Promoting himself as a 
conservative alternative, the governor attracted a surprisingly large 
following.®®® The Wallace candidacy appealed to a "white back-lash" among 
racial segregationists, and he received 30 percent of the vote in Indiana, 34 
percent in Wisconsin and an astonishing 43 percent in Maryland.®®® Despite 
these respectable showings, the governor ended his campaign in July under the 
shadow of an allegedly more viable conservative candidate, Barry Goldwater, 
who had been nominated at the GOP San Francisco convention. It was 
Johnson's clandestine selection of a running mate and the politically dangerous 
insurgence of an all black Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National 
Convention that provided the most compelling drama for the Democrats in 
1964.
President Johnson had enjoyed such high popularity ratings during his first 
year in office that the selection of a running-mate appeared almost insignificant. 
But in typical Johnsonian fashion he engaged in a "name dropping game" and
®®®Stephen Lesher, George W allace: American Populist (New York, 1994), 267-310. 
®®®Theodore H. W hite, The Making O f The President 1964 (New York, 1969), 233-34.
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manipulated various potential nominees.®®® As a test of his abilities, the 
President called upon Senate Majority W hip Hubert H. Humphrey to resolve 
the only crisis of the Atlantic City Democratic Convention.
Attempts to register black voters into the lily-white Mississippi Democratic 
Party had failed miserably prior to the convention as blacks had been barred 
from county and state conventions. As a result, blacks formed a new party, the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.®®® Forty-four MFDP delegates went to 
Atlantic City to contest the seats of Mississippi's all-white delegation. Fearing 
the disruption of a nasty floor fight before a national television audience, 
Johnson demanded that a compromise be arranged. Humphrey, aided by 
Minnesota attorney general Walter Mondale and labor leader Walter Reuther, 
proposed a three pronged solution: that two MFDP delegates be allowed to 
vote at large, that the white Mississippi delegation pledge allegiance to the 
Johnson ticket, and that no delegates from states which discriminated against 
blacks be allowed to participate in future conventions. The compromise was 
clearly biased toward conservative southern delegates, whom Johnson feared 
would bolt the party and support Goldwater. Texas governor John Connally 
had warned the President, "If you seat those black buggers the whole South 
w ill walk out."®®® Mississippi's black delegation firm ly rejected the token
®®®Hubert H. Humphrev The Education O f A Public Man: M v Life and Politics (New York. 1976), 
297.
®®®Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Eaualitv 1954-1980 (New York, 1981), 179.
®®®lbid., 182.
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proposition and stormed out of the convention. Most convention delegates 
supported the Humphrey compromise because a more liberal proposal could 
have factionalized the party and jeopardized the election. The crisis subsided 
when the vice presidential nomination and platform approval took precedence.
As early as May 1964, Johnson had confided in Humphrey that he was 
the preferred vice presidential candidate but cautioned that it might not be 
politically feasible. A former mayor of Minneapolis, Humphrey was a liberal 
Democrat who had supported Truman's divisive pro-civil rights platform in 
1948. A staunch supporter of labor, farm subsidies, price supports and civil 
rights, the Minnesotan, like most of his contemporaries, was also a Cold 
Warrior. Johnson eventually offered the nomination and Humphrey, with 
widespread support from convention delegates, readily accepted. He had 
lobbied actively for the vice presidency and promised unswerving loyalty to 
Johnson despite the President's "aggravating" and "bizarre" method of selecting 
a running mate.®®'
The Johnson-Humphrey ticket ran on a platform that touted four years of 
accomplishments under Kennedy and Johnson. On the domestic front it 
boasted progress in civil rights, the passage of tax cuts, and inroads against 
poverty. The platform's strong emphasis on foreign affairs was indicative of 
Johnson's intention to capitalize on the war and peace issue in the campaign.
®®'Humphrey, Education O f A  Public Man. 299. Humphrey wrote "Johnson had drained every 
b it of ju ice out of the nomination, and he had drained a good deal out of me."
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The Democrats sought to disarm Goldwater's charges that the Democrats were 
"soft" on communism by emphasizing recent international successes. Kennedy's 
resolution of the Cuban missile crisis and Johnson's firm response to the Gulf 
of Tonkin incidents were cited as examples of the Democrats' determination to 
challenge the communist threat. The Democrats claimed that, "On the 
battlefield of the Cold War one engagement after another has been fought and 
won."®®® The platform also alluded to the potential consequences of 
perceived Goldwater's recklessness: "One rash act, one thoughtless decision, 
one unchecked reaction - - and cities could become smouldering ruins and 
farms parched wasteland. The leadership we offer has already been tested in 
the crucible of crisis and challenge." Building upon the theme of responsible 
leadership, the Democrats proclaimed the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as the 
first meaningful step toward controlling the ominous arms race, and as an 
additional jab at Goldwater, the platform clarified that "Control of the use of 
nuclear weapons must remain solely with...the President of the United 
States."®®®
Democratic emphasis on the Gulf of Tonkin affair was also meant to 
accentuate the differences between Johnson and Goldwater. Between the GOP 
and Democratic Conventions, on August 2, 1964, three small North 
Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the American destroyer Maddox thirty miles
®®®Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, ed.. National Partv Platforms. 1840-1968 (Chicago, 
1970), 654.
263 Ibid., 634-44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
off the North Vietnamese coast in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the assault 
appeared entirely unprovoked, the United States had been systematically aiding 
South Vietnamese commando raids on the North. The Maddox, which had 
been on a routine intelligence gathering patrol, easily repelled the attack with 
the assistance of fighter jets launched from the USS Ticonderoea. President 
Johnson responded to the situation by ordering a second destroyer to the gulf. 
On August 4 during a severe storm, both U.S. destroyers claimed to have come 
under renewed attack. Despite mounting evidence that a second attack never 
actually occurred, the President delivered a national television address to 
announce his order for limited retaliation bombing against North Vietnam. 
According to historian George C. Herring, the administration had been "in a 
mood to retaliate" as Johnson and his advisors feared being perceived as "paper 
tigers" reluctant to risk an escalation of the war.®®'' A Johnson aide later 
referred to the President's management of the Tonkin crisis as "ideal 
campaigning."®®®
Barry Goldwater supported the President's "firm action" in response to the 
Tonkin crisis, but claimed that the North Vietnamese attack had resulted from 
Johnson's unclear policy objectives. The senator demanded a "new policy" that
®®*George C. Herring. America's Longest War: The United States And Vietnam. 1950-1975 (New 
York, 1986), 120-21.
®®®Goldman, The Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 176. George C. Herring critic ized Johnson for 
rallying national support w ithout disclosing the United State's substantive covert activ ity against the 
North Vietnamese. See America's Longest War. 122.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
was committed to winning the war in Vietnam.®®® Goldwater's critics used 
the crisis to emphasize the potentially dangerous ramifications of his 
presidency. They charged that the Arizonan would have over reacted to such 
an incident and instead of ordering 63 sorties against North Vietnam he would 
have commanded 630. The New Reoublic commented that Goldwater prefers 
"saturating whole cities and regions with old-fashioned nuclear bombs."®®® 
Actually, the senator supported the level of Johnson's retaliation, saying "we 
cannot allow the American flag to be shot at."®®® However, on August 8, he 
still intended to exploit events in Vietnam and proclaimed that the Democratic 
leadership had failed to "understand communism" and accused it of pursuing 
peace "at any price."®®® On the same day. Congress overwhelmingly passed 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution granting the President broad military authority to 
intervene in Vietnam. Democrat J. W illiam Fulbright, who had recently become 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, skillfully shepherded the 
measure's passage. The Gulf of Tonkin crisis enabled Johnson to rally the 
country behind his leadership and to weaken charges that he lacked adequate 
experience to conduct foreign policy or that he would tolerate communist
®®®Goldwater Campaign Speech, Washington D.C., August 10,1964, BarrvGoldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume I. p.6, Barry M. Goldwater Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tempe, 
Arizona; hereafter cited as Goldwater Collection.
®^^ New Republic. August 22, 1964, 4.
®®®Goldman, The Tragedy O f Lvndon lohnson. 177.
®^^ New York Times. August 7, 1964.
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incursions. Historian Stephen E. Ambrose referred to passage of the Tonkin 
resolution as "the decisive moment in the 1964 election," concluding that the 
President had "pulled off a political miracle,"®®®
Prior to the start of his official campaigning, Goldwater urged more 
aggressive prosecution of the war in Vietnam "with the object of ending 
it."®®' He proclaimed that Vietnam symbolized not a minor skirmish but 
instead a major battlefield in the free-world's struggle against communism. The 
nation, he claimed, needed to "back up its resolve with whatever manpower, 
equipment, and weaponry it may take...to stem the Communist advance in 
Laos and Vietnam."®®® The senator characterized Johnson's cautious Vietnam 
policy as shameful and contended that the country could not "afford the 
tragedy of sending our boys into a war we w ill not permit them to win. 
Nowhere in the world today is there a clearer road to peace through strength 
than in Vietnam."®®®
In August, national election polls favored Johnson by 65 to 30 percent, but 
his opponent demonstrated strength in the South where he led the President 50 
to 41 percent. The Christian Science Monitor reported that Goldwater led in
®®°Stephen E. Ambrose, N ixon: The Triumph of a Politician. 1962-1972 vol. 2, (New York, 1989), 
47-58.
®®'Goldwater Collection, Washington D.C., August 10, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume I. p.6.
®®®Barry M . Goldwater, Where I Stand (New York, 1964), 29.
®®®lbid., 28-29.
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nine states in addition to those in the South.®®'* Despite Johnson's 
overwhelming national margin, many political analysts foresaw "a hot contest" 
because of the candidates' stark contrasting positions and the Arizonan's 
proven ability to win election upsets.®®®
Vacationing in northern California during early August, Goldwater began 
to prepare for a campaign strategy meeting with GOP leaders. Goldwater, 
W illiam E. Miller, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Richard M. Nixon led the one 
day "unity conference" on August 12 in Hershey, Pennsylvania, which was 
attended by more than thirty Republican congressmen, senators, governors and 
gubernatorial candidates. The conference provided Goldwater a forum to clarify 
his position on controversial campaign issues and to ease concerns of fellow 
Republican leaders. The objective was clear; unify the splintered party. 
Eisenhower and Nixon knew that without at least a semblance of party 
cohesion, victory in November was impossible. Eisenhower opened the 
proceedings by urging the Republicans to "get our souls bared so that when we 
go out we can put something together that is worthwhile, that can w in." Vice 
presidential nominee M iller gave a brief opening address. He called for 
cooperation between local, state and national Republican organizations and 
outlined the 1964 election strategy as the reaffirmation of the party's 
commitment to "firmness and strength in foreign affairs and to fiscal
®^'*Newsweek. August 17, 1964, 34, Time. August 7, 1964, 20-21. 
®®®U.S. News & W orld  Report. August 3, 1964, 12.
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responsibility at home."®®®
In the conference's principal speech, Goldwater confronted the 
controversial issues of his candidacy: social security, civil rights, and foreign 
policy extremism. The Arizonan claimed that his position was misunderstood 
on all of these points. Both Eisenhower and Nixon had approved Goldwater's 
text in advance, and Ike told the conferees, "I respect it and admire it."®®®
The senator underscored his basic support for the social security program, 
promised strict adherence to all civil rights legislation, and repudiated all 
extremist groups that relied on threats or violence. But most of all, he sought to 
correct what he called "the supreme political lie" that a Goldwater presidency 
would somehow lead to nuclear war. The senator promised that his election to 
the White House would signal "an immediate return to the proven policy of 
peace through strength which was the hallmark of the Eisenhower years."®®® 
And, as President he would engage in routine and in-depth consultation with 
Eisenhower and Nixon on international affairs and related cabinet 
appointments. Goldwater also reaffirmed his commitment to the NATO alliance 
and the United Nations, declaring them valuable world peace organizations. 
The speech was greeted with vigorous applause.
®®®Karl Hess, In A Cause That W ill Triumph: The Goldwater Campaign and the Future of 
Conservatism. (New York, 1967), 169, 173. A transcript of the conference is reprinted as an 
appendix.
277 Ibid., 172.
®®®Goldwater Collection, Hershey, Pennsylvania, August 12, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume I. p.2.
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During an extensive question and answer period following the senator's 
address, several governors including George W. Romney and Nelson A. 
Rockefeller warned of the explosiveness of the civil rights issue in major urban 
areas and of the nominee's lingering image as a warmonger. Goldwater 
acknowledged the danger of racism as a campaign issue, even saying, "I am 
scared to death of it....I w ill lean overbackwards to keep from discussing it." 
Eisenhower instructed the senator to refute his negative image as a militant on 
a daily basis during the campaign, and Governor W illiam Scranton suggested 
using extensive television advertising to promote the nominee's actual 
positions. Arizona governor Paul Fannin instructed the GOP leaders to work 
hard to place Goldwater's "proper image" before the public. At the end of the 
conference, much to Goldwater's satisfaction, Maine governor John H. Reed 
announced, "Senator, I think I want to say you have done an excellent job. You 
have relieved the reservations that I had and you have my unqualified 
support."®®®
Speaking at a post conference press gathering, Eisenhower emphasized his 
support for the Arizonan. He told reporters that he no longer possessed any 
"uncertainties...as to the fitness, adequacy and quality" of Barry Goldwater and 
that he was "right on his team."®®® Even Rockefeller appeared genuinely 
satisfied, admitting that the nominee's prepared statement had been "very close
®®®Hess, In A Cause That W ill Triumph. 206, 217, 224.
” °Time. August 21, 1964, 13, Newsweek. August 24, 1964, 20.
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to traditional Republican principles that reflect a moderate point of view and 
are in the mainstream of American thought." When some journalists insinuated 
that Goldwater must have compromised his positions on important issues to 
rally the GOP leadership, the senator responded that his address had not been 
expedient or hypocritically conciliatory; rather it "merely, reaffirms what I've 
been saying throughout the campaign."®®’ Leading news magazines covering 
the Hershey meeting reached contrasting conclusions. Time commented that 
Goldwater had "skillfully handled a remarkable summit conference,"®®® while 
Newsweek claimed that his speech had been "nothing less than a series of 
major concessions to the moderates."®®® Murray Kempton of The New 
Republic was equally unimpressed by the gathering, stating that "the new 
Goldwater" only exhibited a change in tone and that the conference "had not 
changed anything essential."®®'' Kempton also noted the absence of several 
staunch Goldwater critics, including Michigan governor Romney, from the 
press conference and questioned Eisenhower's new enthusiasm for the ticket. 
Nonetheless, Goldwater had completed the seemingly obligatory attempt to 
rally party support for the ticket, and with Ike, Nixon, Scranton and possibly 
Rockefeller on board, the Hershey conference appeared successful.
Newsweek. August 24, 1964, 20. 
®^®Time. August 21, 1964, 13. 
” ®Newsweek, August 24, 1964, 19. 
^ ' New Republic. August 22, 1964, 4-5.
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Given the soundness of the national economy and Goldwater's reluctance 
to make civil rights a campaign issue, the GOP nominee saw foreign relations 
as an area of vulnerability for Johnson. Reversing the senator's own "number 
one problem" of war and peace however, would prove more difficult w ith the 
press and the voting public than with party leaders.®®® Modifying his militant 
image required Goldwater to curtail the jingoistic rhetoric that he had exhibited 
throughout the primaries. His refusal or inability to do this had even been 
evident at the Hershey press conference where the senator reaffirmed his 
advocacy of U.S. interdiction of communist supply lines from North Vietnam. 
His contention that Johnson had given the navy's Seventh Fleet permission to 
use tactical nuclear weapons in response to the Gulf of Tonkin crisis was even 
more controversial. Upon hearing the senator's comments, Johnson had broke 
sharply from his strategy to ignore Goldwater and arranged an impromptu press 
conference to rebuke him and deny his charges. The President said, "Loose 
charges on nuclear weapons...by any candidate for any office, let alone the 
Presidency, are a disservice to our national security, a great disservice to the 
entire free world."®®®
Goldwater's unbridled commentary on foreign affairs continued 
throughout August. Speaking at the Illinois State Fair he chastised the Johnson 
administration for granting North Vietnam advance warning of the reprisal
®®®Hess. in A  Cause That W ill Triumph. 172. 
” ®Newsweek. August 24, 1964, 20.
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attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin affair and he repeated an earlier criticism that the 
nation's defense policy was becoming too reliant upon intercontinental missiles 
rather than manned bombers, Goldwater charged that under Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, America's "deliverable nuclear capacity" would be 
reduced by 90 percent in the next ten years.®®® He based this projection was 
based upon the assumption that all Strategic A ir Command bombers would be 
replaced by less accurate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. He later quipped 
that the A ir Force might soon need "Hertz rent-a-bombers."®®® The Defense 
Department contested Goldwater's estimates and stressed that its ICBM 
program was reliable and by the end of the decade would be able to deliver 
250 percent more nuclear warheads. Campaign reporters referred to the 
confusing debate as the "megatonnage gap" with Goldwater talking about 
inaccurate missile launchers and the Pentagon stressing the cumulative 
destructive power of its growing missile inventory.®®®
When asked in late August at an informal press gathering what would be 
the most important issue of the campaign, Goldwater replied, foreign policy. 
Earlier that week he had spoken at a veterans convention in Cleveland where
®°®Time. August 28, 1964, 18. In the same speech Goldwater referred to the secretary as "Field 
Marshall McNamara." In his autobiography w ith  Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York, 1988), 294, 
the senator called McNamara "one o f the most unreliable and untrustworthy men in America."
®®®Time. September 18, 1964, 32. W h ile  discussing missile launcher inaccuracy, Goldwater had 
once commented that, "I want to lob one into the men's room of the Kremlin and make sure I hit 
it." See Johnson, The Vantage Point. 102.
” ®New Republic. September 5, 1964, 8. Also see Newsweek. September 24, 1964, 21.
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he emphasized the need for a reinvigorated North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
He accused Johnson of making the control of nuclear weapons a "partisan 
political issue" and proceeded to restate his position that under crisis 
circumstances the Supreme NATO Commander should have authority to use 
"small conventional nuclear weapons." Goldwater told the veterans that these 
tactical weapons were "no more powerful than the f I re-power you have faced 
on the battlefield."®®® Responding to questions about the recent Democratic 
Convention, the senator criticized Johnson's acceptance speech as being 
"perhaps the most isolationist ever...Not once did he challenge 
Communism."®®’ The Arizonan predicted that Johnson would attempt to 
capitalize on the war in Vietnam by entering into peace negotiations sometime 
before election day. He startled reporters by appearing to soften his position on 
Vietnam when he stated that "talks with the Red Chinese might be profitable." 
Later, in a more characteristically hard line tone, a GOP press aide assured the 
reporters that by "talks" with China Goldwater actually meant an ultimatum 
with possible threats to blow up Chinese bridges if they continued to supply 
Viet Cong guerrillas. Newsweek reported that the confused journalists were left 
to grope through the candidate's customary "semantic fog."®®®
Goldwater officially began his campaign on September 3, 1964, from his
®®°Goldwater Collection, Washington D.C., August 25, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volum e I. p.3-4.
®®’ Newsweek. September 7, 1964, 30.
®®®lbid.
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familiar election launching pad of Prescott, Arizona. Ever cognizant of his
militant image, he promised tranquility abroad and referred to "peace" nearly
twenty times.®®® He proclaimed, "I do not intend to be a wartime president."
The senator lashed out at the President. He renewed his charge that Johnson
would use the Vietnam war to rally voter support during a time of national
crisis. He pledged that if he were elected his conservative principles would be
incorporated into national policy gradually, and that he would honor the
country's commitments to social security and other domestic programs.
Referring to foreign affairs, he warned voters, "Choose the way of this present
Administration, you choose the way of unilateral disarmament and
appeasement." By contrast, a Goldwater presidency offered:
Peace through preparedness. Progress through freedom. Purpose through constitutional order. 
Peace is basic to the differences between the two parties. Johnson does not comprehend the 
nature of the enemy who threatens the peace, or the nature of the conflict which...has been 
imposed upon the entire world. Some distort that we are preoccupied with war. There is no 
greater political lie. W e are preoccupied with peace. And we are fearful that this Administration 
is letting the peace slip away, as it has slipped three time since 1914, by pretending that there 
are no threats to it.
This Administration, which inherited the mightiest arsenal for the defense of freedom ever 
created on earth, is...dismantling it...Republicans will end the draft altogether, and as soon as 
possible. To use military services for political and social schemes-as this Administration does- 
is to drift closer to war on an ebbing tide of military strength. W e have simply got to put this 
record straight, and all of us must understand it. The Republican Party is the peace party. W e 
seek a strong America because only a strong nation can keep the peace. I do not intend to be a 
wartime President. I promise an Administration that will keep the peace-and keep faith with 
freedom at the same time. The Republican Party, this party of peace through strength, has no 
clearer message. Peace has no greater hope.^®'*
®®®Goldwater Collection, Prescott, AZ, September 3, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign Speeches 
Volume I. p.1-5. (U.S. New & W orld  Report reprinted the entire speech on September 14, 1964).
®®‘*Goldwater Collection, Prescott, AZ, September 3, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign Speeches 
Volume II. p.3-5.
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Goldwater also promised to end the "outmoded and unfair" military draft 
system, which he later claimed "discriminates grossly against many of the poor 
and less well-educated."®®® His supporters were energized by the speech, 
which appeared to effectively refute all of the negative charges, including the 
"trigger happy" label, that had been hung on to their candidate. In his 1988 
autobiography, Goldwater referred to the Prescott speech as his "finest 
hour."®®® Even the liberal Nation grudgingly backed Goldwater's proposal to 
end the draft: "Not even Goldwater can be wrong all the time."®®® But the 
magazine's editors remained unconvinced of the Republican's peace overtures 
and concluded that "on nuclear weapons alone any sensible voter w ill prefer 
Johnson to a thinly disguised jingo like Goldwater."®®®
Two days later, W illiam M iller opened his campaign in New York with a 
blistering attack on Hubert Humphrey. M iller challenged the Democrat's Cold 
War credentials by charging that Humphrey favored formal recognition of the 
People's Republic of China and friendlier relations with Castro's Cuba. Senate 
Foreign Relations Chairman W illiam Fulbright came to Humphrey's defense 
and characterized M iller as being full of "foul-mouthed vituperation." M iller in 
turn called Fulbright an "apostle of retreat" and an "advocate of
®®®lbid., p.4. and Goldwater Collection, Dallas, TX, September 23, 1964, Barrv Goldwater 
Campaign Speeches Volume II. p.6.
®®®Casserly and Goldwater, Goldwater. 120.
®®®Nation. September 21, 1964, 104.
®®®lbid., September 7, 1964, 81.
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accommodation who spews forth venomous predictions."®®® Humphrey 
ignored Miller's barbs during the campaign and instead swung straight for 
Goldwater. He told voters, "The question before the electorate is simple, 
prophetic, profound - - which of these men...do you want to have his hand on 
the nuclear trigger?"®®®
President Johnson, "filled with confidence," opened his campaign on 
September 7 in Detroit. He discussed the nation's domestic agenda and 
ignored specific policies abroad. He reassured voters that his administration 
represented peace, preparedness and prosperity. Johnson purposely avoided 
mentioning Goldwater by name, but alluded to the negative image of his 
opponent, saying, "This country is not going to turn from unity to hostility, 
from understanding to hate."®®’ Like Goldwater's primary election opponents, 
the President sought to capitalize on the voters' fears of war. One week later 
LBJ attacked "extremists" who "demand that you choose a doctrine alien to 
America - - a doctrine that would lead to a tragic convulsion in foreign 
relations."®®®
The Democratic strategy to impugn Goldwater was dramatically revealed 
in two national television advertisements sponsored by the Democratic
” ®Tlme. September 18, 1964, 32. 
®°®lbid., September 25, 1964, 16. 
®°’ lbid., September 18, 1964, 30. 
®°®lbid.
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National Committee.^®^ The first, broadcast on September 7, depicted a small 
girl in a field picking pedals off of a daisy. As the girl counted each pedal, a 
man's voice began counting backwards from ten to zero. When the man 
reached zero, the scene changed to an explosion of a nuclear bomb and 
Johnson's voice was heard saying, "These are the stakes. To make a world in 
which all of God's children can live, or go into the dark. We must either love 
each other, or we must die." An announcer's voice followed to encourage 
viewers to vote for Johnson: "The stakes are too high for you to stay 
home."^®'’ An equally disturbing second advertisement aired five days later 
and targeted Goldwater's 1963 senate vote against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
The ad pictured another small girl eating an ice cream cone with a woman's 
voice reminding viewers that radioactive fallout killed children and that if 
Goldwater were elected he might restart atmospheric testing. "Vicious?" asked 
Time magazine, "Of course. But the very fact that such commercials are being 
used speaks mouthfuls about what now stands as the decisive issue of the 1964 
presidential campaign - - the argument over control of nuclear weaponry."^®^
In his book The People Machine. Robert MacNeil characterized the advertising
“^^Presidential aide Bill Moyers and the advertising firm Doyle, Dane Bernbach were largely 
responsible for the television spots. Goldwater's displeasure over the ads was long lasting. In his 
1988 autobiography he noted that even the thought of Moyers still "makes me sick."
"^‘‘Bernard Rubin, Political Television (Belmont. CA, 1967), 186.
°^^ Time. September 25, 1964, 16. Interviewed for the 1988 Goldwater autobiography, the 
Washington Post's Ben Brad lee recalled his impression of the advertisements, they were "a fucking 
outrage. I was outraged."
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campaign as a "viciously clever attempt to keep alive doubts that had been an 
issue all year, of Goldwater's trust worthiness with the nation's nuclear 
arsenal."^®® MacNeil called the television spots "scurrilous," but also credited 
a host of Goldwater's Republican and Democratic critics with the formation of 
his image as a "trigger-happy cowboy...ready to 'shoot from the hip'."^®^
The two Democratic television advertisements were broadcasted once and 
each lasted less than five minutes, but they effectively repelled Goldwater's 
early attempt to capture or at least control the peace issue. The advertisement's 
striking visuals tied the specter of nuclear holocaust to a Goldwater presidency. 
The ads sparked press inquiry over the genesis of the war-peace issue and 
resulted in harsh criticism of both candidates. Time attacked Johnson for not 
acknowledging that U.S. defense policy since the Eisenhower administration 
had provided nuclear weapons authority to the Supreme NATO Commander 
under certain circumstances. The magazine blasted Goldwater for his 
"appalling ignorance" surrounding the ramifications of limited nuclear 
engagements and for downplaying the tremendously destructive impact of 
tactical nuclear weapons.^®® Despite his early attempts to control the war- 
peace issue, Goldwater had been quickly relegated to his familiar defensive 
posture on the most controversial issue of the campaign. This was a perilous
“^“Robert MacNeil, The People Machine: The Influence of Television on American Politics (New 
York, 1968), 205.
“ 'Ibid.
“ “Time. September 25, 1964, 15-19.
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position for an underdog candidate attempting to depose a powerful 
incumbent.
Campaigning on the west coast, Goldwater discussed domestic issues 
including a call for a twenty-five percent reduction in income taxes over a five- 
year period. He also railed against corruption in the nation's capital and against 
urban crime, but he kept foreign affairs in the forefront by declaring 
communism "the only substantial threat to the peace in the entire world" and 
by attacking the Kennedy administration's Cuba policy and linking it to Johnson 
and the war in Vietnam:
The Bay of Pigs was a shock and a shame...the [Cuban] missile crisis?...it proved that an 
Administration which long had planned on the basis that the Soviet never would move missiles 
into this hemisphere, was dead and dangerously wrong.
And it proved that despite weeks, and months, of warning about the missiles, an Administration 
totally political in its goals and instincts could and would wait until the perilous last moment to 
take action...at a time that would have maximum domestic political impact...[this] offers a 
future warning.
Americans must be prepared under such an Administration to be faced by crisis of some sort 
just before an election.
What w ill it be this time? Was the so-called crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin a hint of things to 
come? It should be a warning as well.
The peace of the world may be dying there, along with respect for America, which is an 
important part of our ability to keep the peace. Vietnam, however, to hear this Administration 
talk, is not an issue...this Administration won't admit that what it has on its hand is a war. 
Beyond that, its leader won't admit that Communism is the cause of that war...And you will 
reject the men who talk of peace but lack the strength to keep it.“ ®
Throughout much of September, Goldwater clung to Vietnam as a major
stump issue. He referred to it as "Lyndon Johnson's War" and characterized
“ “Goldwater Collection, Seattle, Washington, September 9, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume II. p.4-6.
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U.S. policy as weak, indecisive, and directionless.^’® He devoted two 
speeches almost exclusively to Vietnam. First in Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina, he claimed that the Johnson administration had been "struck deaf, 
dumb and blind by the mounting crisis in Vietnam...a war in which Americans 
are dying."“”  Goldwater demanded that the administration inform the public 
about why the U.S. military was in Southeast Asia and what its objectives 
were. Ten days later while campaigning in Louisville, Kentucky, the senator 
charged the Democratic Party with administering a foreign policy of unwitting 
appeasement that had resulted in three wars during the twentieth century. He 
began referring to Johnson as "the interim President" and claimed that the 
Vietnam War was a result of LBJ's weak and confusing leadership. The senator 
asked his audiences if there had ever been "a more mishandled conflict in 
American history than Lyndon Johnson's war in Asia."“ '
In response to his opponent's attack, the President unveiled his oft 
repeated peace theme by pledging to "go to any remote corner of the world to 
meet anyone, any time, to promote freedom and to promote peace."“ ^
Johnson did not talk much about Vietnam specifically, but when he did, he
“'“Goldwater Collection, Louisville, KY, September 25, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume II. p.2.
“"Goldwater Collection, Winston-Salem, N.C., September 15,1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume II. p.l.
“' “Goldwater Collection, Louisville, KY, September 25, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume II. p.l.
“' “Goldman, The Tragedy Of Lvndon lohnson. 224.
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promised to maintain the anti-communist position established by his 
predecessors without enlarging the war. The President warned that a military 
escalation would, "result in our committing a good many American boys to 
fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help 
protect their own land."“’ ‘’
During a fourteen-city tour of the South, Goldwater emphasized the 
domestic themes he had honed during his years as the Senate reelection 
chairman. He denounced corruption, violence, welfare, and the large federal 
government as products of political liberalism. In Florida, Oklahoma, Arkansas 
and Texas, his speeches became more reassuring and cautious and cited the 
importance of "national unity, the good life, peace and nuclear 
responsibility."®’  ^ His ongoing attempt to control the peace issue was clearly 
evident by his new critique of those who supported unlimited bombing of 
North Vietnam, and he promised not to frighten others into World War III. 
Journalists reported on Goldwater's "warm reception" in the South and 
frequently noted that he was routinely outdrawing the touring rock-and-roll 
band. The Beatles.
On September 18, Goldwater delivered a thirty minute national television 
speech addressing the importance of foreign policy in the election. He 
criticized Johnson for refusing to "speak plainly" on international affairs and
®’"lb id ., 234-35.
® "M cDowell, Campaign Fever. 175.
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declared that "weakness and indecision and appeasement" in presidential 
leadership risked full scale war. Goldwater declared " I want no part of war" 
and that " I do not intend to be a wartime President...I know its ravages, its 
horror, its destruction." As he would do often during the campaign, Goldwater 
compared his warmonger image to that of Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
who had the courage to challenge Britain's appeasement policy in 1938. He 
characterized communism as a school yard bully and demanded that the 
United States "Just stand up to him...just draw the line on his aggression...he'll 
back down." In response to charges that he had concentrated too much on 
foreign affairs during the campaign, Goldwater said, "I do not apologize for 
this-l insist upon it....If my opponents choose to misconstrue my words and my 
concern, for their own short-range political gain-then so be it...these things are 
far more important and of infinitely more value than the political fortune of any 
man seeking high office."®’® During the next week, Goldwater described 
Johnson's conduct of foreign relations as "dream world diplomacy" that 
encouraged communist aggression, and he renewed his demand for a 
presidential debate to highlight the candidates' differences in "the major issue 
in this campaign," foreign policy leadership.®’ '
September polling data confirmed Goldwater's belief that war and peace
“’“Goldwater Collection, Nationwide Television Address, September 18, 1964, Barrv Goldwater 
Campaign Speeches Volume II. p. 1-8.
“’ 'Goldwater Collection, Midland-Odessa, TX, September 22, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume II. p. 1-6.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
148
had become the number one campaign issue.®’® But despite the Arizonan's 
stalwart campaigning, Newsweek reported that Johnson still maintained a 30 
point lead in national polls and that he had made crucial gains in the South 
where the candidates were now running neck-in-neck.®’“
On September 28, Goldwater began a five day, thirty-three city, train tour 
through the upper Midwest, including stops in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In 
Athens, Ohio, he reiterated the need for military strength during a time of 
peace and claimed, "The surest way to get into a war in this world is to 
become a weak country....read your history...every time we go to war the 
Democrats are in power." Later while in Chillicothe, Ohio, Goldwater repeated 
his attack on Johnson for not debating the issues, saying the President was 
"never around the White House enough to find him. If Khrushchev calls on that 
hot line, some beagle is going to answer." In Cincinnati, with fiery rhetoric, he 
accused the administration of being "soft on Communism" with a foreign policy 
of "drift, deception and defeat." He complained that Johnson refused to debate 
foreign relations because it was politically risky. Regarding Vietnam, the 
Republican asked "Why does he put off facing the question of what to do 
about Vietnam? Does he hope that he can wait until after the election to 
confront the American public with the facts of total defeat or total war in
“ ' “Time. September 25, 1964, 15-19. 
“ ' “ Newsweek. September, 28, 1964, 25-26.
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Asia?"®“° As if reminded of his militant image while in Columbus, Goldwater 
warned of the dangers of a prolonged war in Vietnam and omitted his frequent 
call for "victory"; instead, he declared "I am a peacemonger" and called for an 
end to the conflict and stated that there was no easy solution.®®’
In Crown Point-Hammond, Indiana, Goldwater compared the current 
election to that of 1952, when "the basic issue was to pick a man who could 
best protect our peace and security." While he drew several valid comparisons 
to the previous election, including the dangers of nuclear proliferation and land 
wars in Asia, the Republican's militant rhetoric was hardly reassuring: "The real 
question in this campaign is not who is 'trigger happy' or who w ill 'press the 
button'...The United States w ill never start any war...In all likelihood, the 
President...and the Vice-President would not be around at all to push the 
button. It would be too late for button-pushing...if they ever should push the 
button, we would destroy them."®®®
During September and October, large and receptive crowds greeted 
President Johnson across New England and the Midwest and in large southern 
cities. The size and enthusiasm of his audiences seemed to reinforce polls 
forecasting a Democratic victory of massive proportions. Johnson, a master
“““Goldwater Collection, C incinnati, OH, September 29, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volum e II. p . l,  5.
““ ’M cD ow ell, Campaign Fever. 186, 189, 193, 195.
“““Goldwater Collection, Crown Point-Hammond, IN, October 1, 1964, Barrv Goldwater 
Campaign Speeches Volume III, p. 1-5.
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politician, left nothing to chance. He campaigned vigorously, frequently 
assailing his opponent. He referred to Goldwater as a "raving, ranting 
demagogue" and told his followers that "I admire a brave man, but some 
people have more guts than brains."®®®
Goldwater continued to crisscross the nation with stops in New Jersey, 
Texas, California and Utah. On October 6, he stressed that the relevance of the 
Cold War to the election saying, "This is a live issue, a real issue, and a deeply 
significant issue." He condemned Johnson for his "fraudulent attack" regarding 
NATO's control of nuclear weapons, and he told voters that they had a choice 
between "reacting to Communism...or seeking initiatives."®®“ Three days later, 
the Republican nominee received badly needed support from Richard Nixon, 
who during a television address defended Goldwater's position on NATO's 
control of nuclear weapons as a policy that was started by Eisenhower and 
continued by President Kennedy.®®® Nixon called upon Johnson to apologize 
to the senator, who Nixon described as "a reasonable...calm...patriotic 
man."®®® Goldwater also received the support of President Eisenhower, who 
delivered a foreign policy speech in Columbus, Ohio. Ike expressed his
“““Goldman, The Traaedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 229, 234.
““'‘Goldwater Collection, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume 111, p.6-7.
“““Ambrose, Nixon vol. II, 47-58.
“““Goldwater Collection, Richard M. N ixon National Television Address, October 9,1964, Barrv 
Goldwater Campaign Speeches Volume III, p.4.
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concern for the "harsh problems of national security" and asked voters to be 
"immune to the techniques of promise-peddling and panic-mongering." He 
described the Democratic Party's charges of Republican extremism as "Tommy 
Rot!"®®' In an attempt to revive a foreign policy strategy reminiscent of the 
1952 presidential election, Goldwater promised to send Eisenhower to 
Southeast Asia to help design a more effective policy. He stated that the U.S. 
would never engage in nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union; "neither of us 
would be that stupid."®®®
An October New York Times survey indicated that Johnson held 
commanding leads in seventeen states with another fourteen "leaning."®®® 
Goldwater supposedly held two states with eight leaning, thus leaving nine 
states uncommitted. But the Johnson campaign was gathering momentum in 
the Midwest and, "The oftener Senator Goldwater used his hard line about 
'victory' over Communism, the oftener the President spoke of prudence."®®® 
Three weeks before election day, the weary Goldwater staff received a 
momentary boost. Despite efforts by the White House to suppress the story, 
news spread that a long time Johnson adviser and confidant, Walter Jenkins, 
had been arrested in Washington for homosexual activity in a public facility.
““'G oldwater Collection, Eisenhower Speech in Columbus, O H , October 12, 1964, Barrv 
Goldwater Campaign Speeches Volume III, p.2, 6.
“““ New York Times. October 13, 1964.
“““ Ibid., October 6, 1964.
“““M cDowell, Campaign Fever. 207.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
Goldwater resisted the temptation to comment on the Jenkins affair specifically. 
He had however been speaking out against the country's decaying morality 
under Democratic leadership, and the Jenkins arrest allowed him to establish a 
link between mores and the White House.®®’ Unfortunately for the 
Republicans, turbulent world affairs quickly overshadowed the Jenkins case and 
renewed the specter of nuclear war.
On October 15, Nikita Khrushchev fell from power in the Soviet Union, 
and on the following day, the People's Republic of China exploded its first 
nuclear bomb. These events seized the country's attention and presented the 
candidates with the opportunity to demonstrate leadership during a time of 
international crisis. In a prime time television address, Johnson delivered "one 
of the most effective speeches politically of recent time."®®® The President, 
who had recently decided to emphasize foreign policy in the campaign, 
appeared firm against communism but resolute in keeping peace. He 
acknowledged concern for the "dangerous communists" who had threatened 
war in Cuba and Berlin, but he also referred to their "good sense and sober 
judgement" in support of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In response to China's 
nuclear achievement, Johnson reaffirmed the United State's "defense 
commitments in Asia," warned against nuclear proliferation, and called on 
China to sign the test ban treaty. America's objective, he said, is "peace for all
““ ’ Goldwater refused to broadcast an anti-Johnson film  depicting the decline in the nation's 
morality. See his book Goldwater. 260.
“““M cDowell, Campaign Fever. 209.
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men."®®® Johnson aide Eric F. Goldman commented that the President "strove 
to sound like, what he wanted so much to be, the wise, benevolent father to 
the nation."®®'’
In a televised speech entitled "Soviet Shift And U.S. Policy," Goldwater 
responded to the world events on October 21. He warned the nation that the 
international situation reflected ever increasing dangers; "the Communist threat 
to our security has become more grave." He foresaw Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement as a shift toward "a more unified Communist movement." 
Referencing Khrushchev's 1957 cry to "bury us" three times, he attacked the 
administration's belief in "good" and "bad" communists and called Johnson's 
foreign policy an "utter failure." The simplicity of the senator's outlook was 
reflected in his discussion of Sino-Soviet rapprochement: "They were quarreling 
over who would be the big boss of the entire Communist movement and what 
would be the best way to bury us...[Johnson's] mistake of trying to distinguish 
different kinds of Communism...ignored the fact that all Communist agree on 
the same goal...a Communist dominated world." Goldwater offered three 
foreign policy solutions: rebuild NATO; recognize communism as our enemy; 
and confront it with a "firm policy of resistance." His message had remained 
consistent, one of peace through demonstrative strength. He closed the speech
®“®Arthur Schlesineer. Ir.. Historv of American Presidential Elections. 1789-1968. iV:3691, 3693-
94.
““'’Goldman, The Tragedy O f Lvndon lohnson. 253.
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by promising "I w ill lead you back to sanity in our foreign relations."®®®
The Arizonan traveled extensively during the last weeks of the campaign. 
With a few exceptions the campaign ended much like it had started in New 
Hampshire, with speeches to crowds in small towns such as Lewistown, 
Huntingdon and Altoona, Pennsylvania. On some occasions his enthusiasm 
had diminished, leading reporter Charles McDowell to comment that he dealt 
w ith crowds "like a man keeping appointments with strangers." This was in 
stark contrast with Johnson, who "charged at them, embraced them, cajoled 
and lectured them."®®® In late October Johnson began to tell his crowds, "It 
just won't do for my opponent and Red China to have atomic bombs at the 
same time."®®' Despite a consensus among pollsters that Johnson would win 
in a landslide, Goldwater still predicted a Republican victory predicated upon 
the wishes of a majority of conservative voters who agreed with him on the 
essential issues.®®® During an October 31 stop in Las Vegas, reporters noted 
that local handicappers made Goldwater an eight to one underdog to win the 
election.
Barry Goldwater made his final appeal from San Francisco on November
®®®Goldwater Collection, National Television Address, October 21, 1964, Barrv Goldwater 
Campaign Speeches Volume III, p. 1-9.
“““M cDowell, Campaign Fever. 230.
““'Goldman, The Tragedv O f Lvndon lohnson. 252.
“““On October 27, 1964, actor Ronald W. Reagan gave a th irty m inute televised speech called 
"A Time For Choosing." Many observers, including Goldwater, considered the oratory the best 
speech given in the entire campaign. See Goldwater. 266.
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2. As a demonstration of his honesty and clarity of vision, he delivered the 
identical speech that he had given in Prescott two months earlier. He ended 
with a final promise, "no matter the cost...I w ill give you an honest 
Administration...I w ill tell you the truth."®®® Voters went to the polls the next 
day and provided Lyndon Johnson one of the most decisive presidential 
victories in American history. The New York Times headline read: "JOHNSON 
SWAMPS GOLDWATER."®'’® The Democrat received 43.1 m illion popular 
votes and 486 electoral votes compared to 27.1 m illion popular and 52 
electoral votes for Goldwater. The maverick senator had managed victories in 
only six states: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, 
and Arizona - - the latter by less than 5,000 votes.
Three major factors had contributed to Lyndon Johnson's sweeping 
victory. The first was related to the nation's political and economic 
circumstances. Campaigns for the presidency had begun in earnest w ithin just 
months of the tragic Kennedy assassination and voters responded favorably to 
Johnson's unifying leadership. The incumbent also benefitted from America's 
domestic prosperity as the economy expanded by nearly 13 percent from 1962 
to 1964. Johnson's election success was also dependent on his political 
expertise. Throughout 1964 he drew upon his vast congressional experience 
and championed popular legislation. Furthermore, as a veteran of countless
“““Goldwater Collection, San Francisco, CA, November 2, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume 111, p.8.
340 New York Times. September 4, 1964.
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reelection campaigns, he implemented a flawless election strategy designed to 
contrast his inclusive domestic agenda and cautious foreign policy to the 
"extremist" ideology of his opponent. The final major element of LBJ's election 
victory was related to Goldwater inability to reverse or at least control his 
image as a warmonger. The nation's prosperity had overshadowed the vitality 
of the senator's crusade against big government, and while his concern for 
corruption in Washington and declining morality did resonate with many 
voters, the critical issue of leadership in defense and foreign relations doomed 
his bid for the White House.
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EPILOGUE
Domestic well-being has been a preeminent concern of most American 
voters, but World War II and the ensuing war against communism abroad 
increased the general importance of foreign policy considerations in American 
presidential elections. By the mid-1960s, nearly two decades after the origin of 
the Cold War, anti-communist ideology continued to dominate foreign affairs 
issues in presidential politics. Excluding third party candidate Henry Wallace, 
every major presidential nominee advocated the militant containment of 
international communism. In 1948 and 1956, when national elections 
coincided with international crises, voters rallied behind their incumbent 
presidents. Under these circumstances, the opposing major party candidates 
were reluctant to seriously challenge the incumbent on foreign relations 
because it was politically infeasible, and because they shared the presidents' 
anti-communist perspective. There were two post-World War II elections that 
did not involve incumbent candidates. First in 1952, when the final decisive 
issue of the campaign became the Korean War, a majority of voters backed a 
proven foreign affairs leader. General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Then in 1960, 
when neither candidate displayed a clear leadership advantage in foreign 
relations, voters were deeply divided, contributing to an extremely close
157
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election.
Although these four postwar elections possessed some unique foreign 
policy issues, each major party candidate actively supported the crux of the 
containment strategy. The role of foreign affairs leadership as a decisive issue in 
presidential elections had two primary considerations for voters. The candidates 
needed to offer an appropriate balance between a willingness to use military 
force against the spread of communism and the prudent judgement necessary 
to decide when that force was justified. From 1948 to 1964, voters never 
doubted the various candidates' willingness to wage the Cold War; therefore, 
the issue of prudent judgement became the more important factor. This foreign 
policy benchmark was most evident in the 1964 presidential election.
In January 1964, Republican Barry Goldwater officially announced his 
candidacy for president because no other candidate advocated more vigorous 
action against communism abroad and a smaller federal government at home. 
His staunch political convictions were derived from his experience as a 
successful businessman, military officer, and civic leader. Arizona voters had 
rewarded Goldwater's outspoken support of conservative principles by electing 
him their U.S. senator in 1952 and 1958. While in Congress, his unyielding 
faith in conservatism set him apart from his peers, and by his own admission, 
he labored in the minority wing of the minority party. Although generally 
supportive of GOP initiatives, Goldwater did not hesitate to condemn fellow 
Republicans for supporting liberal causes. His activities on several prominent
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Senate committees gained him national recognition as a leader of the 
burgeoning conservative movement, and by 1963, he had become a legitimate 
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. The Arizonan captured 
the nomination in Kennedy-like manner by cultivating party delegates long 
before the national convention. But Goldwater's path to the nomination proved 
more difficult as liberal and moderate Republican's stubbornly resisted his 
unswerving positions on domestic and foreign affairs. No previous candidate's 
bid for the White House fared so badly at the hands of his own party.
Notwithstanding the GOP infighting, Lyndon Johnson would have 
defeated any opposing nominee in the 1964 election as he benefitted from the 
immense advantages of an incumbent seeking reelection. Like Eisenhower eight 
years earlier, LBJ led the nation during a time of general economic prosperity 
and he had demonstrated an acceptable balance of force and restraint in the 
Cold War. A brilliant politician and campaigner, the Texan also benefitted from 
the unique atmosphere of national sympathy and unity that followed the 
assassination of a widely popular president. A review of polling data 
throughout 1964 indicates that Johnson's ability to win the presidency in his 
own right was never in serious Jeopardy.®'”  Even Goldwater later admitted 
that he would have lost the election "even if Abraham Lincoln had come back 
and campaigned with us."®"® Nonetheless, a Democratic landslide was not
®'” Bruce E. Altschuler, LBI and the Polls (Gainesville, FL: 1990), 1-16.
®'’“ Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York, 1988), 144.
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inevitable. Johnson's spectacular margin of victory was in large part derived 
from the public's decisive perception of Goldwater as an impulsive radical who 
wanted to end federal programs such as social security and who would 
senselessly risk nuclear confrontation in the Cold War.
New York governor Nelson Rockefeller had initiated the assault on 
Goldwater during the 1964 Republican primary elections. His strategy was to 
dramatize the Arizonan's image as a fringe candidate, who only possessed the 
marginal support of right wing radicals. He characterized the senator as a 
militant cowboy from a sparsely populated Western state whose domestic 
policies were outdated and whose foreign policies were dangerous. During the 
primaries. Rockefeller and other Republicans convinced many voters that a 
Goldwater presidency would lead to full scale war in Vietnam and possibly 
nuclear confrontation with the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union.
Barry Goldwater's image as a fervent anti-communist was not a caricature 
created solely by political opponents. As a U.S. senator, Goldwater had 
developed, documented and campaigned for a brinkmanship-like diplomacy 
that became synonymous with his presidential candidacy. When he emerged as 
a legitimate candidate, he could not retreat from his zealous militancy, nor did 
he wish to. The product of an authentic grass roots movement, Goldwater 
organized and ran for the presidency strictly on his own terms with an 
uncompromising dedication to his conservative ideology. Johnson aide George 
Reedy had characterized the Republican's 1964 campaign as a "sacred
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mission."®"®
During the preceding presidential election, Nixon's and Kennedy's foreign 
policy platforms had been almost indistinguishable. Each called for victory in 
the Cold War and accused the other of being impulsive and trigger-happy, but 
neither convinced the public that his opponent would implement a particularly 
dangerous or risky foreign policy. The 1960 election proved to be one of the 
closest contests in the history of presidential politics. By contrast, four years 
later only one candidate demanded victory over communism, and he alone 
was accused of being impulsive and trigger-happy. The 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis had demonstrated the frightening consequences of atomic diplomacy, and 
American voters came to fear Goldwater's continued advocacy of nuclear 
brinkmanship.
As early as October 1963, even before Kennedy's assassination, political 
pundits had forecast that war and peace would be the key issue during the 
1964 presidential election and after his nomination in San Francisco,
Goldwater admitted to GOP leaders that his negative image regarding foreign 
affairs had become his "number one problem."®"" Consequently, the senator's 
campaign speeches were designed to clarify his peace through strength 
position. By September, polling data confirmed that leadership in foreign affairs
®"®lbid., 160.
“""Goldwater Speech, Hershey, Pennsylvania, August 12, 1964, Barrv Goldwater Campaign 
Speeches Volume I. p.2, Barry M. Goldwater Collection, Arizona Historical Foundation, Tempe, 
Arizona.
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had become the most important issue to voters. But, the issue of foreign policy 
was like quicksand to Goldwater, and the more he worked to reverse his 
image, the worse it seemed to become. When asked three weeks before the 
election what had been the most damaging issue during the campaign, he cited 
"the repetition of the outright lie...'the trigger-happy'...'nuclear thing'." The 
1964 election ended in one of the most decisive defeats ever. Ironically, 
Johnson, as the peace candidate, was unbeatable in 1964, but his militant 
policy in Vietnam ruined his chances for reelection four years later.
In the context of U.S. presidential politics, Barry Goldwater w ill be 
remembered first for the striking margin of his defeat in the 1964 election. 
However, the potentially greater significance of his candidacy may lie in the 
many influential precedents set by his campaign. Goldwater was the first 
modern conservative to w in a major party nomination, and his campaign 
broadened national support for conservative policies and weakened Democratic 
dominance in the Deep South. The Arizonan's grass roots popularity led to a 
breadth of campaign contributors that surpassed any other previous presidential 
candidate. His campaign also established new and lasting issues of morality, 
urban crime and nuclear weapons policy. And while many observers 
interpreted Goldwater's loss as a devastating defeat for Republicans, during the 
course of future elections the party reaped many benefits from the popular 
conservative movement in 1964. The Republicans went on to win the 
presidency in 1968 and 1972, and only four elections after Goldwater's run.
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with a more polished and timely nominee, GOP conservatives captured the 
White House on an all too familiar platform calling for an end to big 
government and for the defeat of international communism.
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